[lit-ideas] Heidegger and Humanism
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lawrenchelm1. post@blogger. com" <lawrencehelm1.post@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2009 10:25:17 -0800
Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut wrote Heidegger and Modernity in 1988; which was
translated into English by Franklin Philip in 1990. In their introduction
they define "Humanism" using Sartre:
"Contrary to the claims of contemporary antihumanism, Sartre's
definition of humanism, which he was unfortunately to recant, means the
denial of a human essence, the refusal to shackle man with some historical
or natural definition. In a tradition going back to Rousseau, man appears
as the lone being for whom neither history nor nature can supply codes: if
man has a distinguishing feature, an authenticity (Eigentlichkeit), it can
only lie in his ability (small difference whether we call it transcendence
or freedom) to wrench himself free from every attribution of an essence. In
short, if the notion of humanism has a meaning, it is that the
distinguishing feature of man is his not having one; the definition of man
is to be indefinable; his essence is to have no essence. Things and no
doubt animals too are what they are; man alone is nothing: it is impossible
for him, without foundering in 'bad faith,' to equate himself with any
identity whatever, whether natural, familial, or social. And although it
follows that existentialism is a humanism, authentic humanism is also
necessarily and existentialism, for man's existence (eksistence =
transcendence, the ability to wrench oneself free of codes) is always beyond
any reduction to an essence."
Given this definition we can see how "unreasonable" it would be
for anyone to summarize man's "humanism" as being this or that. F&R go on
to refer to "the universal" which I won't quote at length. They say, ". . .
Plainly, each person endlessly risks confusing himself with particular
determinations; he may conceive of himself as belonging to a particular
nation, a sex, an ethnic or other group, a role, a social function; thus he
may be 'a nationalist,' 'a sexist,' 'a racist,' a 'corporatist' - but he may
also (and this is the humanitas of man) transcend these definitions by
entering into communication with other (universality)."
"To assert that the distinguishing feature of man is his
nothingness is to contend that he can wrench free of any particularism (and
aim toward universality). Saying that man aims at the universal means that
he is a nothingness, that he never wholly confuses himself with any
particular identity or being. The problematic of communication with others,
of intersubjectivity, thus proves inseparable from that of humanism as
existentialism."
F&R then express their exasperation: "Why under these
circumstances do the French Heideggerians need to maintain at any cost - at
the cost of truly mind-boggling contortions of the intellect and
manipulations of history of philosophy - the idea that humanism must be the
bearer of all ills, even to the point of being responsible for Heidegger's
political deviation? What imperative needs does Heidegger's thinking meet
so that, to safeguard its purity, we are asked to condemn if for what it is
not (a humanism) rather than for what it is (a deconstruction of humanism)?
COMMENT: F&R then go on to discus Farias' Heidegger and Nazism, but I'll
leave them here at present. Surely the antihumanists would not claim that
man has an essence. In fact they seem to be saying that the Humanists are
making that claim, but we see from F&R's definition that cannot be the case.
There is no essence, and if there seems to be one it will be discovered to
be founded in tradition. We do not break free from our essence to
licentiously rush hither and yon after every comfort and pleasure we
imagine. We break free from our traditions. Our traditions have a longer
view than that. They do not focus on immediate, short term pleasure, but on
long term success. They are what we have in place of instincts, and they
are intended for the good of our "group," and not to free us from
constraints.
Heidegger defined his "group" as the German Ethnicity. He
wanted Germans to hark back to that "tradition." No, man does not have an
essence, but it is not good for him to use this lack to believe in nothing
(nihilism). He should instead believe in (and be loyal to) his tradition.
But how will an individual or an association of people know when
they are functioning in keeping with their tradition? One should obviously
seek an "authentic" relationship with that tradition, but how shall we be
guided? How shall we know whether we are being authentic or inauthentic?
Well, in the case of the French, Derrida is up to that task of
deconstructing the authentic from the inauthentic. And if you are concerned
about the Christian "tradition," Bultmann will be happy to help you with
that by demythologizing Christianity in such a way as to show you the true
Christian tradition. They are the ubermenschen that you should look to.
I agree with Alan Bloom that we should not abandon our "Western"
tradition. Replacing "traditional" poets with modern politically-correct
poets, because we have no essence and can, moves us away from our "Western
Tradition" toward nihilism. For those of us who want to continue to honor
and (authentically coincide with as much as possible) our Western Tradition,
the arguments of the "Politically Correct" for some current fancy is
anathema. No, we "Western Traditionalists" can't prove that our tradition
is an essence. And no, we can't prove that an essence denies you
Politically Correct people your current fancy, but we can assert that what
you are doing isn't authentically relatable to the Western Tradition. We
can go further than that and assert that what you are doing smacks of
nihilism.
Lawrence Helm
www.lawrenchelm.com
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