[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 14:17:26 -0400

My last post today!

In a message dated  3/24/2015 10:44:18 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx  writes:
Trying to milk the ordinary language for such insights seems rather  like 
trying to find out what a mechanic should do about a broken car by  analyzing 
the terms 'car' and 'mechanic.' Lingustic analysis may be expected to  
render some grammar rules for talking about cars and mechanics, not 
instructions 
 for repairing cars.  

Well, we do expect the car mechanic to have a concept (or as Dworkin  
prefers, 'a conception') of car, auto parts, mechanics, and general Newtonian  
physics.
 
Omar K.:
 
"As to whether judges 'make the law,' there is no contradiction in saying  
that they do so"
 
-- Well, it did worry Hart, but it does have a 'harsh' ring to it, and by  
someone who is obliged, as it were, by the standards of linguistic botany 
(or  'usage' if you mustn't) he had to consider the case very CAREFULLY (his  
favourite adverb) especially noting that Dworkin (of all people!) had chosen 
 that turn of phrase, a judge 'making the law' as misleading -- forgetting  
Grice's lesson that LOADS of things are misleading YET TRUE!

Oddly, in the compilation entitled "Hart's postscript", C. A. B.  Peacocke, 
professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, makes an example with  
Hartian implicatures. Peacocke notes that Newton, since we were talking about  
him, had to use the concept of 'limit', even if he (Newton) was unable to  
provide a conceptual analysis of it. So we have, to use Hart's favourite 
adverb,  to proceed "very carefully" here.
 
 
On a different, but related, note, McEvoy mentions biscuits as  
refreshments:
 
"God is disappointed in Mike for thinking ... it is good enough to produce  
a philosophy but have no biscuits left. ... to follow God's path you must 
make  sure there's always refreshments", and previously had noted that 
something "has  led God to think He must remove Hart from most of these 
universes 
as  well".
 
Part of the reason for introducing Hart into the heart of lit-ideas had to  
do with McEvoy's reference to Popper -- which to me, implicated: "Hart" 
(the  implicature is admittedly not a short-circuit one: it goes alla: Popper 
is  allegedly right, and linguistic analytical philosophers are allegedly by  
definition wrong -- but Hart was an analytic philosopher and NOT ALWAYS 
wrong --  perhaps never wrong!
 
It all started, then, or re-started, with a post by McEvoy entitled, "Re:  
tense":
 
McEvoy writes:

"Though I did not bother to make explicit the  importance of a case like 
Pilcher for any viable 'theory of knowledge', I  think anyone re-reading those 
old posts might see they present a challenge  to anyone who thinks 'law' 
can be grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism,  or a Cartesian 
'intuitionism' etc. Apologies 
for not making this clear at  the time but I did not get round to 
developing this underlying point - and  thanks to Omar for giving me this 
opportunity 
to clarify some  things."
 
Note the reference to a "challenge to anyone who thinks 'law' can be  
grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism, or a Cartesian 'intuitionism',  etc."
 
I especially loved "etc." (a very Hartian turn of phrase), which, to me,  
logically implicated, "Hart" -- the man hisself! 
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
 
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