In "Aspects of reason," the John Locke Lectures, Grice notes that, perhaps
unlike Popper would note, the philosopher (by 'the' he means 'himself' --
"speak for thyself," his motto) should start by providing a conceptual
analysis of the VERB, 'to reason'. As in
i. Then, Sherlock Holmes deduced that the murderer was the butler.
Surely, had Agatha Christie spent more time at Oxford, (i) should read:
ii. Then, Sherlock Holmes abduced that the murderer was the butler.
while on occasion we should find in her writings:
iii. Sherlock Holmes induced this by all he knew 'before hand'.
-- and such.
After all, "inducere" was a verb in Ancient Rome, from in- "into, in, on,
upon" + ducere "to lead" -- which philosophers at some point found
convenient to use for short for "to infer by reasoning". Strictly, to 'reason'
simpliciter.
"deducere" and "abducere" are also items the philosopher should spend some
time linguistic botanising with. But it seems it's 'inducere' that has
appealed them most, as the references below might induce you to believe!
Cheers,
Speranza
REFERENCES: "Induction": an annotated bibliography
Achinstein, P. Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory, Philosophy of
Science, 30.
---- Achinstein argued that 'to confirm' is done usually by induction, but
there is variety.
Adams, E. A Logic of Conditionals, Inquiry, 8.
Alfano, S, Poll: Majority Reject Evolution,” CBS News.
---- Alfano implicates: but should the majority be right? The majority once
thought the earth is flat.
Ambrose, A. The Problem of Justifying Inductive Inference, Journal of
Philosophy, 44
Armstrong, D. Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism vs. Realism,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A Theory of Universals, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue, 30: 503–11. A
World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reply to
van Fraassen,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66(2): 224–229.
---- Armstrong argues for the rationality of induction (which should be
clear to anyone who attended Grice, Aspects of reason, since 'to induce' can
replace 'to reason' ANY TIME).
Ayer, A. Probability and Evidence, New York: Columbia University Press.
Bernoulli, J. Ars Conjectandi, Basel: Impensis Thurnisiorum, The Art of
Conjecturing, Edith D. Sylla (trans.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
Black, D. The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Brown, M. Review of Stove, History and Philosophy of Logic, 8
Campbell, Sc. Fixing a Hole in the Ground of Induction, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 79
--- Campbell argues the fix is one of the easiest things the philosopher
can do!
Campbell, Scott and James Franklin, Randomness and the Justification of
Induction, Synthese, 138.
--- Campbell and Franklin argue that since induction is rational, it's
almost self-justifying!
Carnap, R. The Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. Logical Foundations of Probability, second edition, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
--- Carnap is using 'continuum' metaphorically, but it's a delight of a
word!
Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolo and Gabor Lugosi, Prediction, Learning and Games,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daly, C. Review of A World of States of Affairs, by D. M. Armstrong,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76
Dretske, F. Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science, 44
Edwards, W., H. Lindman, and L. Savage, Bayesian statistical inference for
psychological research,” Psychological Review, 70
de Finetti, Bruno, 1937, “La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses sources
subjective”. Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare, 7. Foresight: Its Logical
Laws, Its Subjective Sources”. A translation by Henry Kyburg of Finetti 1937,
in Studies in Subjective Probability, Henry Kyburg and Howard Smokler
(eds.), New York: John Wiley and Sons. Theory of Probability in two volumes,
New York: John Wiley a nd Sons, A translation by Antonio Machi and Adrian
Smith of Teoria delle Probabilita, 1970, Einaudi.
--- de Finetti, or Finetti, as he prefers, induces in Italian.
Fitelson, B. The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the
Problem of Measure Sensitivity, Philosophy of Science, 66 .The Logic of
Confirmation,” Philosophy Compass, 1–––Logical Foundations of Evidential
Support,” Philosophy of Science, 73–––Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and
Relational Confirmation,” Synthese, 156.
Fitelson, Branden and J. Hawthorne, How Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Handles the Paradox of the Ravens, in E. Eels and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place
of
Probability in Science, Chicago: Open Court.
--- The Raven's paradox or implicature, as I prefer, should appeal Hughes
-- his hawk is white; his raven is black?
Franklin, J. Resurrecting Logical Probability,” Erkenntnis, 55
Frege, G. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle.
Friedman, Michael and Richard Creath (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to
Carnap, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giere, R. Review: The Significance Test Controversy, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 23
Good, I. J., 1967, On the Principle of Total Evidence, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 17 (discussed by Grice as discussed by Davidson
in "Aspects of reason")
George, A. A Proof of Induction? Philosopher's Imprint, 7
--- A. George argues that this proof is actually meta-inductive. We
meta-induced induction is right.
Giaquinto, M., Review of The Rationality of Induction by D.C. Stove,”
Philosophy of Science, 54
--- Giaquinto argues (via implicature) that along with "Paradise lost",
Stove's Rationality of Induction" is one of the most relevant reads he ever
read.
