[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2015 14:01:07 -0400
In a message dated 3/23/2015 9:58:15 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
_jejunejesuit.geary2@gmail.com_ (mailto:jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx) writes:
None of the biscuits, I am embarrassed to say, made it through to the
logical end.
I don't think you should be embarrassed. Actually, I think J. L. Austin
was the one that was embarrassed when he thought that 'if' had a different
_sense_ in:
i. If you are hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard.
He said that to Hart -- never to Grice (fearing it might trigger the wrong
implicature). As a result, Hart started using 'biscuit' conditionals, as
he called them.
R. E. Grandy, who knew Grice well, tried to justify Austin.
Grandy offers the following analysis of a biscuit conditional.
Conditionals generally in conversation are a type of peripheric speech-act
called a "conditional assertion".
For a sentence of the form "if p, q" one does not assert a new conditional
proposition that has its own truth value.
Rather, one conditionally asserts q, with p being its condition.
If p is true, then one has "asserted" q, or is committed to "q"
If p is false, then one has asserted nothing.
Therefore, the truth value of the statement is the same as the truth value
of q, if p is true; but if p is false, nothing was asserted.
This analysis can explain the difference between what Grice calls an
ordinary "indicative conditionals" and J. L. Austin's biscuit conditionals,
while uniting both in a common analysis.
On Grandy's account ("do not multiply senses of "if" beyond necessity") an
ordinary conditional is stated on the warrant that the truth of q,
conditional on p, is highly probable.
J. L. Austin's biscuit conditional is stated on the warrant that the
conversational relevance of q, conditional on p, is highly probable.
We therefore might utter a biscuit conditionals in lieu of either silence
(where we're certain enough of q's irrelevance to say nothing) and uttering
q outright -- "There are biscuits in the cupboard"), where we're certain
enough of q's relevance to say q) - that is, when we have enough of an
inkling of q's relevance to bring it up, but not enough to commit ourselves to
an assertion of q.
But, as Geary notes, the issue is larger. For we are considering the
METHODOLOGY of Philosophy in general and Legal Philosophy in particular.
Instead
of searching for a taxonomy for the different branches of philosophy we
rest assured that, as long as we apply the right philosophical methodology, we
can feel Hart is doing the right thing.
Geary expands on this:
"It is precisely that Common Methodological Approach to Philosophy which
Speranza suggests as a means of studying Hart as pertains to the role that
first principles play in his legal philosophy as promulgated and practiced
by him. Indeed it is just such a Common Methodological Approach to
Philosophy that I have been developing, ... and have finally completed. None
of
the biscuits, I am embarrassed to say, made it through to the logical end."
Linguistic botany was, for Hart, the common methodological approach to ALL
philosophy ("There is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of them").
It is best illustrated by Hart's distinction, not often made, between
'being obliged' and 'being obligated'. Hart's example involves a 'gunnman' and
he uses that again Austin (by Austin I mean John Austin, not J. L. Austin),
since Austin (John Austin) saw that 'oblige' was the key to the science of
jurisprudence. The example, pretty convoluted, by John Austin, involves a
gunman who, "at gunpoint", as Austin puts it, orders you to give him (the
gunman) your wallet.
As Hart notes, this can hardly lead us to the 'heart' of legality:
Hart writes:
"The gunman orders his victim to hand over his purse and threatens to shoot
if he he refuses. If the victim complies we refer to the way in which he
was forced to do so by saying that he was "obliged" [but never 'obligated']
to do so. To Austin it seemed clear that in this situation where one person
gives another an order backed by threats, and, in this sense of "oblige",
obliges [but does not obligate] him to comply, we have the essence of law,
or at least 'the key to the science of jurisprudence', as he puts it."
If that's not linguistic botany, Hart doesn't know what is!
Cheers,
Speranza
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts: