In a message dated 5/14/2014 6:45:21 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: It seems that Donal is going into lingiustic philosophy as well. quoting: "No, it's not. It's not. It's really not.* This construction may be an example, btw, of one that shows its sense - and where it would miss that sense to interpret it merely as a set of "otiose" repetitions. (We may say the sense it shows is, in part, one where writing imitates a common aspect of speech, where speech sometimes shows this kind of repetitious emphasis.)" One problem here is that what McEvoy states the thing _shows_ he manages to _say_. Actually, the 'dictiveness' (versus what I call the 'ostensiveness') is accountable in terms of conversational implicature. One 'maxim' goes: do not be more informative than is required. But McEvoy's utterance was, inter alia, It's not. It's not. It may be argued that the second 'it's not' is over-informative, and indeed, to quote McEvoy's, 'repetious[ly] emphatic' if not an 'otiosity'. But 'conversational implicatures' are ESPECIALLY _triggered_ when maxims such as those are _flouted_. On the other hand, while if Witters wants to give a mystic status to 'what is shown' because it 'cannot be said', that remains some sort of 'wishful thinking' wherever we find ways of _saying_ what is _shown_. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html