[lit-ideas] Kant: Autonomy and Heteronomy of the Will
- From: Erin Holder <erin.holder@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 4 Oct 2005 22:26:14 -0400
Hi,
For anyone who is somewhat well versed in Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic
of Morals. I'm being plagued by this one aspect of the text that I can't get
around and I'm looking for some input.
440-441 (German pagination) Kant discusses the difference between autonomy and
heteronomy of the will. Autonomy, he writes, is the "property the will has of
being a law to itself". In other words, an autonomous will is one that freely
determines itself. In contrast, "if the will seeks the law that is to
determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of maxims for its own making of
universal law - if therefore in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the
character of any of its objects - the result is always heteronomy". In other
words, a heteronomous will is one that is determined by some object (end)
other than itself. So on the one hand we have an autonomous will, which is a
will that determines itself, and on the other hand we have a heteronomous
will, a will that is determined by objects (ends). In the case of a
heteronomous will, Kant writes, the will "does not give itself the law (as is
the case with the autonomous will - my insert), but the object does so in
virtue of its relation to the will".
Now here is what I don't understand in this formulation: Under this
formulation it appears as if the autonomous will, the will that "gives itself
the law" is the "moral will". For, of course, according to Kant the first
rule of morality is that an action must be a categorical, not a hypothetical
imperative, therefore the action must be done as an end in itself and not as a
means to an end, thus it must give the law to itself and cannot be determined
by objects (ends).
As the moral will is not determined by any object (end) towards which it acts,
the moral will is therefore considered to be the "free" will. As Kant writes
at 447, "Thus a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same".
Again, at 453, he writes "We now see that when we think of ourselves as free,
we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the
autonomy of the will together with its consequence - morality".
Kant then writes at 455 that:
"This better person he believes himself to be when he transfers himself to the
standpoint of a member of the intelligible world. He is involuntarily
contrained to do so by the Idea of freedom - that is, of not being dependent
on determination but causes in the sensible world; and from this standpoint he
is conscious of posessing a good will which, on his own admission constitutes
the law for the bad will belonging to him as a member of the sensible world".
So, my question is this: If a free will is one that gives itself the law as
opposed to being determined by an object (end) in virtue of its relation to
the will, and the free will is therefore a necessarily moral will", wouldn't
it be the case that a will that is determined by an object (end) and is
therefore not a moral will is also NOT FREE? And if a will that is not moral
is also not free, then how can any one be expected to take responsibility for
acts that are not moral?
Stupid question maybe, but clearly I'm misunderstanding something here.
Erin
Toronto
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