That would be spelled 'fukinimbecils.' O.K. On Fri, Mar 20, 2015 at 10:46 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > >Once upon a time a fewimbecils introduced coke-lite,> > > Am on phone trying to relay this post to someone important but am > struggling. Is that pronounced "Fuh-wim-beck-uls"? > > D > L > > > > > On Friday, 20 March 2015, 14:50, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Once upon a time a fewimbecils introduced coke-lite, followed by > philosophy-lite. It won't and didn’t take too long to get the > philosophy-ZERO, no calories, no content, no coke, no fat, in fact piles > and piles of words saying exactly nothing > > -----Original Message----- > From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto: > lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Sent: 20 March 2015 14:20 > To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana > > My last post today! > > In a message dated 3/20/2015 7:42:50 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: > Perhaps Grice would have wanted to be introduced as "our man at > everything." However, the notion that, if one is good at philosophy, one > is equally good at metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, > philosophy of law, and whatever comes to mind under the heading > 'philosophy of such and such' > strikes me as a phantasy, and a hybristic one. Even Bertrand Russell, who > certainly was very broadly educated - honestly probably more so than Grice > - acknowledged that he didn't know much about aesthetics, and didn't > publish on it. > > Again, the source of this is the very wise and Aristotelian adage, > > "Philosophy, like virtue, is entire". > > This has a VERY COMPLEX logical form. If we think of Achilles, for > example, and his alleged virtues. Surely Aristotle was obsessed with > bravery, as he should. But surely, too, if Achilles was virtues, it is > virtue as a 'unity' we should be looking at. > > Grice was a captain with the Royal Navy, and we all know about coordinates > in longitude and latitude. When he left the Navy to return to philosophy > (although once a captain, always a captain) he applied Long. and Lat. to > philosophy. He claimed that we are still talking about what Thales spoke, > because Philosophy has LATITUDINAL unity. > > And Thales did not just say that all is water. Since there is LONGITUDINAL > unity, Thales was a philosopher, therefore, he philosophised in an > unitary* way. > > So, if there is LATITUDINAL unity in philosophy, it means that legal > philosophy fits somewhere. This is perhaps well expressed by McEvoy, in a > different context, when he writes in Re: Hartiana: > > "In the hands of "legal philosophers", 'legal philosophy' is effectively a > form of 'philosophy-lite', that takes law-related issues as its > subject-matter." > > where the keyword is "PHILOSOPHY-LITE" (as used by McEvoy and Jim Wilson, > "New and Selected Philosophy-lite" -- but not necessarily me). > > Take again Hart and Grice on convention. Hart speaks seriously of at least > two-people scenario. Grice goes further and speaks of the New Highway Code > he once invents while lying in his tub. > > The idea is merely to enhance conceptual analysis. > > For by referring to this Highway Code, Grice is into something else: > > "X [may be current] only for utterer U" > > i.e. a 'convention' may not NEED two (or more) individuals, as Hart's > usual scenarios are. > > X is current iff it is only U's practice to utter X in such-and-such > circumstances. > > In this case, U WILL surely have a readiness to utter X in > such-and-such circumstances -- even 'meaning' something. > > This is related to a slightly different scenario "in which X is NOT > current at all, but the utterance of X in such-and-such circumstances is > part of SOME SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION which U [ALONE] has devised but which > has never been put into operation (like the highway code which I invent one > day while lying in my bath)." > > Or a legal system designed by von Wright (Hart loved what he called > "Scandinavian legal philosophy" and he was ready to use the proper > nationalistic label). (Keyword: Scandinavian realism). > > In that case, U surely HAS a procedure for X in, granted the _attenuated_ > sense (i.e. way) that U has envisaged a possible system of practices > which WOULD involve a READINESS to utter X in such-and-such circumstances." > ---- Studies in the Way of Words, WOW, p. 128. (Cfr. Robinson Crusoe's > legal system -- before Friday enters the scene). > > When Chomsky read this (in Searle's compilation, "The philosophy of > language", Oxford readings in philosophy, ed. by Warnock) he said, > "Behaviourist!" in a bad tone, but neither Grice nor Hart are behaviourist > in the old Watson-type style of 'machine-without-the-ghost' type of > behaviourism (even if for Hart it seems an analytic truth that a rule > needs to be associated with some relevant behaviour -- or other -- > 'manifested' as Witters would prefer). > > Where exactly LEGAL Philosophy fits in Philosophy's latitudinal history > may well incite a dispute between Grice and Hart, which is where the fun > of philosophy rests. > > "Philosophy, like Virtue, is One." > > Or, if you prefer, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of > them. > > Cheers, > > Speranza > > * Not to be confused with Unitarianism -- but related to it! I'm not > surprised that Grice's philosophical unitarianism (cfr. 'virtue > unitarianism) may provoke as much controversy as 'theological' unitarianism > did -- especially in Ancient Rome. > > Appendix on unitarianism. > > Unitarians trace their history back to the Apostolic Age, i.e. the life of > Jesus and the decades immediately after his death, and claim this doctrine > was widespread during the pre-Nicene period, that is, before the First > Council of Nicaea met in 325. Many believe their Christology > (understanding of Jesus Christ) most closely reflects that of the > "original Christians." (For a discussion of the New Testament evidence, > see Nontrinitarianism.) > > While it is evident that other Christologies existed in the late 1st and > early 2nd centuries, at least some Jewish-Christian congregations tended to > hold the view that Jesus was a great man and prophet, even the Son of God, > but not God himself. (See Ebionites.) > > One of the earliest controversies over the nature of Christ that involved > the propagation of "unitarian" ideas broke out at Rome during the > episcopate of Victor I (189–199). This was the so-called "Monarchian > controversy", which originated in a revolt against the influential Logos > theology of Justin Martyr and the apologists, who had spoken of Jesus as a > second god. Such language was disturbing to some. Justin's language > appeared to promote ditheism (two gods). The view, however, was defended > by Hippolytus of Rome, for whom it was essential to say that the Father > and the Logos are two distinct "persons" (prosopa). > > Some critics of Justin's theology tried to preserve the unity of God by > saying that there is no difference to be discerned between the ‘Son’ and > the ‘Father’ (unless ‘Son’ is a name for the physical body or humanity of > Christ and ‘Father’ a name for the divine Spirit within). This sort of > thinking, known as Modal Monarchianism or Sabellianism, would one day lead > to a compromise doctrine that the Father and the Son are consubstantial > (of the same being). > > Other critics preserved the unity of God by saying that Jesus was a man, > but differentiated in being indwelt by the Spirit of God to an absolute and > unique degree. They thus denied that Jesus was God or a god. They became > known as "adoptionists", because they suggested that Jesus was adopted by > the Father to be his Son. This view was associated with Theodotus of > Byzantium (the Shoemaker) and Artemon. > > So even at this early stage we find evidence of proto-Arianism (Justin's > view) and proto-Socinianism (the Adoptionist view), though they were, as > yet, not fully formed. Both of these theologies have similarities to > latter day Unitarianism. > > The Monarchian controversy came to a head again in the mid-3rd century. In > 259 the help of Dionysius of Alexandria, was invoked in a dispute among > the churches in Libya between adherents of Justin's Logos-theology and > some modalist Monarchians. Dionysius vehemently attacked the modalist > standpoint. > He affirmed that the Son and the Father were as different as a boat and a > boatman and denied that they were "of one substance" (homoousios). The > Libyans appealed to Dionysius of Rome, whose rebuke to his Alexandrian > namesake stressed the unity of God and condemned "those who divide the > divine monarchy into three separate hypostases and three deities". > > Another crisis occurred over Paul of Samosata, who became bishop of > Antioch in Syria in 260. Paul's doctrine is akin to the primitive > Jewish-Christian idea of the person of Christ and to the Christology of > Theodotus of Byzantium (adoptionism). To many his doctrine seemed plain > heresy, and a council of local bishops was held to consider his case in > 268. The bishops found it easier to condemn Paul than to expel him, and he > remained in full possession of the church with his enthusiastic > supporters. However, the bishops appealed to the Roman emperor, who > decided that the legal right to the church building should be assigned "to > those to whom the bishops of Italy and Rome should communicate in > writing". It was the first time that an ecclesiastical dispute had to be > settled by the secular power. So Paul was put out of his church. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > > > >