Some incorporate moral conditions into his definition of lying (modified to
include cases in which speakers only intend to deceive about their beliefs):
- (L11)U lies =df
U freely makes a believed-false statement to another fully responsible and
rational person, with the intention that that other person believe that
statement to be true or the intention that that other person believe that that
statement is believed to be true, or both.
According to (L11), it is not possible to lie to children, madmen, or those
whose minds have been impaired by age or illness, since they are not fully
responsible and rational persons.
It is also not possible to lie to a would-be murderer who threatens your life
if you will not tell him where his quarry has gone, and in general when you are
acting under duress in any way (such as a witness in fear of his life on the
witness stand, or a victim being robbed by a thief), since statements made in
such circumstances are not freely made. It has been objected that the moral
deceptionist's conceptual analysis of lying is unduly narrow and restrictive.
Surely, e.g. it is possible to lie to a would-be murderer, whether it is
impermissible, as some absolutist deontologists maintain, or permissible (i.e.,
either optional or obligatory), as consequentialists and moderate deontologists
maintain.
It has also been objected that the moral deceptionist's conceptual analysis of
'lying' is morally lax. By rendering certain deceptive untruthful statements to
others as non-lies, they make it permissible to act in a way that would
otherwise be open to moral censure.
In general, even those who hold that all lies have an inherent negative weight,
albeit such that it can be overridden, and hence, who hold that lying is
defeasibly morally wrong, do not incorporate moral necessary conditions into
their definitions of lying Non-Deceptionists hold that an intention to deceive
is not necessary for lying. For simple non-deceptionists, there is nothing more
to lying than making an untruthful statement. According to some, e.g., a jocose
lie is a lie. For a complex non-deceptionist, untruthfulness is not sufficient
for lying. In order to differentiate lying from telling jokes, being ironic,
acting, etc., a further condition must be met. For some Complex
Non-Deceptionists, that further condition is warranting the truth of the
untruthful statement. For other Complex Non-Deceptionists, that condition is
making an assertion. Some hold that it is possible to lie by making a false and
untruthful statement to an addressee without intending to deceive the
addressee, so long as the statement is made in a context such that one warrants
the truth of the statement (and one does not believe oneself to be not
warranting the truth of the statement), or one intends to warrant the truth of
the statement:
- (L12)
U lies iff
(i) U makes a false statement p to A,
(ii) U believes that p is false or probably false (or, alternatively, U does
not believe that p is true),
(iii) U states p in a context in which U thereby warrants the truth of p to A,
and
(iv) U does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to
y.
- (L13)U lies iff
(i) U makes a false statement p to A (ii) U believes that p is false or
probably false, or, alternatively, x does not believe that p is true.
(iii) U intends to warrant the truth of p to A.
Some include the falsity condition in both of his definitions. However, some
are prepared to modify both definitions so that the falsity condition is not
required Some also hold that the untruthfulness condition is not stringent
enough, since, if a utterer U simply does “not believe” her statement to be
true, but does not believe it to be false, or believes that her statement is
probably false, but does not believe it to be false, U lies. Two alleged
counter-examples may be given of non-deceptive lies:
A guilty student tells a college dean that he did not cheat on an examination,
without intending that the dean believe him (since “he is really hard-boiled,
he may take pleasure in thinking that the Dean knows he is guilty”), because he
knows that the dean’s policy is not to punish a student for cheating unless the
student admits to cheating.
A witness provides untruthful and false testimony about a defendant, where
there is a preponderance of evidence against the defendant, without the
intention that the testimony be believed by anyone, in order to avoid suffering
retaliation from the defendant and/or his henchmen.
Neither utterer lies according to the definitions of lying of Simple
Deceptionists (L1), (L2), (L3), (L4) and (L5) or Complex Deceptionists (L6),
(L7), (L8) and (L9) or Moral Deceptionists (L10) and (L11).
Both are lying according to (L12) and (L13), because each warrants the truth of
his statement, even though neither intends to deceive his addressee.
It has been argued that the witness and the student do have an intention to
deceive. It has also been argued that they are being deceptive, even if they
lack an intention that their untruthful statements be believed to be true.
However, it has also been argued that they fail to warrant the truth of their
statements, and hence fail to be lying according to (L12) and (L13).
One argument is that, in the witness example, the statement is coerced, and
coerced speech acts are not genuinely assertoric. In the context of a threat of
violent death, the mere fact that he is speaking under oath is not sufficient
to institute an ordinary warranting context.
Another argument is that the witness and the student are not warranting the
truth of their statements because they believe that their audiences believe
that they are being untruthful. If one warrants the truth of a statement, then
one promises or guarantees, ether explicitly or implicitly, that what one says
is true.
Warranting the truth of a statement presupposes that the statement is being
used to invite or influence belief. It does not make sense for one to guarantee
the truth of something that one is not inviting or influencing others to
believe. The result is that to lie is to breach trust. To lie is to invite
others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, but, at the
same time, to betray that trust by making false statements that one does not
believe. The combination of warranting the truth of one’s statement and
breaching trust would appear to make this definition of lying similar to that
of Complex Deceptionists.
It would also appear to produce similar results. For example, the following can
be said about negotiators. It is common and often a matter of course for people
to deliberately misstate their bargaining positions during negotiations. Such
statements are lies according to standard dictionary definitions of lying—they
are intentional false statements intended to deceive others. However, given the
definition of lying (L12), such cases are not lies unless the negotiator
warrants the truth of what he says. Suppose that two hardened cynical
negotiators who routinely misstate their intentions, and do not object when
others do this to them, negotiate with each other.
Each person recognizes that the other party is a cynical negotiator, and each
is aware of the fact that the other party knows this. In this sort of case,
statements about one’s minimum or maximum price are not warranted to be true.
If a negotiator makes an untruthful statement,
“That is the highest I can go"
to another negotiator, since the negotiator believes that the other negotiator
believes that he is making an untruthful statement, he cannot intend to warrant
the truth of his statement, and/or the context (of negotiation) is such that he
is not warranting the truth of his statement.
As a result, it is not the case that he lies, according to (L12). He is not
lying according to (L13), either, at least if it is true that you cannot intend
to do something that you do not expect to succeed at. It seems that the same
thing can be said about the student and the witness. If the student believes
that the dean already knows he is guilty, and if the witness believes that the
jury, etc., already knows that the defendant is guilty, it seems that neither
can intend to warrant the truth of his statement, and/or the context is such
that neither is warranting the truth of his statement.
If this is so, then neither is lying according to L12 and L13.
Cheers,
Speranza
