[lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Shaggy Dog Story
- From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2012 11:38:37 -0400
John Wager wrote:
"... I can't for the life of me see what the real issue is in "saying" or
"showing" something, at least in the abstract. Can somebody give me a real
example of how this makes some difference in our lives?"
I am sure someone will disagree with me, but this is my suggestion
regarding the 'real issue' of the saying/showing distinction in
Wittgenstein.
In the Tractatus, at 3.221, Wittgenstein writes, 'A proposition can only
say *how* a thing is, not *what* it is'. This is part of a larger
discussion of the relationship between objects, their names, and
propositions that use those names. The argument seems to be that a
proposition, by virtue of having logical form, functions like a picture of
a state of affairs that involves objects. However, while a proposition can
say this state of affairs, it cannot at the same time, give the sense of
itself. Or, as Wittgenstein puts it at 3.332, 'No proposition can say
anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained
in itself'. The sense of the proposition is therefore variable, depending
on how this proposition and others like it, are used. The proposition gives
a fixed picture, it says something, but it's sense or meaning cannot be
similarly fixed, and therefore is shown. At 3.144, Wittgenstein writes,
'States of affairs can be described but not *named*. (Names resemble
points; propositions resemble arrows, they have sense.)' I find this
imagery helpful, that a proposition says something pointedly, but can only
direct its meaning in a particular direction. It is maintaining this
distinction, between what a proposition says about a particular state of
affairs and what it means, that I think is important, not just in
philosophy but in our daily lives.
An example of this could be the (as I write) soon to be released decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the Affordable Care Act. Whatever the
decision, it will include the vote, which will probably be some variation
of 5-4 or 6-3. This vote itself will be understood by many to have
implications for understanding the decision, with the closer vote making
the decision more controversial. The vote says something specific about
what the judges did but it doesn't say anything about the significance of
the vote total itself. What the vote means, well that is more like
following a finger-post, where people turn to similar votes in the past as
a guide to the significance of the vote for the future. The vote does not
tell us what it means, it only says how things happened and shows us what
it might mean.
The same approach can be taken to the idea that the amount by which a
presidential candidate wins an election somehow gives the candidate more or
less of a mandate. However, it is important to distinguish between the
state of affairs pictured in a vote tally, and the sense or meaning of this
tally. There is oftentimes a confusion that associates the clarity of the
picture given by a proposition with the sense of the proposition, so that
scientific or logical propositions are, by virtue of their clarity, taken
to have a sense or meaning that is similarly clear. It seems to me that
Wittgenstein's say/show distinction can be helpful in many different
situations in our lives as we consider the significance of facts in our
lives.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
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