Le 1 ao=FBt 04, =E0 08:45, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx a =E9crit : > > snip > > M.C. : Now this is getting interesting > > Thanks to M. Chase, and to R. Paul for correcting M. Chase. M.C. I join jls in thanking R. Paul for his interesting comments. But=20 is it correct to say they "correct" me? My claim was : "not even Russell would have been wacko enough = to=20 suggest, as jlsperanza does, that the latter of these phrases [sc. "The=20= king of France is bald"] implies that "something like the king of=20 France exists" ". In other words, I claimed that, for Russell, "The=20 king of France is bald" *does not* imply that somethng like the king of=20= France exists. If R. Paul's remarks are to be said to "correct" me,=20 then they would have to show this proposition is false. But it's not, nor does R. Paul say it is. What he does say, if I=20= understand him rightly, is that for Russell, a proposition such as "The=20= king of France is bald" *appears at first glance* - i.e., until it is=20 analysed - to imply the existence of something like the king of France.=20= But what happens when we *analyse* such phrases, i.e. go beyond=20 appearances and try to figure out what is actually going on in them=A0?=20= In the extract provided by R. Paul, Russell allows two possible=20 analyses of such statements: 1. We say, with Meinong, that propositions that appear to lack a=20= denotation in fact *have* a denotation. Russell *rejects* this=20 Avicennean/Meinongian/Speranzanian solution. 2. We deny that any denotation is actually taking place in such=20= statements. This is Russell's solution. R. Paul is quite right to bring up Meinong, whose views - = remakably=20 like those of Avicenna - are extremely pertinent here. Meinong would=20 say that a phrase about an object normally taken to be non-existent -=20 for instance, "the mountain I'm now thinking of is made of gold" can be=20= a *true* statement about a non-existent object. But like Avicenna,=20 Meinong distinguishes between "Sein statements", which predicate=20 existence, and "Sosein statements" which do not. A Sein-statement is an=20= affirmative statement that can be existentially generalized : from=20 =93=A0Swahili is difficult" we can infer "the Swahili language exists".=20= Sosein-statements are not existentially generalizable : from a=20 statement about the golden mountain we *cannot* infer that golden=20 mountains exist. So much for Meinong. But Russell *denies this distinction = between=20 Sein-statements and Sosein statements* : in his theory of description,=20= every statement is either a Sein-statement (i.e. one that affirms or=20 presupposes the existence of the object in question) or the negation of=20= a Sein-statement; for Russell *there are no Sosein-statements*. In summary, I still maintain my original view : it is *not* the = case=20 that Russell thinks the statement "the king of France is bald" implies,=20= presupposes, or allow the legitimate inference that "something like the=20= king of France exists". Best, Mike. > Indeed, the > 'wacko' one was Meinong -- a German, etc. --. In Russellian (and=20 > Gricean) > parlance, while"The king of France is not bald" _implicates_ that=20 > there is a king of > France (due to the word 'not', not to the fact that we know France is = a > Republic), "The king of France _is_ bald" certainly _implies_ it (i.e.=20= > that there > is a king of France). (v. Grice, "Presupposition and Conversational > Implicature", in Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard). > > But back to 'the African language': > > M. Chase answers: > >>> Do you speak any African languages? >> Well, I'm learning Egyptian. > > There is a sense in which we can say that Egyptian is indeed _the_=20 > African > language (_par excellence_). Ergo: 'the African language' =3D = Egyptian.=20 > A purist > would perhaps object at this point that there's no such thing as _the_ > African language (let alone anything as reasonably thinking that=20 > Egyptian is > _it_), but that's neither here nor there: the crux is that there _is_ = a > legitimate, colloquial use of the definite description, "the African=20= > language" to refer > to "Egyptian": Cf. > > The African language M. Chase thinks is _the_ African language" > > Oddly, this becomes otiose (and quasi-tautological) when expanded: > > Egyptian is the African language that M. Chase thinks > is the African language" > > I note "quasi-tautological", because M. Chase can be wrong -- or think > things differently. > > A still different, current among historical linguists, legitimate use=20= > of > "the African language" is the definite description used to refer=20 > (attributively > and predicatively) to the Ur-African language -- a proto version of=20 > Swahili, > but with much more declensions--, out of which _all_ (current) other=20= > varieties > of the African language can be shown to have sprung (cf. "M. Chase=20 > speaks > French, therefore he speaks Indo-European", or "JL speaks Spanish,=20 > therefore he > speaks Latin"). > > Cheers, > > JL > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > > Michael Chase (goya@xxxxxxxxxxx) CNRS UPR 76 7, rue Guy Moquet Villejuif 94801 France ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html