"One might say, broadly speaking, whereas the Diagnostic Realist relies on hypothesis, the Constructivist relies on hypostasis." -- Grice ---- For a Diagnostic Realist (as Grice isn't) the actual nature of reality is UNAVAILABLE for inspection. The job of the philosopher (or metaphysician) is, like a scientist, to make plausible hypothesis about it. Grice's own metaphysical approach, however, is one of Constructivism. He builds up and account from primitives, rather than forms theories which are consistent with scientific explanations. In a message dated 6/9/2013 6:35:05 A.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: Popper's theory of knowledge constitutes an empiricist alternative to this kind of 'traditional empiricism': it is not merely an alternative but, in the view of many of have come to understand it, a vast improvement and advance on traditional empiricism. It has in less than 100 years utterly changed the intellectual landscape in which we understand 'science' and not only the logic of science but its relation to metaphysics. Mmm. Interesting. I wonder if we don't mean 'science' and its 'relation' to, or rather 'contrast' with, metaphysics. Grice plays with two words here: he wants to say that the scientist uses hypotheses. (cfr. however Newton, "Hypotheses non fingo"). Whereas the metaphysician indulges in hypostases. Grice is referring to "the universe". "It is a widely (if not universally) held view, that at least one part of the business of metaphysics is to determine an ontology; or, if you prefer, to settle on an answer to the questoion what, in general or particular terms, the 'universe' ... contains." ---- "Thus far, a. people b. tables c. chairs d. atoms e. electrons and f. quarks have escaped exclusion [to that ontological question]." ----- Grice proposes a representation of a "Scentific realist", for whom, "metaphysical hypotheses wll be judicious to the extent to which, if true, they would provide backing or justification for the content and methodology of scientific theory." Having delivered the motto of the constructivist (he identifies with): 'hypostasise rather than hypothesise', Grice continues with the implicatures of the scientific realist: "The diagnostic realist wishes to regard the optimal metaphysical posture as being one which accepts the general accoutn of Reality which maximally justifies and supports the deliverances of science." ---- "But WHAT science?" "WHAT science? Palmistry? Phlogiston Theory?" --- recall the previous reference to 'atom', 'electron', and 'quark'. ---- "It seems that we need at least a restriction to REPUTABLE deliverances of REPUTABLE sciences" ---- One problem: "And how are these [reputable deliverances now of reputable sciences] to be selected EXCEPT ON THE BASIS of likelihood of truth, and how is THAT to be optimised in advance of ANY CLUE about the nature of Reality?" ----- Here it may be that the clash between b. and c. 'table' and 'chair' -- and d (atom), e (electron) and f (quark). Grice continues: "It seems that there is an initial need for SOME GROUNDS of acceptability of the findings of science which are INDEPENDENT of those which, it is hoped, will be provided by a correct and adequate account of Reality." McEvoy: "Popper's theory of knowledge constitutes an empiricist alternative to this kind of 'traditional empiricism': it is not merely an alternative but, in the view of many of have come to understand it, a vast improvement and advance on traditional empiricism. It has in less than 100 years utterly changed the intellectual landscape in which we understand 'science' and not only the logic of science but its relation to metaphysics." As did _Grice_'s theory then! (even if perhaps to different audiences!?) Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html