Goldman, Alvin L., Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Gower, B. Stove on inductive scepticism, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 68
--- Gowe argues that should Sextus Empiricus (a sceptic) had read Hume he
would NOT have been an 'inductive sceptic', which he finds an anachronism.
Grattan, I., Popper and the Problem of Induction, A Fresh Look at the Logic
of Testing Scientific Theories, Erkenntnis, 60
--- Grattan implicates that looks, like lettuce, can be fresh -- then
there's a fresh look at fresh lettuce.
Hacking, I. M. Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Review: Likelihood, British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science, 23.
Hajek, A. What Conditional Probability Could not Be, Synthese, 137
Harman, G. The Inference to the Best Explanation, The Philosophical
Review, 74. Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation, The
Journal of Philosophy, 65.
Helman D. Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence,
Cognitive Science, and Philosophy, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Hempel, C. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind, 54.
Hochberg, H. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs,” Noûs, 33
Hume, D. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby Bigge,
Oxford, Clarendon Press. OEnquiries concerning Human Understanding and
concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted from the posthumous edition and
edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical index
by L. A. Selby Bigge, MA. Third edition with text revised and notes by P. H.
Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Indurkhya, Bipin, Some Remarks on the Rationality of Induction, Synthese.
-- a source of inspiration for Armstrong: 'to reason' and 'to induce' can
be used in the same contexts.
Irzik, Gurol, Armstrong's Account of Probabilistic Laws, Analysis, 51
Jeffrey, R. Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses, Philosophy
of Science, 23 The Logic of Decision, second edition, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, W. E., Logic: in three volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications.
Juhl, C. The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction,
British Journal for the Philsosophy of Science, 45.
-- Grice noted that Reichenbach's straight rule (allegedly) is "not as
straight as it seems". Grice spends some time teaching Davidson how to read
Reichenbach in "Actions and Events" (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly).
Kelly, Kevin, and Oliver Schulte, Church's Thesis and Hume's Problem,
Logic and Scientific Methods, M. L. Della Chiara et al. (eds.), Dordrecht:
Kluwer, ––– and Clark Glymour, Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of
Scientific Justification,” Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of
Science, Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Kolmogorov, A. N., Foundations of the Theory of Probability. A translation
and revision by Nathan Morrison of Grundbegriffe der
Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications in 1964.
Kyburg, H. The Justification of Induction, Journal of Philosophy, 54.
--- One of the sources for Armstrong: if induction is rational (and
'induce' and 'reason' are interreplaceable, then surely induction is almost
self-justifying)
–––, The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference, Dordrecht: D.
Reidel.
Levi, I. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?” Journal of Philosophy,
57 -- Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (Oddly, "Hard Choices" is the title of Hillary
Clinton's memoirs).
Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers (Volume II), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lipton, P. Inference to the Best Explanation, London and New York:
Routledge. Second edition..
Loeb, L. Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's argument about
induction,” Synthese, 152.
--- Hume's argument about induction started the thread on the alleged
problem (or 'pseudo-problem', for Witters) of inducing that all ravens are
black).
Maher, P. The Hole in the Ground of Induction, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 74 -- Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox,” Philosophy of
Science, 66 -- The Concept of Inductive Probability, Erkenntnis, 65
--- the hole was NOT created by the raven. Here it's not the raven's
implicature, as it would in Ted Hughes, OM, but the paradox of the raven,
'saith
nevermore'.
Maxwell, N. Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein versus van Fraassen.
Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 44
--- Maxwell should have added, 'in three easy Griceian steps.' They are
easy and Griceian if you've read "Aspects of reason", where "Prob" and is the
operator (or sentential modifier) that Grice uses for utterances that
should be understood as having arrived via induction.
Mayberry, T. Donald Williams on Induction, Journal of Thought, 3
-- Donald Williams is a genius.
Mayo, D. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
–––, and Aris Spanos, Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–
Pearson Philosophy of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science,
57
--- Neyman's and Pearson's philosophy of induction is fascinating in that
it combines many different factors into a unified viable theory.
Mill, J. S. System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a
Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific
Investigation, Volume 1, London: John W. Parker.
--- Mill (vide "Grice to the Mill") classifies logic as being either
ratiocinative and inductive. Grice complained that this seems to trigger the
wrong implicature that inductive logic is not ratiocinative -- "but then
'ratiocinative' is an ugly word," he added.
Miller, D. Professor Donald Williams versus Hume, The Journal of
Philosophy, 44
Nagel, E. Review of The Ground of Induction by Donald Williams, The Journal
of Philosophy, 44
--- E. Nagel, not to be confused with Grice's pupil, the brilliant T.
Nagel, thinks there should be no holes on that ground ("Induction is not a golf
course," he utters metaphorically)
Nicod, J. Foundations of Geometry and Induction, P. P. Wiener (trans.),
London: Harcourt Brace.
