Wolin is quoting from page 20 of Ernest Gellner, Words and Things: A Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology, 1959. I don't see how "ever on guard" is so very different from "on guard 24/7." Did they say "24/7" back in 1959 when Gellner wrote his book? Lawrence -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Walter C. Okshevsky Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2009 10:13 AM To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Lawrence Helm Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Heidegger and the Night Watchmen There is an unfortunate dualism marring Wolin's views below and he also gets the philosopher's hours wrong. The philosopher is on guard 24/7. The dualism reminds me of the error in thinking that there is a clear conceptual distinction between negative and positive freedom. Surely neither is possible without the other as all "freedom from" is a "freedom to" do something, or be something, or kiss someone ... We also fall prey to the fallacy of dualism in believing that the critique of knowledge is possible independent of some conviction and insight into the nature and conditions of knowledge. I can criticize the Toronto Maple Leafs for quite a number of pages; but the validity of my critique depends upon my understanding of hockey and the skills and dispositions its excellent performance requires. Walter O MUN Quoting Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>: > J.L. > > Well, yes, Robert Paul announced that he intended to "stir things up." When > one reaches a certain age one likes to do that, or (in my case) one likes to > be "stirred up." At the very least one can thereby assure oneself that one > isn't quite ready for the senility ward at the local old-folk's home. > > But in keeping with the tenor of the Robert Paul note, consider the > following from the introduction to Richard Wolin's Heidegger's Children, > Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse: > > "Today, philosophy departments are ruled by the methods of linguistic > analysis. Yet this school of philosophy represents another manner of > narrowing philosophy's influence and range. The existential concerns that > occupied pride of place in Heidegger's rich phenomenological inquiries seem > banished from philosophy's horizon. History and social criticism, too, seem > to have forfeited their place. Wittgenstein claimed that language games > must be understood as 'forms of life,' all language games make sense > internally. Thus, the goals of philosophy should be therapeutic rather than > substantive. The elimination of misunderstandings, rather than the > establishment of positive goals or agendas, is the end toward which thought > should aspire. Philosophy should, we are told, place more trust in common > sense or everyday linguistic practice. As a perceptive critic has remarked: > > 'Linguistic philosophy is conceived not merely as therapy or euthanasia, but > also as prophylaxis, and as a prophylaxis against a necessarily ever-present > danger. . . . This is the Night Watchman theory of philosophy: it has no > positive contribution of its own to make, but must ever be on guard against > possible abuses that would interfere with, or confuse, genuine knowledge.'" > > Lawrence >