[lit-ideas] Re: Linguistic Botany

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2015 17:53:50 +0200

I think that I can see how the 'ordinary language philosophy' might have
arisen during the Second World War and the early stages of the Cold War,
when the 'ordinary man' was needed to defend the country, including the
philosopher's own life and livelihood. So one was well advised
'pragmatically' to pay a lot of attention and respect to the ordinary man's
linguistic usage, his 'common sense' etc. But by the time Russell wrote his
essay in the late 1950s, the philosopher's 'ordinary man' was probably
beginning to sound more like the academic himself, using scholarly grammar
and allowing some more intellectual expressions like cause, intention etc.
to 'slip' off his tongue. And of course that haughty indifference to
'empirical observation' is nothing at all like the common person, who tends
to be both interested in and rely a lot on empirical observation. The
'ordinary man' really became the academic in disguise, as Russell correctly
diagnosed.

O.K.

On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 2:10 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Common usage is guide to nothing, if it were we would read each other
the thesaurus or some such idiocy



*From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Omar Kusturica
*Sent:* 03 April 2015 14:07
*To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Linguistic Botany



Another thought is Lakoff's argument that common usage is actually riddled
with metaphors, which are potent precisely because they largely operate at
the subconscious level. "The sun raises in the East" is probably fairly
harmless today - although it wasn't harmless at all in the 16th century,
when people were prosecuted for questioning some version of this claim -
since the astronomers have by now established that it isn't actually true.
But there are others such as the time-money metaphor which we hardly even
consciously recognize as a metaphor, with the consequence that we actually
think, and often act, as if time were actually money. Lakoff gives the
examples of 'wasting time,' 'spending time with / on someone,' 'investing
time,' 'living on a borrowed time' and so forth.



All this should, I think, cast serious suspicions on the reliability of
common usage as an epistemological and moral guide.



O.K.



On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 12:36 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

Well, I don't believe that it makes any important difference, even
pragmatically, where "I believe" is placed in the sentence. In writing, we
try to vary the sentence patterns somewhat to avoid stylistic monotony so
that may be the reason for such shufflings of word order. In any case, I
don't think that the placement of "I believe" in the sentence makes any
practical difference to the degree of commitment. If someone challenges my
views, he is hardly likely to pay attention to whether I placed "I believe"
in the beginning of the sentence, or in the end, or in the middle.



What may be slightly odd here is that "I believe" is used in connection to
"it is raining" at all. After all, we don't usually make conjectures about
whether it is presently raining but go to the window and look. But it may
be that in some context one would say "I believe." I cannot see how the
whole issue is supposed to have some great significance.



O.K.



On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 11:29 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Linguistic Botany is a specific philosophical technique. It starts by
collecting specimens of expressions in a given field, say: metaphysics, or
epistemology. English philosophers start with English expressions, or
Greek and
Latin, and proceed.

In a message dated 4/2/2015 11:31:49 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
He did not set out to advocate language change, but to make an
epistemological point. That point is that common usage cannot be trusted
as an arbiter
of truth and knowledge. In fact, it is arguable that common usage is not
to be blamed; it was created or evolved for the purpose of facilitating
communication, not of supplying accurate scientific or metaphysical
descriptions. ... At fault are the philosophers who claim that, because
we usually say
such or such, this must of necessity be the case.

not of supplying accurate metaphysical descriptions.

I would say 'ontological' descriptions. What Russell calls 'stone-age
metaphysics' (as incorporated in this ordinary language, or 'common use'
that he
sees as given a cult by philosophers) is best defined as a stone-age
physics, if you like. It may well be the case that the ordinary-language
philosopher who proceeds via linguistic botanizing is a

PRAGMATIST

at heart. What is true is not at stake, but what is useful. And talk of
'things', for example, rather than subatomic particles, is useful and thus
preferable, when engaged in the 'ontological description' that the language
you use commits you with, is a respectable philosophical enterprise.

In another passage Russell calls about the 'silly things silly people say'.
But surely, 'silly' as applied to 'people', is hyperbolic. I hope Russell
felt SILLY at some point in his life. It would be boring otherwise. Plus,
'silly' literally means 'blessed'. When one considers Urmson's
Parentheticals, also, and his analysis of "I believe" in utterances
(prefacing position,
"I believe it's raining", middle position, "It is, I believe, raining", or
final "It's raining, I believe") he is making a philosophical point, and
there is nothing silly about any of these three things that people say.
What
a clown say, in a comedy skit, is a silly thing, but hardly the rich
collectabillia which is the product of the philosopher after he has
engaged in
some linguistic botanising.


Cheers,

Speranza





------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html





Other related posts: