"The cat is on the mat" -- elementary Donal McEvoy writes in reply to R. Henninge: Are you claiming that that a name like "cat" that can be analysed in terms of other names (eg. leg, head, tooth) can be an EP? That any name that be so broken down can at the same time be "elementary"? --- This reminds me of the sentence used by Stephen Toulmin -- complete with accompanying drawing -- in _The uses of argument_ -- viz.: "The cat is on the mat." --- I always took a liking for this sentence. I thought it was _logical_. Apparently, though, it is a sentence from a manual anglophones use to learn the language, and 'mat' is used not because it's something cats usually are on -- but because it rhymes with 'cat' -- "the mat is on the rug" would not do. It's more of a phonetic or phonographic exercise. Now, I believe the fact that 'cat' can be analysed in terms of 'leg, head, tooth', as Donal suggests, is pretty irrelevant. First, the total conjunction of such _elements_ is not there to easily be nominated. Note the ridiculousness of the expansion The cat's leg, the cat's head, the cat's tooth, [are] on the mat. Surely this is dependent on having a notion of 'cat' -- for you to be able to use it in the possessive case ('cat's'). Surely one can invent a lingo, where the possessive is not used, and an index is introduced to mark the _origin_ of the body part: "The leg(-cat), the head(-cat), the tooth(-cat), [are] on the mat." I would agree that would be correct, provided we add a ceteris paribus 'ad infinitum' clause: "The cat's leg, head, tooth, etc [and so on completing the thing] are on the mat." Donal will say that a similar treatment awaits 'the mat' (threads of wool, etc.). Now, it would seem that for Russell and Wittgenstein and Henninge and Paul and me, 'The cat is on the mat' is indeed atomic and elementary. A closer inspection into the logical form shows it's not, though. 'Felix is on the mat' may be atomic/elementary, but hardly 'the cat'. 'The' involves the iota-operator, in logic, which involves the universal quantifier, and the particle 'if': "There is at least a cat on the mat, there is not more than one cat on the mat, and nothing which is the cat is not on the mat." Henninge suggests, "the dot -- in http://www.andreas.com -- just after 'andreas' -- is blue" "The dot is blue". One minor problem with this is that dot are supposed to have no extension, but colours only applied to extended surfaces. So it's not really a dot that is blue -- but something that _represents_ or looks like a dot. I'm not sure phenomenalist language like that would prima facie count as 'atomic' or 'elementary'. (Cf. Austin's discussion of 'That spot over there is the village church'). Henninge says that for Wittgenstein, 'elementary' or 'atomic propositions' were _o-kay_. But recall the very first quote for 'atomic proposition' in the OED: 1912 L. WITTGENSTEIN Let. (to Russell) in Notebks. 1914-16 (1961) 120, "I believe that our problems can be traced down to the atomic propositions." -- Perhaps having the wider context would help. Dear Bertrand, How's the weather in Cambridge? Having some awful weather here -- in the trench. Anyway, hope life's well. I'm writing something I may end up calling "Tractatus" -- but I guess you'll think that's pretentious? Other suggestions welcome. ... Sorry for the interruption here. The sargeant has just told me, "Heil mit wir schribben schuet!" and I wonder if that's elementary -- or atomic. I have a copy of your the American Journal of Mathematics (XXX) with me, and on p. 238 you define an elementary proposition. But I cannot make myself agree with that definition. Anyway, nothing too serious, I hope. But I am led [to] believe that our problems _can_ be traced down to the atomic [propositions]. My regards to all in Cambridge that I know, Will be seeing ya soon, X X O O Lud ----- Cheers, JL 1908 B. RUSSELL in Amer. Jrnl. Math. XXX. 238 A proposition containing no apparent variable we will call an elementary proposition... Elementary propositions together with such as contain only individuals as apparent variables we will call first-order propositions... We can thus form new propositions in which first-order propositions occur as apparent variables. These we will call second-order propositions... Thus, e.g., if Epimenides asserts â??all first-order propositions affirmed by me are falseâ??, he asserts a second-order proposition. Ibid., Propositions of order n..will be such as contain propositions of order n - 1, but of no higher order, as apparent variables. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html