--- Nicod is a genius.
Nix, C.J. and B. Paris, A Note on Binary Inductive Logic, Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 36
Okasha, D. Does Hume's argument against induction rest on a quantifier–
shift fallacy? Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 105
--- Apparently it does, but Home (as I prefer to spell his surname) did not
care much for Aristotle's quantificationnal logic (vide Polish logic).
Oliver, A. Review of A World of States of Affairs by D.M. Armstrong, The
Journal of Philosophy, 95
Peano, G. Selected Works of Giuseppe Peano, translated and edited by Hubert
C. Kennedy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Pearson, E. Statistical concepts in their relation to reality, Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society 17
Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books. A
translation by the author with the assistance of Julius Freed and Jan Freed of
Der Logik der Forschung, Vienna: J. Springer, 1935.
-- The meaning of 'assist' may require a conceptual analysis. Cf. "Viv
assisted Tom with "The Wasteland". Incidentally, Julius and Jan are related.
Ramsey, F. P. Truth and Probability,”in Ramsey [FOM]. The Foundations of
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), London,
Routledge and Kegan Pau.
Reichenbach, H. The Theory of Probability, Berkeley: University of
California Press, A translation by Ernest R. Hutton and Maria Reichenbach
ofWahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Eine Untersuchung uber die logischen und
mathematischen
Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Leiden, Revised by the author.
Experience and Prediction. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix
edition 1968.
Rowan, Michael, Stove on the Rationality of Induction and the Uniformity
Thesis, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44
--- Usually, Grice preferred 'uniformity OF NATURE', since he found
"Nature" a fascinating concept to provide an analysis for.
Royall, R. Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. London, New York,
Chapman and Hall.
Rudner, R. The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” Philosophy
of Science, 20
Salmon, W. On Vindicating Induction,” Philosophy of Science, 30
-- Salmon argues, with Armstrong that, since 'to reason' and 'to induce'
are interreplaceable, the vindication (figurative use) of induction is
pretty easy -- 'vindicate' is a nice word to provide a conceptual analysis for,
too. It usually implicates others. Not all stuff needs a vindication unless
that stuff has been attacked, but this is implicatural.
––– 1967, Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh, University of
Pittsburgh Press.
Savage, L. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Schulte, O Means–Ends Epistemology,” British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 50.
Schurz, Gerhard, The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction
Game. A New Approach to Hume's Problem, Philosophy of Science, 75
--- Schurz uses 'meta-induction' with a straight face! Congratulations!
Skyrms, B. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press. Choice and Chance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bayesian Projectability,” in Douglas Stalker (ed.), Grue: Essays on the
New Riddle of Induction, Chicago: Open Court.'
-- "Grue" was one of Grice's favourite shades of ... er ... blue ... er ...
green. "Grass is grue?"
Slowik, E. Natural laws, universals and the induction problem,
Philosophia, 32
-- Slowik argues that the 'problem of induction' is possible apocryphal.
Sober, E. Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning. International
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 52
Spohn, W. Enumerative induction and lawlikeness, Philosophy of Science, 72
-- Spohn kept ravens as pets, and he enumerated them.
Sprenger, I. Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials,
Philosophy of Science, 76.
Steel, D. A Bayesian way to make stopping rules matter, Erkenntnis, 58.
Stove, D. The Rationality of Induction, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
-- a classic and a source for Armstrong.
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen (crediting
Grice).
Suppes, P. Review of Kevin Kelly, The Logic of Reliable Inquiry, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49: 351–354. The primacy of utterer's
meaning. In P.G.R.I.C.E., ed. Grandy & Warner.
Surowiecki, J. The wisdom of crowds: why the many are smarter than the few
and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies, and
nations, New York: Doubleday.
Tooley, M., Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Nature of Laws,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7
Vnfraassen, Bas, Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 65
Vickers, J. Chance and Structure: An Essay on the Logical Foundations of
Probability, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vranas, P Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian
Solution, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55.
White, F. Hempel's Raven Paradox: A lacuna in the Standard Bayesian
Solution” British66(4): 533–537.
Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World, New York: Mentor.
Williams, D. The Ground of Induction, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press. Reissued, New York: Russell and Russell Inc.,
--- for Williams, induction is no golf course: no holes please.
--- The Problem of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
6(4): 619–622. On the Derivation of Probabilities from Frequencies,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5, “The Challenging Situation in the
Philosophy of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6
Yahya, H. Atlas of Creation, Hackensack, NJ: Global Publishing Company.
Zabell, S. Symmetry and Its Discontents: Essays on the History of
Inductive Probability, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carnap on
probability
and induction,” in Friedman and Creath (eds.).
-- The use of 'inductive probability' implicates, for Kneale, that there is
induction which is not probabilistic and that there is probability that is
not inductive.
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