In a message dated 5/19/2010 12:32:28 A.M., donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: Does W say this in terms? If so, where? ---- The reference Grice gives (WoW, p. 5, footnote 4) is "In Philosophical Investigations". He surely needs not to specify where. The quote is: "Wittgenstein observed that one does not see a knife and fork as a knife and fork (In Philosophical Investigations)." "The idea behind this remark was not developed in the passage in which it occurred, but presumably the thought" -- if he or she (since Anscombe translated) had any -- "was that, if a pair of objects plainly ARE a knife and a fork, THEN, while it MIGHT be 'correct' to speak of someone as SEEING them as something different (perhaps as a leaf and a flower?), it would be on most occasion (Wittgenstein implies 'always'?), except, perhaps, in very special circumstances which Wittgenstein does not specify, be 'INcorrect' (but also 'false', or 'out of order', or 'devoid of sense')" --- as the typical Anscombianisms go "to speak of seeing an x as an x." ----- Thanks for commentary on Nancy Cartwright. Sorry about sex change. You should try speaking Italian sometime! We don't distinguish between 'his' and 'hers' -- so go figure! ---- McEvoy confuses 'law' with 'law'. A law is something 'said' -- It's LEG-alistic, cfr. Lekton, lexis. So the 'laws' CAN lie. To think of 'nomos' as an ontological category is beyond belief! J. L. S. Bordighera