[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 16:47:38 +0200
As to "the rule of recognition" for laws:
1. Does it help that they are usually called laws ?
2. They need to be endorsed by the relevant institution. One then looks for
a signature / stamp somewhere at the bottom of the act that confirms this.
They will usually also be published in an official gazette.
Perhaps I am missing the point as to what mystical, metaphysical "rule of
recognition" is sought here.
O.K.
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 12:33 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> My last post today!
>
> The Greeks loved a criterion.
>
> The Romans followed suit. Cognate Roman words with the Greek word include:
> cribrum: "sieve," crimen: "judgment, crime," and cernere (past participle
> "cretus") "to sift, separate".
>
> And so did Hart! (He speaks of the rule of recognition as "the ultimate
> criterion in identifying the law.") (in HIS case, following Witters, who,
> if
> he never defined 'criterion', he may have implicated that G. E. M.
> Anscombe
> should re-read Plato (in "Theaetetus", 178b) or Aristotle (in
> "Metaphysics", 1068a3), who both use it.
>
> In a message dated 3/29/2015 5:13:18 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "'W]hat we have in PI is W attempting
> to show what
> he thinks can only be shown. This is the central and running theme of PI."
>
> I wonder if we can add the idea of an outward criterion now. Because a
> criterial semanticist would perhaps want to add that what 'can only be
> shown'
> needs some bit of a criterion to go along with.
>
> McEvoy goes on: The fundamental point of that "That" is that it is a
> "That" by which the meaning is shown, not said. Likewise, the difference
> between
> "this value" and "that one" is a difference in meaning that is shown in
> the difference of the values arrived at for y - it is not a difference in
> meaning said by those different values. Further, and likewise, the
> difference
> in meaning between "x2" and "2X" is also shown by the way these are used
> differently etc. and is not a difference said by their expression. For W
> in
> PI, what he is writing constitutes not a general theory of meaning [in
> contrast to the Tractatus, though even in the Tractatus its general
> theory of
> meaning involves a crucial distinction between what can be said and what
> can
> only be shown, and it turns out its general theory of meaning cannot be
> said but only shown]; what W writes in PI offers examples of how meaning
> is
> shown, without W ever saying how meaning is shown in any sense that takes
> us
> beyond what is shown by the examples. W never says how meaning is shown in
> any such further sense because it is his view that this is beyond the
> "limits of language" i.e. the "limits of language" are such that it is not
> possible to say in language how meaning is shown by language. Hence W
> answers the
> question "What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant?" not by
> giving some general account of any such "criterion" but by referring to
> examples by which the meaning of a specific formula may be shown: "It is,
> for
> example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use
> it." In teaching someone the use of words we show their sense; in using
> the
> words in accordance with this teaching we show their sense.
> What W is getting at here could be rephrased as follows: "Now ask
> yourself, how is it shown that one means the one thing or the other by
> "x!2"? How
> it is shown may be, for example, by the kind of way we always use it, by
> the
> way we are taught to use it. How it is shown will reveal the sense in
> which meaning it can determine the steps in advance."
>
> One key passage here that relates to 'criterial semantics' (as Gordon
> Baker used it, and as Dworkin used it to apply it to H. L. A. Hart) is
> McEvoy's:
>
> "W[itters] answers the question, 'What is the criterion [...]?' NOT by
> giving some general account of any such 'criterion'."
>
> Perhaps this allows for a couple of readings. Seeing that Albritton filled
> pages with Witters's use of 'criterion', and added a postcript to his
> (Albritton's locus classicus) it may well be suggested that while Witters
> never
> answers the question as to what a criterion is -- he SHOWS it!
>
> "Criterion" (or as I prefer, criteria) seems a key concept in Witters's
> prose, even if he never SAYS what he means by it -- perhaps he is
> expecting
> his addressee to get a copy of Liddell and Scott (yes, the Liddell of
> Alice
> in Wonderland).
>
> The word is a neuter one:
>
> κριτήριον , τό,
>
> And it's defined by Liddell and Scott as a "means for judging or trying",
> a "standard", frequently of the mental faculties and senses.
>
> The first citation they give is:
>
> “ἔχων αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ”
>
> Plato Theaetetus 178b.
>
> Cf. R.582a, Plu.2.448b, etc..
>
> The second explicit citation is:
>
> “τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν χυμῶν”
>
> Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1068a3.
>
> Cf. Epicur.Ep.1p.5U. (pl.), Sent.24, al.
>
> The third explicit citation they give is:
>
> περὶ κριτηρίου
>
> -- a title of works by good ole Epicurus (D.L.10.27), Posidonius (Diocl.
> ap. D.L.7.54), and Ptolemy: generally,
> and here is where they give the fourth explicit citation:
>
> χρόνον εἶναι μέτρον καὶ κριτήριον τάχους
>
> measure, test, Zeno Stoic.1.26, etc.
>
> They note that in LEGAL language, it can mean (or be used, rather, to
> mean) court of judgement, tribunal, Pl.Lg.767b;
>
> The fifth explicit citation is then
>
> καθίζειν κριτήριον
>
> Plb.9.33.12, cf. PHib.1.29 (a) (iii B. C.), 1 Ep.Cor.6.2, IG14.951.20,
> Paus.2.20.7, POxy.2134.6 (ii A. D.), etc.
> It can also be used for a decision of a tribunal, judgement, SIG826 K9
> (Delph., ii B. C.).
>
> The etymological source is of course "krites", 'judge,', and the root is
> from Indo-European root *krei- (see crisis). Used in English as a from
> 1610
> onwards
>
> Thus a 'crisis' (cognate with 'criterion') is literally a "judgment,
> result of a trial, selection," from krinein "to separate, decide, judge,"
> from
> IE root *krei- "to sieve, discriminate, distinguish".
>
> Cognates from this common Indo-European root include:
>
> Greek krinesthai "to explain;"
>
> Old English hriddel "sieve;"
>
> Latin:
> cribrum: "sieve,"
> crimen: "judgment, crime,"
> cernere (past participle cretus) "to sift, separate;"
>
> Old Irish criathar,
>
> Old Welsh cruitr "sieve;"
>
> Middle Irish crich "border, boundary".
> .
> Cheers,
>
> Speranza
>
>
>
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