in particular nothing metaphysical or popperian hinges on what properties
of CI dolphin lacks. the issue is an isomorph of asking what testing would
establish whether a computer doesn't or does possess a language faculty
palma, apgs
On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 1:17 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
D. writes:
It's not just a difference in how we humans use W3 - it's that animals
have no access to W3, so they cannot use W3 "knowledge" at all.
Otoh, what may happen is that W1 and W2 processes, connected with animal
knowledge, simulate (or correlate with) knowledge in its W3 form for
humans. However, we should not attribute any role to W3 in these animal W1
and W2 processes.
**And why is that ? Do how-to knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance count
as W3 knowledge for Popper / Donal, and if not why ? (That many animals
have those kinds of knowledge is, I think obvious enough that I don't need
to go into examples and anecdotes.)
Besides, there is a fair amount of scientific evidence that at least
dolphins have a language, and so presumably they have propositional
knowledge as well. Surely these are not matters that could (or should) be
decided by 'metaphysical arguments' but by empirical observation and tests,
insofar as they can be decided at all.
O.K.
On Mon, Dec 11, 2017 at 8:27 PM, Donal McEvoy <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
wrote:
I can see W3 as an _abstraction_ -- not sure if necessarily of W2, butmost likely of it (at least for Grunebaum).>
It is true that W3 contents have a somewhat abstract character. But it's
problematic to suggest that W3 is "of" W2: it is and it isn't, and we need
to examine the ways it is and isn't.
For Popper, there are senses in which W3 is "of" W2 - for example, W3
only emerges from the human W2. But W3 products - though produced by the
human W2 - are not "of" W2 in some other senses, and are not correctly
considered as an abstraction of W2:- for example, we produce the sequence
of natural numbers, but the existence of primes within that sequence *is
a W3 property of the sequence* that predates their W2 discovery by
humans; and so the W3 content of 'prime numbers' is here not an abstraction
of W2 processes but an autonomous, unintended consequence of certain W2
processes.
I think I misread McEvoy’s previous commentary on non-Homo sapiens andW3.>
Yes, I felt you did.
McEvoy is stating, if I understand him alright, is that while there is acorrelate of W3 in non-Homo sapiens, there is no W3 as such – and this has
to do with the way Homo sapiens _uses_ W3.>
It's not just a difference in how we humans use W3 - it's that animals
have no access to W3, so they cannot use W3 "knowledge" at all.
Otoh, what may happen is that W1 and W2 processes, connected with animal
knowledge, simulate (or correlate with) knowledge in its W3 form for
humans. However, we should not attribute any role to W3 in these animal W1
and W2 processes.
Yet it must be admitted that it may be very tempting to make such an
attribution, and that it's easy to deceive ourselves that higher animals
have a limited form of W3 knowledge.
Consider the trainable ape. Obviously '2 + 2 = 4', in W3 mathematical
terms, whereas it would be wrong to say 'Yellow patch + Yellow patch = 4' *in
W3 mathematical terms*. Now consider the ape who we train to take
bananas from a pile using cue cards. The training could involve cue cards
with numerals or cue cards with coloured patches.
If we used coloured patches, with 'Yellow patch' "meaning" retrieve 2
bananas, 'Blue patch' meaning retrieve 3 bananas *etc.*, we might be
clear enough that the ape was not learning a number system by this training
*in
the W3 sense of a number system* - the ape is simply learning to use a
certain kind of physical cue (the cue card with its coloured patch) to
carry out a task (of retrieving a certain number of bananas from the pile).
But if we did this training with cue cards with numerals on them, we
might be (wrongly) tempted to think that in this case the ape is actually
grasping the meaning of numerals in their W3 sense - rather than merely
grasping the symbols-for-numerals as physical cues, as in the previous case
of coloured patches.
In the case of higher animals, like apes, I think Popper would be open to
the possibility that well-constructed tests might show these animals can
access some forms of W3 content, but he remained sceptical - for reasons
too complex and involved to fully explore here, Popper viewed W3 knowledge
as creating a gulf between human knowledge and animal knowledge, especially
in terms of error-correction by critical reflection.
