[lit-ideas] Re: Hitchens on Moore's flick

  • From: Scribe1865@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2004 00:38:54 EDT

A.A. If there was any substance to it, would the Rabid Right not be 
exploiting it?  What's missing here?

EY: You are missing the fact that it actually happened.  Perhaps you will 
find this account more credible, since it comes from an academic arms control 
group. You can read the full account to discover how Motorola/Clinton pushed 
the 
MIRV sale through the Commerce Department to bypass Defense Department and 
national security objections.

People think we only helped arm Saddam. We help arm almost all of our 
potential foes.


http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/testimonies/2002/china-us-comm.htm
Testimony of Gary Milhollin
Professor Emeritus, University of Wisconsin Law School
and 
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control

Before the U.S.-China Security Review Commission
January 17, 2002


I am pleased to appear today before the U.S.-China Security Review 
Commission. The Commission has asked me to comment on China's efforts to obtain 
sensitive technology from the United States, and on the effectiveness of export 
controls to protect U.S. national security.
I would like to begin with a few remarks about China's current and projected 
strategic posture. In a report released earlier this month, the CIA observed 
that China has a long-running modernization program to develop mobile, 
solid-propellant ICBMs and that the intelligence community projects that by 
2015, most 
of China's strategic missile force will be mobile. The CIA also pointed out 
that China has had the ability to develop and deploy a multiple reentry vehicle 
system for many years, including a MIRV system. The CIA assessed that China 
could develop a multiple reentry vehicle system for its CSS-4 ICBM in a few 
years, although its pursuit of a multiple RV capability for its mobile ICBMs 
and 
SLBMs would encounter significant technical hurdles and would be very costly. 
The intelligence community projects that the overall size of China's 
strategic ballistic missile forces, over the next 15 years, will range from 
about 75 
to 100 warheads deployed primarily against the United States. U.S. intelligence 
predicts that China will have about two dozen shorter range DF-31 and CSS-3 
ICBMs that could reach parts of the United States, and an SRBM force of several 
hundred missiles by 2005.
Imports of high technology from the United States, such as high-performance 
computers, will undoubtedly help China reach these strategic goals.
I would like to direct the Commission's attention to a report on sensitive - 
that is, strategically important - U.S. exports to China that my organization 
published in April 1999. The report covered the period from 1988 to 1998. The 
report found that the U.S. Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion 
worth of strategically sensitive U.S. exports to the People's Republic of 
China. The exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear 
weapons, 
machine nuclear weapon components, improve missile designs and build missile 
components. 
Some of this "dual-use" equipment went directly to China's leading nuclear, 
missile and military sites - the main vertebrae in China's strategic backbone. 
And several of these Chinese buyers later supplied nuclear, missile and 
military equipment to Iran and Pakistan. It seems clear that China received 
American 
exports of great military and strategic value with the blessing of the U.S. 
government. Consider the following:
The China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful 
for uranium prospecting. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for 
uranium that U.S. intelligence believes will be used to make nuclear weapons. 
The China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation was allowed to buy 
equipment useful for building China's new C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise 
missiles. China Precision then exported the missiles to Iran where, according 
to 
the U.S. naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten U.S. ships and 
personnel. 
The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to receive equipment to process 
data from a nuclear fusion research reactor. The Academy then exported the 
reactor to Iran, where it is used for training scientists believed to be 
working 
on nuclear weapons. 
American equipment was also approved for the National University of Defense 
Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons, 
for the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop 
stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, for the Beijing University of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in 
guidance, navigation, and flight dynamics. The licensing records do not reveal 
whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but it is safe to assume 
that virtually all of them were, otherwise it would not have been appropriate 
to 
apply for a license. 


------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

Other related posts: