[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2015 07:19:51 +0100

That would be spelled 'fukinimbecils.'


On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 10:46 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>

> >Once upon a time a fewimbecils introduced coke-lite,>
> Am on phone trying to relay this post to someone important but am
> struggling. Is that pronounced "Fuh-wim-beck-uls"?
> D
> L
>   On Friday, 20 March 2015, 14:50, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Once upon a time a fewimbecils introduced coke-lite, followed by
> philosophy-lite. It won't and didn’t take too long to get the
> philosophy-ZERO, no calories, no content, no coke, no fat, in fact piles
> and piles of words saying exactly nothing
> -----Original Message-----
> From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: 20 March 2015 14:20
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
> My last post today!
> In a message dated 3/20/2015 7:42:50 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
> Perhaps Grice would have wanted to be introduced  as "our man at
> everything." However, the notion that, if one is good at  philosophy, one
> is equally good at metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of  science,
> philosophy of law, and whatever comes to mind under the heading
> 'philosophy of such and such'
> strikes me as a phantasy, and a hybristic one.  Even Bertrand Russell, who
> certainly was very broadly educated - honestly  probably more so than Grice
> - acknowledged that he didn't know much about  aesthetics, and didn't
> publish on it.
> Again, the source of this is the very wise and Aristotelian adage,
> "Philosophy, like virtue, is entire".
> This has a VERY COMPLEX logical form. If we think of Achilles, for
> example,  and his alleged virtues. Surely Aristotle was obsessed with
> bravery, as he  should. But surely, too, if Achilles was virtues, it is
> virtue as a 'unity' we  should be looking at.
> Grice was a captain with the Royal Navy, and we all know about coordinates
> in longitude and latitude. When he left the Navy to return to philosophy
> (although once a captain, always a captain) he applied Long. and Lat. to
> philosophy. He claimed that we are still talking about what Thales spoke,
> because Philosophy has LATITUDINAL unity.
> And Thales did not just say that all is water. Since there is LONGITUDINAL
> unity, Thales was a philosopher, therefore, he philosophised in an
> unitary*  way.
> So, if there is LATITUDINAL unity in philosophy, it means that legal
> philosophy fits somewhere. This is perhaps well expressed by McEvoy, in a
> different context, when he writes in Re: Hartiana:
> "In the hands of "legal philosophers", 'legal philosophy' is effectively a
> form of 'philosophy-lite', that takes law-related issues as its
> subject-matter."
> where the keyword is "PHILOSOPHY-LITE" (as used by McEvoy and Jim Wilson,
> "New and Selected Philosophy-lite" -- but not necessarily me).
> Take again Hart and Grice on convention. Hart speaks seriously of at least
> two-people scenario. Grice goes further and speaks of the New Highway Code
> he  once invents while lying in his tub.
> The idea is merely to enhance conceptual analysis.
> For by referring to this Highway Code, Grice is into something else:
> "X [may be current] only for utterer U"
> i.e. a 'convention' may not NEED two (or more) individuals, as Hart's
> usual  scenarios are.
> X is current iff it is only U's practice to utter X in  such-and-such
> circumstances.
> In this case, U WILL surely have a readiness to  utter X  in
> such-and-such circumstances -- even 'meaning' something.
> This is related to a slightly different scenario "in which X is NOT
> current  at all, but the utterance of X in such-and-such circumstances is
> part of SOME SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION which U [ALONE] has devised but which
> has never been put into operation (like the highway code which I invent one
> day while lying in my bath)."
> Or a legal system designed by von Wright (Hart loved what he called
> "Scandinavian legal philosophy" and he was ready to use the proper
> nationalistic label). (Keyword: Scandinavian realism).
> In that case, U surely HAS a procedure for X in, granted the  _attenuated_
> sense (i.e. way) that U has envisaged a  possible  system of practices
> which WOULD involve a READINESS to utter X  in such-and-such circumstances."
> ---- Studies in the Way of Words, WOW,  p. 128.  (Cfr. Robinson Crusoe's
> legal system -- before Friday enters the  scene).
> When Chomsky read this (in Searle's compilation, "The philosophy of
> language", Oxford readings in philosophy, ed. by Warnock) he said,
> "Behaviourist!" in a bad tone, but neither Grice nor Hart are behaviourist
> in  the old Watson-type style of 'machine-without-the-ghost' type of
> behaviourism  (even if for Hart it seems an analytic truth that a rule
> needs to be associated with some relevant behaviour -- or other --
> 'manifested' as Witters would prefer).
> Where exactly LEGAL Philosophy fits in Philosophy's latitudinal history
> may  well incite a dispute between Grice and Hart, which is where the fun
> of philosophy rests.
> "Philosophy, like Virtue, is One."
> Or, if you prefer, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of
> them.
> Cheers,
> Speranza
> * Not to be confused with Unitarianism -- but related to it! I'm not
> surprised that Grice's philosophical unitarianism (cfr. 'virtue
> unitarianism) may provoke as much controversy as 'theological' unitarianism
> did -- especially  in Ancient Rome.
> Appendix on unitarianism.
> Unitarians trace their history back to the Apostolic Age, i.e. the life of
> Jesus and the decades immediately after his death, and claim this doctrine
> was  widespread during the pre-Nicene period, that is, before the First
> Council of  Nicaea met in 325. Many believe their Christology
> (understanding of Jesus  Christ) most closely reflects that of the
> "original Christians." (For a  discussion of the New Testament evidence,
> see Nontrinitarianism.)
> While it is evident that other Christologies existed in the late 1st and
> early 2nd centuries, at least some Jewish-Christian congregations tended to
> hold  the view that Jesus was a great man and prophet, even the Son of God,
> but not  God himself. (See Ebionites.)
> One of the earliest controversies over the nature of Christ that involved
> the propagation of "unitarian" ideas broke out at Rome during the
> episcopate of  Victor I (189–199). This was the so-called "Monarchian
> controversy", which  originated in a revolt against the influential Logos
> theology of Justin Martyr  and the apologists, who had spoken of Jesus as a
> second god. Such language was  disturbing to some. Justin's language
> appeared to promote ditheism (two gods).  The view, however, was defended
> by Hippolytus of Rome, for whom it was essential  to say that the Father
> and the Logos are two distinct "persons" (prosopa).
> Some critics of Justin's theology tried to preserve the unity of God by
> saying that there is no difference to be discerned between the ‘Son’ and
> the ‘Father’ (unless ‘Son’ is a name for the physical body or humanity of
> Christ and  ‘Father’ a name for the divine Spirit within). This sort of
> thinking, known as  Modal Monarchianism or Sabellianism, would one day lead
> to a compromise doctrine  that the Father and the Son are consubstantial
> (of the same being).
> Other critics preserved the unity of God by saying that Jesus was a man,
> but differentiated in being indwelt by the Spirit of God to an absolute and
> unique degree. They thus denied that Jesus was God or a god. They became
> known  as "adoptionists", because they suggested that Jesus was adopted by
> the Father  to be his Son. This view was associated with Theodotus of
> Byzantium (the  Shoemaker) and Artemon.
> So even at this early stage we find evidence of proto-Arianism (Justin's
> view) and proto-Socinianism (the Adoptionist view), though they were, as
> yet,  not fully formed. Both of these theologies have similarities to
> latter day  Unitarianism.
> The Monarchian controversy came to a head again in the mid-3rd century. In
> 259 the help of Dionysius of Alexandria, was invoked in a dispute among
> the  churches in Libya between adherents of Justin's Logos-theology and
> some modalist  Monarchians. Dionysius vehemently attacked the modalist
> standpoint.
> He affirmed  that the Son and the Father were as different as a boat and a
> boatman and denied  that they were "of one substance" (homoousios). The
> Libyans appealed to  Dionysius of Rome, whose rebuke to his Alexandrian
> namesake stressed the unity  of God and condemned "those who divide the
> divine monarchy into three separate  hypostases and three deities".
> Another crisis occurred over Paul of Samosata, who became bishop of
> Antioch  in Syria in 260. Paul's doctrine is akin to the primitive
> Jewish-Christian idea  of the person of Christ and to the Christology of
> Theodotus of Byzantium  (adoptionism). To many his doctrine seemed plain
> heresy, and a council of local  bishops was held to consider his case in
> 268. The bishops found it easier to  condemn Paul than to expel him, and he
> remained in full possession of the church  with his enthusiastic
> supporters. However, the bishops appealed to the Roman  emperor, who
> decided that the legal right to the church building should be  assigned "to
> those to whom the bishops of Italy and Rome should communicate in
> writing". It was the first time that an ecclesiastical dispute had to be
> settled  by the secular power. So Paul was put out of his  church.
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