[lit-ideas] He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave
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- Date: Fri, 30 May 2014 07:40:26 -0400 (EDT)
That was Grice's example of 'conventional' implicature. And he meant
'Jack', as viewed by Jill.
In a message dated 5/29/2014 9:38:10 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes in "Bernal Daiz confesses his fear":
"Bravery
consists in overcoming that fear, and after all, there are comrades to the
right and to the left. One doesn’t want to let them down now does one?"
Well, now R. Paul has reminded us of the passage in Aristotle which deals
with courage, bravery and fear. I shall re-quote it both in English and
Greek.
For never mind Wade, his background is Eton-Cambridge ("I read science" --
but "wasn't going to be a scientist" himself"). We may take L. Helm's words
as an analysis:
>Bravery consists in overcoming [...] fear.
This may be taken as an 'analysis': a man is brave if (and only if, as
logicians remind us) he overcomes [his] fear. I am reminded of Grice's example
of a CONVENTIONAL (not conversational) implicature:
Jill says of Jack:
Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, BRAVE.
(Grice spends five pages analysing this enthymeme, and he is only focusing
on 'therefore').
----
What does Aristotle says about 'bravery' (andreia -- a term that is cognate
with 'aner', as, oddly, perhaps, in Ancient Roman, 'virtus' (virtue) in
cognate with 'vir' (as in 'virility'). I'm less sure about 'brave', but the
Italians overuse it when they apply it to the common-or-garden prima donna
("Brava!").
Aristotle says:
"Now although the same things are not FEARFUL to everybody, there are some
terrors which we pronounce beyond human endurance, and these of course are
FEARFUL to everyone in his senses."
Or in his right senses, I would add. As St. George about to fight with the
dragon, let's say. Perhaps a good thing about St. George (my favourite
saint -- and England's patron saint) is that he _lacked_ rational senses --
but
then so did the dragon.
Aristotle goes on:
"And the terrors that man can endure differ in magnitude and degree; as
also do the situations inspiring
confidence."
"But the courageous man is proof against fear so far as man may be."
Here we seem to have an equivalent to Helm's dictum above ("bravery
consists in the overcoming of fear").
Note the caveat by Aristotle, a sort of 'ceteris paribus' caveat: "so far
as man may be".
Aristotle: "Hence although he [the brave man -- let's call him "Jack"]
will sometimes fear even terrors not beyond man's endurance, he will do so in
the right way"
Aristotle is concerned with criteria (as Wittgenstein and McEvoy may put
it). So he has to introduce the value-oriented 'right' as in 'right way'.
This will allow him to define the brave man as the one who overcomes fears "in
the right way".
Aristotle goes on:
"[A]nd he will endure them as principle dictates, for the sake of what is
noble"
Here there is a bit of the idea of 'mesotes', virtue and value. What is
noble is apparently just 'kalon', with my friends translate as 'nice', rather
than noble. Kalokagathia being nice-and-good, or beautiful-and-good. Plato
applied 'kalon' to the 'shape' only. So 'kalon' may be 'figurative' here.
The opposite is 'kakon', or as Cicero would translate, 'malicia', or 'vice'.
So we have a contrast between 'virtue' and 'vice' and the right way to
stay in the middle.
In other words, the brave man pursues a noble end (where 'noble' is
'kalon', rather than its opposite -- the vicious man who pursues an ugly end).
Here Aristotle indulges in a bit of reasoning, which is NOT deductive,
although the translation features 'therefore'. Rather, the syllogism (or
argument)
goes:
It's the 'telos' that defines an activity.
If a 'telos' (or end) is noble, so is the activity that aims at it.
The 'telos' of the courageous man is 'noble'
----
Therefore the activity of the courageous man is noble.
Transitivity of nobility, we may call it, from 'telos' to 'agency'.
---- This 'telos', incidentally, may prove problematic when we think that a
baboon (or a couple thereof) are pursuing 'noble ends' when attacking a
leopard. Biologists reject the idea of 'intention' (and possibly 'end of
action as intended by the agent') in their analyses and descriptions.
Aristotle goes on:
"[F]or that is the end at which virtue [arete, not 'virtus'] aims."
Aristotle continues:
"On the other hand it is possible to fear such terrors too much, and too
little."
Here he is applying the idea of 'mediocritas' or mesotes. It's fearing the
fear 'in the right way' that makes the man rightly brave, rather than
overbrave, as it were. There may be a problem here, and Aristotle (and later
Urmson) knew it, when it comes to the 'hero'.
Urmson wrote an essay, "Saints and Heroes", and noted that they engage in
super-erogatory actions. They don't do what they 'ought' to do. They do MORE
than they ought to do. This is an interesting paradox. Cfr. Achilles
(semi-god anyway) vs. Hector, say, and it would be good to trace the Illiad
references in "Red Badge of Courage".
Aristotle was obsessed with the 'heroic' since he thought of having it as
criterion for the noble style or elevated style and tragedy.
Aristotle goes on:
"and also to fear things that are not fearful as if they were fearful."
-- this may be the symptom of a 'coward', which is Crane's obsession, and
the (-)-extreme in the bravery scale.
Aristotle goes on:
"Error arises either from FEARING what one ought NOT to fear,"
e.g. what is described as a ghost, knowing that ghosts do not exist.
"or from fearing in the wrong manner,"
back to the sort of undefined primitive, 'the right way'.
"or at the wrong time, or the like; and similarly with regard to
occasions for confidence."
The Greeks, fortunately, had not developed gladiatorial games, but
Spartacus (a Greek) will later excell in them. I would think that the bravery
of a
gladiator is ultimately stupid. Or rather, even if he does NOT fear (as he
faces three hungry lions -- or is merely a 'net-gladiator' without shield
or spear) he is not being 'brave' "in the right way", but rather "at the
wrong time", for while people did apply for gladiators, it was usually a
change of fortune (becoming a prisoner of war) that turned a noble person into
a
gladiator. And who wants to fight just to 'entertain' the emperor and his
populace ('bread and circus')? The end does not somehow seem too noble.
Aristotle goes on:
"The courageous man then is he that endures or FEARS the right things and
for the right purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and
who shows confidence in a similar way. For the courageous man feels and acts
as the circumstances merit, and as principle may dictate."
The 'principle' is an idiom that R. M. Hare will inherit. Once J. L. Austin
asked R. M. Hare if he would accept a bribe from a student. "No," said
Hare. Austin continued, "but what would be your full answer?".
"I don't accept bribes _on principle_."
Austin retorted: "I think that's being, as Grice would have it,
overinformative. I would stick with a simpler, "No, thankyou."
----
Aristotle:
"And every activity aims at the end that corresponds to the disposition
of which it is the
manifestation. So it is therefore with the activity of the courageous
man: his courage is noble; therefore its end is nobility, for a thing is
defined by its end; therefore the courageous man endures the terrors and
dares
the deeds that manifest courage, for the sake of that which is noble."
I was noting the use of 'therefore', which may be confusing.
It's not that Aristotle infers 'the end is noble' from the premise 'the
courageous act is noble'. Rather it's the other way round: the end of the
courageous action is noble; therefore, the courageous action is noble.
The Greek can nicely confuse us all -- but this is what Aristotle
ultimately HAD IN MIND!
It runs: τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι
καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε
νοῦν ἔχοντι: τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ
τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ
ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ
καλοῦ ἕνεκα: τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον
καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς
τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἣ μὲν ὅτι ὃ
οὐ δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν
τοιούτων: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ
δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ
καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος: κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ,
καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.
τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.τὸ δὲ
φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτό, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ
ἄνθρωπον. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι: τὰ
δὲ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ
ἧττον: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος
ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς
δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα: τοῦτο
γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ταῦτα
φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι τὰ μὴ φοβερὰ ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι
. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἣ μὲν ὅτι ὃ οὐ δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι
οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἣ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων: ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα
ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος: κατ᾽ ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ
λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. τέλος δὲ πάσης
ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν. †καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ
ἀνδρεία καλόν.† τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος: ὁρίζεται γὰρ
ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ
πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ
μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος （εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς
πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν ἀνώνυμα）, εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις
μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε
κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς: ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν
ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι
ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας: ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος
περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι: ἐν οἷς
οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν
θρασύδειλοι: ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ
οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός:
καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. καλοῦ δὴ
ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ἀνδρείαν. τῶν δ᾽ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος
（εἴρηται δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι πολλά ἐστιν
ἀνώνυμα）, εἴη δ᾽ ἄν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλγητος, εἰ μηδὲν
φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς
Κελτούς: ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ
θρασύς. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζὼν εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ
προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας: ὡς γοῦν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει,
οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι: ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται.
διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασύδειλοι: ἐν τούτοις
γὰρ θρασυνόμενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. ὁ δὲ τῷ
φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων δειλός: καὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὡς
οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ.
Grice would have us do 'linguistic botany': look for synonyms to 'brave'
and 'courageous', or bravery and courage (as in the red badge of courage).
For Aristotle uses 'andreia', and I think this colours his reasoning a bit,
in that it's blatantly cognate with 'aner' (man, or rather perhaps
masculinity, as in 'virile'). So the axiom, 'a brave man is no man' seems to
follow.
Using other epithets may yield different results. And it may do to:
--- to check if Greek philosophers pointed to the cognateness of 'andreia'
(bravery) with 'aner' (man).
--- to check if the astute Cicero noted that the exact translation of
'andreia' is perhaps 'virtus' -- or explored, as per an exercise of 'linguistic
botany' that he adored, the different epithets that apply to a range of
behaviours.
Cheers,
Speranza
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