Tests to show animals could process W3 content *as such* would have to
be very carefully constructed so that it was sufficiently clear that the
animal was not merely taking (what *for us* is) W3 content and
processing it in W1 or W2 terms. We may remember that computers may appear
even more intelligent than higher animals because computers can take (what
is for us) W3 content, which we have encoded in W1 formats, and subject it
to very elaborate and refined W1 processes; further these W1 processes may
produce content that is (for us) W3 content, and sometimes very developed
and refined W3 content; yet it is illusory to suggest that the computer has
any access to W3 or, within its W1 systems, is processing the W3 content in
W3 terms. However, if we can be deceived that computer 'intelligence'
derives from computers accessing W3 content *as such*, then we might
easily deceive ourselves that animal intelligence may also be based (to
some limited extent) on the animal accessing W3 content.
It's also possible that higher animals, particularly the very social
ones, may have a great deal of what we call 'social intelligence' or
'emotional intelligence' - and this 'social intelligence' may tempt us to
think they have access to W3. But I think Popper's view is that we as
humans (or proto-humans) had this kind of great social intelligence long
before we created any W3 products.
There are many, many difficult and intractable questions here. Some
remain open to scientific investigation - a recent investigation seemed to
indicate our forebears were walking upright *before* they descended from
the trees.
Afaiui, the current view is that human brain power *in W1 terms* had
largely (if not entirely) evolved to its current state in modern man long
before our forebears developed any traceable W3 or much in the way of W3
achievements - perhaps even before we spoke (voice box evolution may have
been subsequent to our forebears having brains comparable to ours in W1
terms). In other words, we have had an exponential increase in human
cultural W3 achievements without any correlative increase in human W1 brain
power: this might seem miraculous, but it is part of W3-theory to explain
this by way of W3's 'rebound effect' on our human W2. The human brain
has had its current W1 form for probably more than 100,000 years, whereas
nearly all the most significant W3 achievements have occurred within the
last 10,000 years, and many only within the last 1,000 (roughly speaking),
and many only in the last 300 years.
Again afaiui: the crucial characteristic of our W3 products is that they
become objects in their own right: this permits our W2 to operate on them
in a more critical, advanced way than where "knowledge" remains as an
internalised W2 state or process.
The recent discussion of *Roberts* was partly to indicate how this idea,
of their becoming "objects in their own right", may be 'experienced' by
engaging in their critical discussion (say of W3 constructs like
"capacity", and limitation periods, and amendments, and "cause of action",
and the inter-relations between these brought out by reasoning); and so W3
may be 'experienced' as more than a metaphor for certain highly developed
mental activity that we might otherwise consider as occurring entirely
within W2.
D
L
------------------------------
*From:* "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
*To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
*Sent:* Monday, 11 December 2017, 12:28
*Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Hands Across The Bay
Two aspects about Popper’s alleged W3. One is from the field of music,
and it comes from an example of an implicature by Grunebaum:
i. She sang “Home Sweet Home.”
ii. She sang notes which corresponded quite closely to
the vocal score of “Home Sweet Home.”
I’m paraphrasing slightly. The idea is that (ii) implicates that she sang
badly (by the utterer flouting ‘be brief’ and offering a rigmarole
instead).
The other aspect or point seems to be the role of ‘abstraction’. I can
see W3 as an _abstraction_ -- not sure if necessarily of W2, but most
likely of it (at least for Grunebaum). Therefore, it is ‘practical’ to
refer to W3, because it saves effort. There is something like what
Grunebaum calls the P. E. R. E. – or principle of economy of rational
effort. While it is possible to reconstruct W3 along W2 lines, we need not.
A philosopher of language, for example, may never have to APPEAL to W3 –
but philosophers in other fields may.
I think I misread McEvoy’s previous commentary on non-Homo sapiens and
W3. McEvoy is stating, if I understand him alright, is that while there is
a correlate of W3 in non-Homo sapiens, there is no W3 as such – and this
has to do with the way Homo sapiens _uses_ W3. If what I said above about
the “abbreviation” role of W3 – qua ‘abstraction’ – I can see McEvoy’s
point. Incidentally, Grunebaum’s point that only Homo sapiens can m-intend
has been challenged by some ethologists, and this line of reasoning may be
worth pursuing. The idea would be that while not anything like ‘ordinary
language,’ non-Homo sapiens species do have pretty good ‘systems of
communication’. Specimens may lack the ability to appeal to an
‘abstraction’ of this or that ‘system,’ which is what W3 would essentially
amount to. But that’s another matter.
Cheers,