My last post today! In a message dated 3/24/2015 10:44:18 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: Trying to milk the ordinary language for such insights seems rather like trying to find out what a mechanic should do about a broken car by analyzing the terms 'car' and 'mechanic.' Lingustic analysis may be expected to render some grammar rules for talking about cars and mechanics, not instructions for repairing cars. Well, we do expect the car mechanic to have a concept (or as Dworkin prefers, 'a conception') of car, auto parts, mechanics, and general Newtonian physics. Omar K.: "As to whether judges 'make the law,' there is no contradiction in saying that they do so" -- Well, it did worry Hart, but it does have a 'harsh' ring to it, and by someone who is obliged, as it were, by the standards of linguistic botany (or 'usage' if you mustn't) he had to consider the case very CAREFULLY (his favourite adverb) especially noting that Dworkin (of all people!) had chosen that turn of phrase, a judge 'making the law' as misleading -- forgetting Grice's lesson that LOADS of things are misleading YET TRUE! Oddly, in the compilation entitled "Hart's postscript", C. A. B. Peacocke, professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, makes an example with Hartian implicatures. Peacocke notes that Newton, since we were talking about him, had to use the concept of 'limit', even if he (Newton) was unable to provide a conceptual analysis of it. So we have, to use Hart's favourite adverb, to proceed "very carefully" here. On a different, but related, note, McEvoy mentions biscuits as refreshments: "God is disappointed in Mike for thinking ... it is good enough to produce a philosophy but have no biscuits left. ... to follow God's path you must make sure there's always refreshments", and previously had noted that something "has led God to think He must remove Hart from most of these universes as well". Part of the reason for introducing Hart into the heart of lit-ideas had to do with McEvoy's reference to Popper -- which to me, implicated: "Hart" (the implicature is admittedly not a short-circuit one: it goes alla: Popper is allegedly right, and linguistic analytical philosophers are allegedly by definition wrong -- but Hart was an analytic philosopher and NOT ALWAYS wrong -- perhaps never wrong! It all started, then, or re-started, with a post by McEvoy entitled, "Re: tense": McEvoy writes: "Though I did not bother to make explicit the importance of a case like Pilcher for any viable 'theory of knowledge', I think anyone re-reading those old posts might see they present a challenge to anyone who thinks 'law' can be grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism, or a Cartesian 'intuitionism' etc. Apologies for not making this clear at the time but I did not get round to developing this underlying point - and thanks to Omar for giving me this opportunity to clarify some things." Note the reference to a "challenge to anyone who thinks 'law' can be grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism, or a Cartesian 'intuitionism', etc." I especially loved "etc." (a very Hartian turn of phrase), which, to me, logically implicated, "Hart" -- the man hisself! Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html