The appeal to common usage really seems to be some linguistic version of
argumentum ad populum (common usage = common opinion) and as such it is
probably irrelevant philosophically even when the premises are true. Still,
one cannot always permit the 'ordinary language philosophers' to make the
common usage mean whatever they want it to mean. When Tom says that he saw
a table, he does not thereby mean to subscribe to 'the causality theory of
perception.'
O.K.
On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 2:35 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I am unable to understand this fetish of “usage”. If there were any
basis to it, when I worry about Omar, for goodness’ sake
I have three worries, Omar, sake and goodness…
And you expect anyone to take this excrement seriously/?
*From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Omar Kusturica
*Sent:* 04 April 2015 13:11
*To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Linguistic Botany
JL blames Russell for not providing suitable examples of "silly things
silly people say" and goes on to provide some himself, including the
so-called "paradigm-case argument." This purports to refute skepticism
by pointing out examples of common usage such as "I see a table." Briefly,
I don't think that the skeptic is necessarily prohibited from saying that
he sees a table. He might mean by saying this that he has an experience of
perceiving a table-like object, or that he visualizes a table-like image on
the retina, or that he is dreaming a dream table in this particular dream
W, or that the Demon presented him on this occasion with an apparition of a
table, or whatever interpretation is consistent with his version of
skepticism. On some versions of skepticism it might even be possible to
assign truth values to such statements, e.g. "I saw a table" might be false
within some skeptical paradigm if the perception of a table-like image did
not really occur and true if it did.
What we have here is another example of 'ordinary language' philosophers
attempting to enlist common usage in their service, only this time not to
fight a war but to support some pet philosophical theories of theirs such
as 'the causal theory of perception.' The common usage of "I saw a table"
is not inconsistent with the casual theory of perception but neither does
it entail such a theory. It is also not inconsistent with skepticism,
although it does not entail it. It is not meant to answer ontological
questions, and it doesn't.
O.K.
On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 11:43 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
My last post today!
O. K. was remarking about Urmson's "Parentheticals". I think Urmson's point
is that "I believe", which he contrasts with "I know" is best NOT seen as
a typical Russellian 'propositional attitude', but rather as forming a
scale (a term Urmson uses):
<know, believe>
so that if you consider a proposition, "It might well be snowing in
Northern Canada", the addition of a phrase containing either 'believe' or
'know'
adds to the authority the speaker assumes in uttering the original
sentence:
'believe' used for low probability, 'know' for almost certainty: "It might
well be snowing in Northern Canada, I would believe". "It might well, for
all I know, be snowing in Northern Canada". These are parenthetical uses
of
'believe' and 'know', which require a different analysis from a
common-or-garden Russellian propositional attitude.
In a message dated 4/2/2015 11:31:49 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
"Russell did not set out to advocate language change, but to make an
epistemological point. That point is that common usage cannot be trusted
as an
arbiter of truth and knowledge. We don't need to correct the common usage
that 'the Sun raises in the East' ... At fault are the philosophers who
claim
that, because we usually say such or such, this must of necessity be the
case.
When Grice notes that
"No general characterisation of the Method of "Linguistic Botanizing"
carries with it any claim about the truth-value of any of the specimens
which
might be subjected to Linguistic Botanizing".
he is having in mind the PCA, that Russell does not care to quote -- the
paradigm case argument.
This type of argument was created by a student of Grice at St. John's, A.
G. N. Flew, and applied to issues of free will.
It also attracted the attention of K. S. Donnellan.
Donnellan interprets the "paradigm-case argument" is a form of argument
against philosophical scepticism found in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Donnellan notes that this argument counters doubt about whether any of some
class of things exists by attempting to point out paradigm cases, clear
and indisputable instances.
The cases are usually collected after some exercise in linguistic botany.
A distinguishing feature of the argument is the contention that certain
facts about ordinary language entail the existence of paradigm cases.
The paradigm-case argument has been used against a wide range of sceptical
positions.
A typical example is doubt about our ability to perceive directly material
objects.
As in Grice's example:
"Hamlet (and some soldiers) saw the ghost of Hamlet's father."
Donnellan notes:
"Such doubt can be raised by reflection upon the physiological and physical
facts about perception. For example, since seeing involves the
transmission of light waves to our eyes and these waves are what
immediately affects
our eyes, it may appear that we are mistaken in thinking that we see
objects. If anything, we should say that we see light waves. The fact
that it
takes a certain amount of time for light to travel from an object to our
eyes
lends support to this. How can we see something unless we see it as it is
at
the present moment? While considerations such as these show how scepticism
can arise, one striking fact about the paradigm-case argument is that if
it is valid, the sceptic can be refuted directly without the necessity of
examining in detail the reasons behind his position. The first step in the
argument is to make the scepticism bear on particular cases. If we cannot
perceive material objects, then, presumably, we cannot see the table we
are
working on or the pen with which we write."
"Next, a situation is sketched in which, ordinarily, no one would hesitate
to affirm just the opposite. If the light is excellent, our eyes open, our
sight unimpaired, the table directly before us, and so on, then we should
ordinarily have no qualms about stating that we see a table. The argument
would be weak if it relied merely on the fact that people would ordinarily
have no doubts in such situations, for it does not follow from this that
they
state the truth."
For Donnellan, the argument claims something more for the kind of
situations it describes: "It holds that they are indisputably examples of
seeing a
table because of their relationship to the meaning of the expression
"seeing
a table." Typically, this relationship is brought out by saying that such
a situation is just what we call "seeing a table" or that it is just the
sort of circumstances in which one might teach someone the meaning of the
expression "seeing a table." Generalizing and taking the strongest
interpretation of the force of these remarks, one might ask: "If this is
just what we
call X, then in saying that it is X, how can we fail to state the truth?
If
this is a situation in which we might teach the meaning of X, then how can
it fail to be a case of X ?" In denying that anyone ever sees a table, the
skeptic seems to be placed in the position of refusing to apply the
expression "seeing a table" to the very situation to which that expression
refers."
Donnellan concludes the passage on 'see': "If the skeptic concedes that the
situation presented is an instance of that which he doubted to exist, then
he admits defeat. But if, despite what has been said, he will not concede
this, the final stage of the argument poses a dilemma. When the skeptic
wonders whether we ever really see such things as tables, we naturally
understand the words he uses in their usual sense. By "usual sense" is
meant no
more than what we should have understood by his words see and table if,
instead, he were describing some scene he had witnessed. But how can his
words
be construed in this way when he refuses to use them of a typical
situation
in which their usual meaning might be taught and which is just what we
ordinarily call "seeing a table"? On the other hand, if the skeptic
claims some
different or novel meaning for his words, the original shock of his
skeptical conclusion is blunted. For in some special sense of the words,
it may
be true that we never see tables. In fact, what often happens is that the
skeptical position maintains its plausibility only through an unnoticed
fluctuation between the usual sense of the key expressions and some
special
sense. The paradigm-case argument may serve to bring out into the open
the fact
that an unusual meaning must be looked for."
Russell may be into a critique of the paradigm-case argument, but he
wouldn't say it. And in any case, Donnellan's interpertation of it is just
one
among many. It's best to regard the philosopher as just providing with
paradigm-case arguments via linguistic botany and yet not committing to the
truth-value of such botany.
Cheers,
Speranza
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