[lit-ideas] Re: Logical Corpuscularism

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 6 Sep 2015 21:33:57 -0400

In a message dated 9/6/2015 12:47:36 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
This inevitably turns humans into automat[a] fpr processing given
'sense-data' - and it is by-the-by whether those sense-data are 'given' by way
of a
deterministic or an indeterministic process.

In my previous note I remarked that 'fee' can apply to many things,
including physical ('free fall' was Grice's favourite). McEvoy is speaking of
'human freedom', not necessarily free will.

This note by Bollinger at

http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/quantum-physics-free-will/

may clarify. We may have Boyle's Corpuscularianism with Indeterminism --
which may not need we have solved the problems of downward causation that so
preoccupied Popper.

Bollinger writes:

"If a billiard ball"

or a corpuscule, for for Boyle and Locke these were round, if smaller,

"bounces off enough walls, the small irregularities of those walls will
ensure that any initial prediction of its path will fail, no matter how
carefully that initial model is done. Considering that every molecule [or
corpuscule] in a gas or liquid is a lot like a billiard ball -- yes, even if it

started out quantum entangled -- it's hard not to come to the conclusion that
there is an awful lot of intractable unpredictability in the universe at
large. So, if the universe is experimentally unpredictable in a way that
cannot be circumvented -- anyone, am I missing something there? -- then how
can theories that imply predestination ever make meaningful experimental
predictions? In the absence of such predictions, interpretations of theories
that lead to the block (that is, predestined) universes become abstract
philosophy, not science."

which is why I love Boyle the philosopher and not necessarily Boyle the
scientist and disagree with Popper about this distinction between a claim
being useful as a metaphysical claim but not as a research programme or vice
versa.

Cheers,

Speranza


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