[lit-ideas] Re: It means nothing, absolutely nothing...

From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat, 25 Oct 2008 14:37:29 -0230
I offer the following hypotheses and interpretations in reply to Donal's
penetrating commentary and interrogations. Warning: Some of my replies are
fallible and should be treated with caution. Read only in a well ventilated
area and keep away from children. 


Quoting Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

> --- On Tue, 21/10/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
>  
> > Donal's claims I find to betray a confusion between
> > Kant's editorializations on
> > his moral theory and that moral theory itself. Kant was not
> > the most astute
> > interpreter of his own moral theory. Vide *The metaphysics
> > of virtue* in
> > relation to the *Groundwerk* ans the second *Critique*. 

Donal replies:

> This is as may be - I certainly don't feel competent to dispute it. However,
> the principle of 'universalisability' would not rule out killing killers -
> not if Kant thought that if he killed someone it would be right that he
> should pay with his life. 

Walter replies:

I know of no maxim presented by Kant bearing the term 'right" (or 'wrong') in
it. Perhaps this is because K recognizes that this would be begging the
question and misapplying the CI. The CI is a test of moral rightness. Hence, an
agent's determination of the rightness of her maxim must follow upon the test
and not pre-judge rightness. The universalized maxim here is: "All who kill
will themselves be killed." Clearly, it would be a case of illegitimate
self-exemption for an agent to will that maxim since she cannot rationally will
that she be excluded from the application of the universalized maxim. And, as a
rational being, she must will the development of her talents and capacities for
beneficence towards others - willing which isn't much good if you're pushing
daisies. As well, the maxim seems to be self-contradictory since if everybody
killed everybody else, nobody would be around to do the killing. The maxim
defeats itself as the embedded intention is rendered impossible upon
universalization.

Donal continues:

> The best argument against the death penalty is,
> forgiveness and not wanting ourselves to be executed aside, surely the
> possibility of mistake - plus the empirical weakness of the argument that the
> death penalty actually works as a deterrent.

Walter replies:

These are consequentialist considerations, not moral ones in K's sense of
willing from the form of law. The moral question of cap[ital punishment is not
the prudential question of what consequences are there that would lead us to
refrain from this form of punishment.

Walter wrote:

> > Regarding the matter of self-contradiction raised by Donal:
> > morally
> > impermissible maxims exhibit not a logical contradiction
> > but rather a practical
> > contradiction. 

Donal replies:
 
> This reply is fair enough. It reminds me of a reply Popper sent me to a
> school-boy letter of mine where I criticised the various 'paradoxes' [of
> sovereignty, democracy etc.] he offers in his OSE: saying these were not
> truly logical paradoxes. His reply, acknowledging that of course it is
> possible for a democracy to commit suicide (by voting for a dictator - there
> are still some suicidal tendencies in Germany he added), is that his
> paradoxes are essentially a practical affair. 

Walter replies:
Yes, some contradictions are practical. They are similar to what Habermas calls
a "performative contradiction." In both cases, the contradiction is not between
two propositions. Regarding democracy: I would say that, yes, it is possible
for
a democracy to commit suicide, but it couldn't do so as a democracy. For a
democracy to vote for a dictator is for that state to cease to be democratic.

Donal's reply continues:

> But I feel Popper's 'sovereignty paradoxes', though a practical matter, are
> on stronger ground than Kant's or other's idea of moral principles having to
> be universalisable - even though I admit there is an important truth
> contained within this idea: see below.

Walter replies:

I am not familiar with those paradoxes, so I cannot comment. (I don't think
that
"truth" is an issue within Kant's moral theory. Morality is a matter of
imperatives, not truths in a propositional sense.


Walter wrote:

> >Das heisst: the maxim is not universalizable
> > in that if
> > everybody
> > did it then nobody could do it, and an agent who willed
> > such a maxim would be
> > engaged in illegitimate self-exemption (and could not,
> > consequently, legislate
> > the maxim as a universal law.) 

Donal replies:

> This is not entirely clear as an argument.The main practical weakness lies, I
> think, in overlooking the importance and usefulness of 'discretionary
> justice' - in the law, from sentencing to the admissbility of evidence,
> decisions are not derived from "maxim as a universal law" but are effectively
> made as a form of discretionary justice within a framework that imposes some
> limits on the range of the decision. It is questionable whether doing away
> with this flexibility, and its concommitant 'inconsistency', would increase
> rather than decrease 'justice'.

Walter replies:

I think there are 2 separate questions here. First, how is an agent who has
committed moral wrong to be treated by society, the law, etc.? Second, was the
agent's willing morally wrong? The former raises prudential matters of the kind
Donal identifies. Morality is not a prudential matter since it is individuated
by form, not substantive conseuqences, i.e., states of affairs in the world.
Habermas instructively differentiates between questions of justification and
questions of application having to do with the appropriateness of acting on a
justified norm or principle given specific circumstances. 

