[lit-ideas] International Colloquim to drop by if in neighbourhood
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 15:57:31 +0100
22 Y 23 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2014
Coloquio internacional “El legado de Karl Popper (1902-1994): A veinte años de
su muerte”
www.popper-en-chile.cl
10:00 a 17:45 hrs.
Salón de Actos “Sergio Flores F.”
Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad de Valparaíso
Serrano 546, Valparaíso
PROGRAMA EN: http://www.popper-en-chile.cl/programa/
To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Karl Popper’s death (September 17,
1994) the Center for the Study of Science, Technology and Society
and the Institute of Philosophy, University of Valparaíso, Chile, have
organized an International Colloquium to remember and reflect on
Popper’s philosophy, with special emphasis on his political philosophy.
The main speakers will be Angeles Jimenez (Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, Spain), David Miller (University of Warwick, UK), Jeremy
Shearmur (Australian National University) and Carlos Verdugo
(Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile). The Colloquium will be held on
September 22-23 at the Faculty of Humanities, Serrano 546, Valparaíso,
Chile.
Para conmemorar el vigésimo aniversario de la muerte de
Karl Popper (17 de Septiembre de 1994), el Centro de Estudios sobre
Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad, en conjunto con el Instituto de
Filosofía de la Universidad de Valparaíso, han organizado un Coloquio
Internacional para reflexionar sobre la filosofía de Popper,
especialmente su filosofía política. Los principales conferenciantes
serán Angeles Jimenez Perona (Universidad Complutense de Madrid,
España), David Miller (University of Warwick, Reino Unido), Jeremy
Shearmur (Australian National University) y Carlos Verdugo Serna
(Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile). El Coloquio se realizará los días 22 y 23
de Septiembre de 2014, en la Facultad de Humanidades de la
Universidad de Valparaíso, Serrano 546, Valparaíso, Chile.
Para
comemorar o vigésimo aniversário da morte de Karl Popper (17 de setembro de
1994), o Centro para o Estudo da Ciência, Tecnologia e Sociedade e o Instituto
de Filosofia da Universidade de Valparaíso, Chile,
organizaram um colóquio internacional para lembrar e refletir sobre a
filosofia de Popper, com especial ênfase na sua filosofia política. Os
principais oradores serão Angeles Jimenez (Universidad Complutense de
Madrid, Espanha), David Miller (University of Warwick, Reino Unido),
Jeremy Shearmur (Australian National University) e Carlos Verdugo
(Universidad de Valparaíso, Chile). O Colóquio será realizado em
setembro 22-23, na Faculdade de Ciências Humanas, Serrano 546,
Valparaíso, Chile.
PROGRAMA
LUNES 22 DE SEPTIEMBRE
10:00-10:30
Saludo de bienvenida: Decano de la Facultad de Humanidades, Prof. Carlos Martel
LLano.
Palabras del Coordinador del Coloquio: Prof. Carlos Verdugo Serna, Director del
Centro de Estudios sobre Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad.
10:30-11:30
Conferencia Inaugural: “Errando el blanco. La Historia Desdichada de las
Críticas
al Falsacionismo”. David Miller (University of Warwick).
11:30-12:00 Intermedio y Café
12:00-13:30 Discusión y Comentarios
13:30-15 :30 Almuerzo
15:30-16:30
Segunda Conferencia: “Crítica, racionalidad y política. Observaciones sobre el
legado popperiano”. Angeles Jimenez Perona (Universidad Complutense de
Madrid).
16:30-17:45 Discusión y Comentarios
MARTES 22 DE SEPTIEMBRE
10:00-11:00
Tercera Conferencia: “Algunos problemas con la concepción de la democracia de
Popper”. Carlos Verdugo Serna (Universidad de Valparaíso).
11:00-11:30 Intermedio y Café
11:30-12: 30 Discusión y Comentarios
12:30 – 15:00 Almuerzo
15:00-16:00
Conferencia Final: “Popper, Political Philosophy and The Public Sphere”. Jeremy
Shearmur (Australian National University).
16:00-17:30 Discusión y Comentarios
17:30-17:45 Palabras de Cierre
Organiza:
Centro de Estudios sobre Ciencia, Tecnología y Sociedad
Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades
Universidad de Valparaíso
Auspician y patrocinan:
Universidad de Valparaíso
Convenio de Desempeño
División Académica
División de Investigación
Fundación Jorge Millas
The Karl Popper Charitable Trust
On Tuesday, 9 September 2014, 7:31, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Nope friend. Hume has the view that what he calls causation is a sort of
compulsion, a fact human minds. He is wrong, but that becomes an interpretive
enterprise. I like (a lot Hume's view) it.
