There you go again.
On Thursday, 25 October 2018, 03:46:47 BST, <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
My last post today!
Some definitions have the very odd and unacceptable result that a notoriously
dishonest person cannot lie to people who he knows distrust him.
It does seem, however, that this definition has the same result.
Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive. A modified
version of (L12) may be provided that combines the warranting context
condition, and the not believing that one is not warranting condition, in the
single condition of believing that one is in a warranting context:
- (L14)If U is not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism or using
metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, then they lie iff
(i) they say that p(ii) they believe p to be false
(iii) they take themselves to be in a warranting context.
According to (L14), it is not possible to lie if one does not believe that one
is in a warranting context. Consider the case of a putative lie told in a
totalitarian state, since this is the case of utterances demanded by a
totalitarian state. These utterances of sentences supporting the state are made
by people who don’t believe them, to people who don’t believe them.
Everyone knows that false things are being said, and that they are only being
said only because they are required by the state. It seems somewhat reasonable
to suggest that, since everyone is forced to make these false utterances, and
everyone knows they are false, they cease to be genuine lies.
People living in a totalitarian state, making pro-state utterances, are a
trickier case (which they should be). Whether or not their utterances are made
in contexts where a warrant of truth is present is not at all clear.
If a speaker is making an untruthful statement to a hearer, and everyone knows
that false things are being said, that is, the speaker knows that the hearer
knows that the speaker is being untruthful, then the speaker does not believe
that she is in a warranting context.
According to (L14,) it is not the case that U lies.
However, it is arguable that in both the student and the witness cases,
everyone knows that false things are being said, and hence, that the speaker
does not believe that he is in a warranting context.
If this is so, then according to L14, neither the student nor the witness is
lying.
Some argue that lying does not require an intention to deceive, and that there
can be non-deceptive bald-faced lies and knowledge-lies. However, others reject
(L12), since it entails that one cannot lie when the falsity of what one is
stating is common knowledge. This definition of lying does not relieve the
narrowness. The concept of warrant is not broad enough to explain how we can
lie in the face of common knowledge. One can warrant p only if p might be the
case. When the falsehood of p is common knowledge, no party to the common
knowledge can warrant p because p is epistemically impossible.
According to some, a negotiator who tells a falsehood that will lead to better
coordination between buyer and seller is telling a bald-faced lie. Some define
lying as just asserting what one does not believe
It is a condition on telling a lie that one makes an assertion. Some
differentiate between assertions and non-assertions according to narrow
plausibility. To qualify as an assertion, a lie must have narrow plausibility.
Thus, someone who only had access to the assertion might believe it.
This is the grain of truth behind the assumption that lying requires the
intention to deceive. Bald-faced lies show that assertions do not need to meet
a requirement of wide plausibility, that is, credibility relative to one’s
total evidence.
Some provide, as examples of assertions, and hence, lies, the servant of a
maestro telling an unwanted female caller that the sounds she hears over the
phone are not the maestro and that the servant is merely dusting the piano
keys, and a doctor in an Iraqi hospital during the Iraq war telling a
journalist who can see patients in the ward in uniforms that “I see no
uniforms." The claim that these are assertions, however, and therefore lies, is
controversial. These statements neither express the speaker’s belief, nor aim
to affect the belief of the addressee in any way, since their falsehood is
common knowledge. Some alas does not offer a definition of asserting a
proposition (with necessary and sufficient conditions). To the extent that some
do not fully analyze the concept of assertion, their definition of lying is
unclear. It may be argued against this that the utterances in question are not
assertions, and hence, on his own account, fail to be lies.
Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive. Some have
also defended the assertion condition for lying. You lie when you assert
something that you believe to be false. Some hold that you assert something
when you you make a statement and you believe that you are in a situation in
which the Gricean norm of conversation, or desideratum of conversational
candour, ‘Do not say what you believe to be false,’ is in effect. This
conceptual analysis of lying is:
U lies if and only if
(i) U state that p to A,
(ii) A believes that U makes this statement in a context where a maxim of
conversation is in effect, "Do not make statements that you believe to be
false" (Grice's desideratum of conversational candour)
(iii) U believe that p is false.
Alleged counter0examples to this conceptual analysis have prompted a revision
of this definition in order to accommodate these counterexamples:
- (L15)U lies if and only if
U says that p.U believes that p is false (or at least that p will be false if
you succeed in communicating that p), and
U intends to violate the conversational maxim against communicating something
false by communicating that p.
-
(L16)
U lies if and only if you say that p, you believe that p is false (or at least
that p will be false if you succeed in communicating that p), and you intend to
communicate something false by communicating that p.
