[lit-ideas] Re: Implicatures of "Feel"
- From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, David Ritchie <ritchierd@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 1 Sep 2010 15:50:05 -0230
That people continue to reach decisions, and that the world "goes on," are
propositions of no philosophical relevance whatsoever if interpreted in
strictly empirical terms.
Philosophical questions and arguments have to do with conceptual and normative
matters. (Ultimately, transcendental.) Pour example: Are the decisions
rational? Are they morally permissible? Is the "going" of the world in
accordance with universal moral and epistemic virtues? What are my obligations,
given the "fact" of my humanity, regarding the promotion of moral and epistemic
virtue in others, myself and the world? ("I pause in my discourse to reflect
upon and appreciate my perfect use of commas in my correspondence above." -
Izzie Newton ((or something like that)).
If an Arts College can't instill in its students an understanding and
appreciation of the trivium and the quadrivium, then surely it must be
committed to the flames. And this because any "fine" art must be a "liberal"
art.(Does OCAD still stand in T.O.?)
Walter O
MUN
Quoting David Ritchie <ritchierd@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> On Aug 31, 2010, at 1:26 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky wrote:
>
> > Yes, the following utterances seem possible:
> >
> > "I feel I love you." (Also: "I believe I love you." and "I think I
> > love you." in
> > deference to the Partridge Family.)
> >
> >
> > Other possible feelings include: envy, jealousy, being at peace with
> > the world,
> > anger, lust, sorrow, elation, indignation, resentment, vindicated
> > (not sure
> > about that one), fear, loathing, (but not awe or anxiety since these
> > have no
> > specific object - Heidegger on "moods" as dispositions of In-der-
> > Welt-Sein) -
> > sadness, love, infatuation. Does Aristotle's "munificence" count as
> > a feeling?
> > Is his "magnanimity" a feeling or a disposition? Both?
> >
> > "I feel it's hot." No problem.
> >
> > "I feel I agree (disagree) with you." Well, "what are we to say
> > about that"? If
> > the object of the (dis)agreement is a proposition, then one's
> > feelings about
> > its truth or rightness are epistemically otiose.
> >
> > Compare with: "We should stop doing moral philosophy until we get a
> > handle on
> > the psychology of virtues and vices." Isn't that a category mistake?
>
> In the art college where I work students, and even some of my
> colleagues, reach for language that gives equal weight to, or even
> primacy to, something they call "emotional intelligence." Thus when
> they approach a problem, their oral reasoning is a mish mash appeal to
> evidence, with a conclusion that begins "I feel." I have great
> difficulty mounting challenges to such a rhetorical strategy. What's
> to be said, "Well, I feel differently"?
>
> And yet they reach decisions and the world goes on, category mistake
> or no.
>
> David Ritchie,
> Portland, Oregon
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