In fact the attempts by many (most famously B. Russell for the English reading
public, to "get rid" of "effects" etc. come to nothing given the hard case that
nobody has been able to show what suggests that "global warming has been
brought about by burning of carbon based fuels" is not a causal claim. His
bunch of fake "humeans" claim to have "shown" that there is a possible a world,
nomologically fixed by your semantics, in which global warming is an effect og
a. nothing
b. al Gore
c. paris Hilton
the burden is on the fake humeans, not on those who assign truth values to
causal claims.
-----Original Message-----
From: Eric [mailto:mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx]
Sent: 08 September 2014 21:59
To: Adriano Palma
Subject: RE: standard confusions
>> One thing that I suggest to avoid is uninformed idiocy.
I agree. Having read (or maybe you think, misread) Hume, I can only add that
Hume also insisted that causation was non-empirical. Not only are people's
motivations complex (Ibsen's onion layers) but causation itself can never be
precisely located by sense data.
This is why I write about "faith" or "imaginative reconstruction."
Best to you,
Eric
-----Original Message-----
From: Adriano Palma [mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx]
Sent: Friday, September 5, 2014 2:34 AM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Omar Kusturica
Subject: standard confusions
If people were to get Hume right....... it would be a "nice day" as the yanks
say.
CERTAINLY one can reach any practical judgment in any theoretical way. For
those of the generation www one can devote some time to set up a programm run
by Cohen of the nyt and let the machine crank up any judgment, practical,
scientific, philosophical, financial, private life advisory, or anything one
likes.
Hume the great man saw quite distinctly that any judgment if it has to "bring
about" acts has components that are "contents of beliefs" and motivational
structures much harder to pin down.
That is why I can be perfectly convinced, say by M Gandhi, that I should "turn
the second cheek" or some such, and thereby concurrently smack the face of the
English policeman with a cosh.
One thing that I suggest to avoid is uninformed idiocy.
Regards
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Walter C. Okshevsky
Sent: 04 September 2014 21:16
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Omar Kusturica
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
Just a couple of Kantian thoughts from the dacha:
There are technical, prudential, etc, meanings of "right" and "wrong." However,
to speak of *moral* right or wrong is to speak either of obligation (ought) or
permissibility in moral terms. What is morally right is either obligatory or
permitted. What is morally wrong is either morally forbidden or morally
impermissible.
So, yes, I would think that if you claim that action or maxim P is right, you
may only be claiming that P is morally permissible but not obligatory (i.e.,
ought to be done).
I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally). But
I don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.
If you claim that something is right "in theoretical terms" only, you are not
making a moral (practical judgement). There is no "simply theoretical" when it
comes to practical judgement. I guess that's how it got it's name.
Walter O
MUN
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right
> or wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can
> argue that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily
> commanding that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or
> not do what is right, after all.)
>
> O.K.
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below.
> > From Hume's pen:
> >
> >
> > ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
> >
> > In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections.
> > But the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the
> > section:
> >
> > Hume writes:
> >
> >
> > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> always
> > remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
> > way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes
> > observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am
> > surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
> > propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is
> > not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
> > imperceptible"
> >
> > This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he
> > means
> that
> > the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
> >
> > Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
> >
> > "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
> > ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis
> > necessary that it shou’ d be observ’d and explain’d; and at
> > the same time that a reason should
> be
> > given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new
> > relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
> > different from it … [I]
> am
> > persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert
> > all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the
> > distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
> > relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason."
> >
> > I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic'
> > operator here (unknown to Hume):
> >
> > Ë«p
> >
> > We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
> > 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
> > comprise the cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed
> > imperceptible) of an 'is'
> > turning into an 'ought to':
> >
> > !p
> >
> > Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is,
> > and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
> > ought, or an ought not."
> >
> > Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
> > philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or
> > that religion.
> > And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
> >
> > I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
> >
> > Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
> >
> > The S is P.
> >
> > versus
> >
> > The S OUGHT TO BE P.
> >
> > Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
> > copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in
> > the Frege sign.
> >
> > Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or
> > ought-laden expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as
> > Hume criticises) would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an
> > 'ought' there, because he would rely on his addressee to understand
> > that he is staying in the realm of 'morality'.
> >
> > The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which
> > admittedly sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume
> > woke Kant up from
> his
> > dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following
> > Aristotle, assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place
> > of reason in ethics!
> >
> > -----
> >
> > Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin
> > had borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Speranza
> >
> > *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of
> > reason in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
> >
> >
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