Both (L15) and (L16) are able to accommodate the following counterexample to
the earlier definition. When Marc Antony said to the Roman people,
"Brutus is an honorable man."
the citizens of Rome know that (a) Antony did not believe that Brutus was an
honorable man, that (b) Antony was subject to a norm against saying things that
he believed to be false, and that (c) Antony had been a cooperative participant
in the conversation so far. Thus, they were led to conclude that Antony was
flouting the conversational maxim in order to communicate something other than
what he explicated. In fact, the best explanation of his statement was that he
wanted to communicate the exact opposite of what he explicated ("It is not the
case that Brutus is an honorable man.") Since Antony does not intend to violate
this conversational maxim against communicating something that he believes to
be false (that Brutus is an honorable man) by saying
“Brutus is an honorable man,”
or, more simply, since Antony does not intend to communicate something false
with his untruthful statement, it follows that Antony is not lying. However, in
the case of a guilty witness, Tony, against whom there is overwhelming
evidence, who says
“I did not do it,”
without the intention that anyone believe him, he does intend to violate the
norm of conversation against communicating something that he believes to be
false (that he did not do it) by saying
“I did not do it,”
or, more simply, he does intend to communicate something believed-false with
his untruthful statement, even though he does not intend that anyone believe
this. It has been contended that non-deceptive liars do not intend to
communicate anything believed-false with their untruthful statements, and,
indeed, may even intend to communicate something believed-true with their
untruthful statements. Some reject the claim that non-deceptive liars do not
intend to communicate anything believed-false, even if they intend to
communicate something believed-true. Bald-faced liars might want to communicate
something true. For instance, Tony may be trying to communicate to the police
that that they will never convict him. But that does not mean that he does not
also intend to communicate something false in violation of the norm. He wants
what he actually said to be understood and accepted for purposes of the
conversation. It is not as if
“I did not do it”
is simply a euphemism for
“You’ll never take me alive, coppers!” However, in the case of polite
untruths, such as
“Madam is not at home,”
the untruthful statement is simply a euphemism. For example, the words
"Madam is not at home,“
delivered by a servant or a relative at the door, have become a mere euphemism
for indisposition or disinclination. In the case of polite untruths, it seems,
there is no intention to communicate anything believed-false. In the case of
the servant who tells the female caller,
“I’m dusting the piano keys,”
or the Iraqi doctor who tells the journalist
“I see no uniforms,”
or the negotiator who tells the other negotiator
“That is the highest I can go,”
or the person living in the totalitarian state who makes the pro-state
utterance, it is also arguable that there is no intention to communicate
anything believed-false.
If this is true, then there is some support for the claim that non-deceptive
liars do not intend to communicate anything believed-false with their
untruthful statements, and hence, that they are not lying according to (L15) or
(L16). Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive. Some
have also defended the assertion condition for lying.
You lie when you assert something you believe to be false. To assert that p is
to say that p and thereby propose that p become common ground. A proposition,
p, acquires, to use Grice's parlance "common ground status" in a group if all
members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that p, and all believe
that all believe that all accept that p, etc. Lying gets thus analysed as
follows
- (L17)U lies to A if and only if
U says that p to A, and
U proposes that p become common ground, and
U believes that p is false.
In the case of a speaker making an ironic untruthful statement, the speaker
does not propose that the believed-false proposition (e.g., “Brutus is an
honorable man”) become common ground
However, in the case of a non-deceptive liar, the speaker does propose that the
believed-false proposition (e.g., “I did not cheat”) become common ground.
The fact that in the case of a non-deceptive lie it is common knowledge that
what the speaker is saying is (believed to be) false does not alter the fact
that the speaker is proposing that the believed-falsehood become common ground.
Indeed, even if the (believed) truth is initially common ground, before the
speaker proposes that the believed-falsehood become common ground, it is still
the case that the non-deceptive liar is proposing to update the common ground
with her utterance. E.g., in the case of the student and the dean,
“The student wants herself and the Dean to mutually accept that she did not
plagiarize."
It is possible to argue that this account of assertion, and hence (L17) is
faced with a dilemma when it comes to non-deceptive lies. Either, in the case
of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does propose that the believed-false
proposition become common ground, but becoming common ground is too weak to
count as asserting, or becoming common ground is strong enough to count as
asserting, but, in the case of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does not
propose that the believed-false proposition become common ground. Consider the
alleged counter-example of a guest at a party saying to another guest,
The man drinking a martini is a philosopher.
-- and of the two guests proceeding to talk about the philosopher, when it is
common knowledge that the drink in question is not a martini. Perhaps it is
mutually recognized that it is not a martini, but mutually recognized that both
parties are accepting that it is a martini.
The pretense will be rational if accepting the false presupposition is an
efficient way to communicate something true. However, if proposing that a
believed-false proposition become common ground can mean engaging in and
sustaining a “pretence,” possibly in order to communicate truths, then it is
not clear that this counts as making an assertion. Hence, a non-deceptive liar
may be proposing that her believed-false proposition become common ground
without this being an act of making an assertion. But this means that she is
not lying, according to (L17)
Alternatively, if proposing that a believed-false proposition become common
ground means something more than this, such that the speaker intends or wants
herself and her hearer “to mutually accept” her believed-false proposition,
then it is not clear that a non-deceptive liar intends or wants this.
If this is correct, non-deceptive lies fail to be lies according to (L17). And
we will leave (L18) and beyond for a longer day!
Cheers,
Speranza
REFERENCES
Grice, H. P. The desideratum of conversational candour.
Grice, H. P. WoW -- Way of Words.
Grice, H. P. The conversational maxim, "Try to make your conversational
contribution one that is true."