Walter wrote:

> > Donal is correct, however, in his other claim that acting
> > differently in
> > relevantly similar situations does not constitute a logical
> > mistake. It is,
> > however, a moral mistake. If anyone can provide
> > counter-examples to this claim,
> > I'm sure both of us would be eager to hear them. 

Donal replies:

> When talking of consistency here, we rely on a notion of "relevantly similar
> situations" - but there are no set criteria for this. What might appear to be
> "relevantly similar situations" to one may appear quite distinguishable to
> another. So even if a principle of 'universalisability' is accepted, its
> practical application is bound to be highly problematic. 

Walter replies:

I wouldn't want to mystify "relevantly similar circumstances." The route taken
by the traditional epistemological sceptic is not one we need to follow. We
argue in everyday language for the existence of such circumstances across a
wide panalopy of contexts - legal, educational and linguistic. We can all
provide our own examples, I'm sure. 

Donal continues:

> It is perhaps for
> this reason that Popper uses that the formulation - an open-ended one - that
> the correct moral responses depends on the _specific moral problem_. It might
> be added that even on such a formulation we immediately run into the
> (practical) problem of how _specific_ we make our characterisation of moral
> problems - and the answer to this may well vary with the moral problem under
> consideration [the specifics of why someone does not have a valid driving
> licence may be of comparatively little interest compared with the specifics
> of why someone committed a murder].

Walter replies:
 
Moral problems are individuated as such by their reference to our obligations
to
respect the autonomy and dignity of persons as ends-in-themselves. If a problem
is a "moral" one it raises that issue. Hence, not every case of driving without
a license is a moral issue.

Walter wrote:
 
> > Donal's claim that consistency in action and judgement
> > (i.e., maxim formation)
> > "may be over-valued" is a very odd claim.

Donal replies:

> It is not so "very odd". Since consistency depends on treating
> 'like-cases-alike', and since deciding when they are sufficiently alike is
> problematic and involves a value-judgment, and since such value-judgments are
> fallible and may ride roughshod over significant _specific_ differences
> between cases that are otherwise alike, it might be suspected that the search
> for consistency is one that can be over-valued and indeed one that distort a
> proper _individuated_ moral response.

Walter replies:

I'm not sure what "individuated" here means, but if it means "particularistic"
or "agent-relative" then I would disagree and stand with Kant against the
multitudes. If I am willing from the moral point of view, then "I" will as
anybody would will from this point of view. Moral judgement is impersonal -
i.e., it is indifferent to the particularities of an agent's ethical identity
(as formed through socialization into the values and traditions of some
religious or cultural tribe.)


Donal continues:

> It seems to me this whole field is one of dilemmas and conflicting values.
> 'Universalisability' contains an important idea, though perhaps not much more
> than a version of 'The Golden Rule', 

Walter interrupts:

The GR is only a prescription against illegitimate self-exemption. Kant
explicitly, and correctly, denies any equivalence between the GR and the CI.


Donal continues:

> but it is not the be-all and end-all -
> and over-valued it can distort: for the core of morality (if we can speak of
> a 'core') must surely lie - not in custom, human nature, fixed moral systems
> etc. - but in human conscience. 

Walter replies:

Everybody has a conscience. The question is whether the principle animating the
conscience is a moral one or not. Here, empiricists such as David Hume and Adam
Smith are of little help. (Although Phil insists they are quite amicable
drinking companions.)

Donal continues:

> This, btw, is linked to why we must treat
> others as ends-in-themselves: not because we would wish to be so treated, but
> because they are creatures with at least the potential to act with conscience
> (and in this they are moral beings even if they get it wrong in their acts
> and judgments i.e. I am suggesting that a person who makes a flawed moral
> decision in good conscience may nevertheless have acted morally, from at
> least the first-person POV, even if their decision is to be morally opposed
> and condemned from an 'outside' perspective).

Walter replies:

I agree with most of that, and so would The Master Philosopher himself, I
believe. But we would suggest that the idea that one can act contrary to moral
law while simultaneously acting from respect for moral law is an impossibility.
The violation of respect for moral law, while acting in accordance with moral
law remains a possibility for us. Although in the latter case our actions and
willings bear no genuine moral worth.

I believe the distinction between an "inside" and an "outside" perspective is
epistemically incoherent on Kantian grounds. (Not even Nagel or Strawson would
disagree with me on that, surely.

I pour much gratitude upon Donal's efforts and patience with my Kantian
musings.

Walter O.
Moral Absolutist and Fallibilist


> Donal
> Moral Fallibilist
> Utopia
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
> 



------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
References:
- [lit-ideas] Re: It means nothing, absolutely nothing...
  - From: Donal McEvoy
[lit-ideas] Re: It means nothing, absolutely nothing...

Other related posts:
