You guys seem to me (I've been rather pre-occupied w/ leaking/pouring tub faucets, installing ceiling fans, painting kitchen drawers, and haven't read *closely* this thread) to be dancing around the more or less obvious "can/does thought exist pre-language". I sort of thought the jury was in on this one. ?? Julie Krueger obviously ignorant in Missouri ========Original Message======== Subj: [lit-ideas] Re: Language, Justice and Social Practices (long) Date: 9/27/05 10:37:48 P.M. Central Daylight Time From: _phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxxx (mailto:phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx) To: _lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx) Sent on: Robert Paul wrote: "... waiting for Phil to respond to the examples of Treppenwitz and l'esprit d'escalier, both of which pick out a concept which English monoglots certainly have, even though they lack a name for it. (A description is not a name in my book.)" How does one know that English monoglots have these concepts? Certainly many English monoglots have experienced Treppenwitz but why take that to be evidence of a concept yet to be named? Does one have to have a concept of pain to experience pain? Here again the ability to point to something does not constitute an identification of a concept. As Robert himself notes, a description is not a name and I would add neither is it a concept. Isn't it more likely that upon reflection the monoglot would search around for some way of conceptualizing the experience and perhaps adopt the German name? And wouldn't it be as likely that limited to only English, the experience would remain unconceptualized? I don't see how the lack of a conceptualization of an experience in one language but not another is evidence that there is a common concept known to all people. Robert continues: "... I believe, although I'm not sure, that Phil is willing to accept that if there is some way of consistently picking out certain things, and identifying them as the same as or different from other things, a _name_, such as 'pawn' may not be required; that is, there may be ways of consistently picking out and classifying a thing other than by naming it. And my argument would be, that if this is so, the insistence on _a_ name is pointless." I don't understand what 'consistently picking out certain things' means except the use of a name. It need not be the word 'pawn'. It could just as easily be some variation of 'the-piece-that-starts-at-this-position'. What else is a name but that which 'consistently picks out certain things'? Far from being pointless, the ability to 'consistently pick out a certain thing' is constitutive to holding a concept. One could not hold a concept without a criterion of identity that would fix the concept as being about something. There can be no meaning to the concept of a pawn without there being certain things consistently picked out by the concept. In this way, the name, or the ability to consistently pick out certain things, is necessary to there being a concept. Sincerely, Phil Enns Toronto, ON ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html