[lit-ideas] Re: Logical Corpuscularism

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 07:41:43 -0400

Thanks for the exegeses, and I shall have a read!

In a message dated 9/10/2015 6:39:38 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I also detect in JLS' comments a confusion between "determinism" (as
Popper explains it, a la Laplace) and "causalism"

For a moment I thought McEvoy would say that Speranza confuses between
determinism and determined, and I was reminded of Grice, "I might be confused,
but I'm not mistaken!" (Wilson, "Grice: The Ultimate Counterexample",
Nous).

When I say that I might merge 'determinism' with 'determined' (as in
"Popper is determined to go back to Austria.") I was thinking of the "and we
do
not wish..." segment in the quotation from Doyle. The full quotations below.

There is more in McEvoy's post, like indeed, the idea that causation need
not be linked with determinism. I am reminded of an operator that logicians
sometimes use, a bended arrow (as in "Tweetie is a bird; therefore, Tweetie
flies -- or "If Tweetie is a bird, Tweetie flies". Ornithologists use a
bended arrow there for the 'if', for it has to allow "unless Tweetie is an
ostrich or an emu").

The segment by Popper then is:

"we do not wish to say that such things as free decisions are just
probabilistic affairs."

There may be a modality confusion here analysed by Noel Burton-Roberts. In
the modal square of propositions, if we allow p=1 STILL being a
"probablistic affair", what Popper seems to be IMPLICATING perhaps is that
'we'
(majestic 'we') do not wish to say (because it would be a "harsh" thing to say
--
to use Locke, Hume, and Grice) "such things" as

i. A free decision is merely a probabilistic affair.

This may have led me to believe that Popper was endorsing something like
Hart/Hampshire's idea that there's CERTAINTY involved in one's so-called
'free' decisions (as in Armstrong's decision to fly to the moon) and that a
free decision is better 'described' (since Popper is so interested in what "we
do not wish to say" and what we do wish to say, I thought his focus thus
was terminological) as having a probability p = 1, in the
quantum-theoretical (and only?) sense?

Cheers,

Speranza

Popper:

"First of all, I do of course agree that quantum theoretical indeterminacy

in a sense cannot help, because this leads merely to probabilistic laws,
and we do not wish to say that such things as free decisions are just
probabilistic affairs."
"The trouble with quantum mechanical indeterminacy is twofold. First, it
is probabilistic, and this doesn't help us much with the free-will
problem,
which is not just a chance affair. Second, it only gives us indeterminism,
not openness to World 2 [Popper's Mind World]. However, in a roundabout
way
I do think that one may make use of quantum theoretical indeterminacy
without committing oneself to the thesis that free-will decisions are
probabilistic affairs."
"The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered repertoire
may be an act of choice, even an act of free will. I am an indeterminist;
and in discussing indeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that
quantum indeterminacy does not seem to help us [...]."
"For the amplification of something like, say, radioactive disintegration
processes would not lead to human action or even animal action, but only
to
random movements."
"I have changed my mind on this issue (See p. 540 of J. C. Eccles and K. R.

Popper, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin, Heidelberg, London, New York:
Springer-Verlag, 1977).
"A choice process may be a selection process, and the selection may be from

some repertoire of random events, without being random in its turn. This
seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of our most vexing
problems, and one by downward causation."
"A choice process may be a selection process, and the selection may be from

some repertoire of random events, without being random in its turn. This
seems to me to offer a promising solution to one of our most vexing
problems, and one by downward causation."
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