Two kinds of alleged counter-examples have been offered to refute L1.
ALLEGED COUNTER-EXAMPLES ADDRESSED TOWARDS THE NECESSITY OF THE FOUR
PRONG-ANALYSANS.
First, objections have been made to each necessary condition, on the basis that
it is not necessary for lying.
According to these alleged counterexamples as to how Englishmen use 'lie,' (L1)
is too narrow.
On top of it, alleged counterexamples (again as to how Englishmen use 'lie')
have been made to the four necessary conditions being jointly sufficient for
lying, on the basis that some further condition is necessary for lying.
According to these objections, (L1) is too broad.
Let us start with the alleged counterexamples against the necessity of the
four-pronged analysans.
The Conditions Are Not Necessary.
Against the 'stating' condition of (L1), it has been objected that the making
of a statement is not necessary for lying.
Lying to others may be defined as any form of behavior the function of which is
to provide others with false information or to deprive them of true
information, or as a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without
forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to
be untrue.
Importantly, this entails that lying can consist of simply withholding
information with the intent to deceive, without making any statement at all.
Those who make this objection would make lying the same as intentionally
deceiving.
**************
Against the second, the untruthfulness condition of (L1), it has been objected
that an untruthful statement is not necessary for lying.
This objection comes in a variety of forms.
There are those who argue any statement made with an intention to deceive is a
lie, including a truthful statement that is made with an intention to deceive.
Lying may thus be defined as “any intentionally deceptive message that is
stated."
There are also those who, relying upon a Griceian account of conversational
implicature (Grice 1989, 39)), as we do in this Club, argue that someone, like
Faulkner, who makes a truthful statement but who thereby conversationally
implicates a believed-false statement is lying.
Importantly, such an “untruthful implicature” is “directly intended."
Thirdly, there are those who argue for the possibility of “lying ironically,"
or indirect lying.
If utterer U makes an ironic untruthful statement, through this presentation of
himself as insincerely asserting, he presents himself as believing the opposite
of what he says, which is a capacity to assert in effect.
If utterer U is insincere in this and actually does believe in the truth of
what he states, despite invoking trust in his believing its opposite, this is a
lie -- an "indirect lie,"we might say.
E.g. if an utterer who is listening to a sappy pop song at a party is asked if
he likes this kind of music U replies, ironically,
Yeah, right, I love this kind of music.
U lies if U actually does love this kind of music.
Against the untruthfulness condition, it has also been objected that it is not
necessary for lying that the statement that is made is believed to be false.
It is sufficient that the statement is not believed to be true, or is believed
to be probably false.
As it has been claimed, agnostics about the truth of their assertions who
nonetheless assert them without qualification tell lies.
Against the addressee condition of (L1), it has been objected that it is
sufficient for lying that the untruthful statement is made, even if it is made
to no one — not even to oneself.
Lying may thus be defined as a conscious expression of other than what we
believe.
It has also been objected that it is possible to lie to a third party who is
not the utterer's addressee.
In general, it is possible to distinguish between cases where “A' eavesdrops,
unbeknown to the first and second parties” (eavesdropping), cases where utterer
U utters p to his addressee A while A', with the awareness of both other
parties, listens in and knows that the first- and second-party know he is
listening in, although it is for the addressee only that the utterance is
intended (kibbitzing), as well as cases similar to "kibbitzing" except that the
utterance is also intended for the addressee [who knows that they know that he
is listening in]” (disclosure), and cases similar to disclosure “except that
although the first and second parties know that the hearer is listening in, the
hearer does not know that they are listening in” (bogus disclosure).
Even if it is not possible to lie to eavesdroppers, or to those merely
listening in, as in the case of kibbitzing, it may be possible to lie in the
cases of bogus disclosure, as in Mickey saying to Danny,
The pick-up is at midnight tomorrow.
with the intention of deceiving the F.B.I. agents listening in.
It may even be possible to lie in the case of disclosure.
In the thriller "Capricorn One" about a Mars landing hoax, during a nationally
televised transmission between the astronauts ‘in space’ and their wives at the
control centre, which is being monitored closely by NASA handlers, Col. Charles
Brubaker asks his wife Kay to tell his son:
When I get back, I am going take our son to Yosemite again, like I did last
summer.
In fact, Brubaker brought his son to a different place the previous summer
(Flatbush, where a film was being shot), something that the colonel's wife
*knows.*
According to this alleged counterexample, Col. Brubaker lies to his NASA
handlers about what he did last summer, even if they are not his addressees.
Against the addressee condition, it has also been objected that it is possible
to lie to an animal, a robot, etc., as well as to what might be another person
— e.g., if a home owner, woken up in the middle of the night and wondering if
there are burglars below the stairs, shouts down:
I am bringing my rifle down there.
-- although he has no rifle.
Against the "intention-to-deceive-the addressee" condition of (L1), it has been
objected that, even if an intention to deceive the addressee A is required for
lying, it is not necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee
about the content of the untruthful statement.
It may be an intention to deceive the addressee A about the beliefs of the
utterer U abut the statement—specifically, the belief that the untruthful
statement is true.
There are at least two ways in which (L1) may tweaked in response to this
alleged counter-example.
It could be held that what is essential to lying is the utterer's intention to
deceive the addressee about the utterer's belief that the untruthful statement
is true:
U utters a sentence, ‘p’ where ‘p’ means that p, in doing which either U
expresses his belief that p, or U intends the the addressee A to take it that
utterer U believes that p” and the utterer U believes [p] to be false.
(L1) may thus be therefore modified as follows:
- (L2)U lies =df
U makes a statement that p -- where p is believed to be false, to an addressee
A, with the intention that the addresee A believe that p is believed to be
true.
Alternatively, (L1) could be modified to incorporate either intention, as
follows:
- (L3)U lies =df
U makes a believed-false statement (to addressee A), either with the intention
that that statement be believed to be true (by the addressee A), or with the
intention that it be believed (by the addressee A) that that statement is
believed to be true (by the utterer U making the statement), or with both
intentions.
Against this condition, it has also been argued that it is not necessary that
it be an intention to deceive the addressee about either the content of the
untruthful statement or about the beliefs of the speaker about the untruthful
statement.
It seems sufficient that there is an intention to deceive about some
matter—that is, it is sufficient that the utterer U intend that the addresee
believe to be true something that the utterer believes to be false.
Note that those who offer these alleged counter-examples would turn lying into
any deception involving untruthful statements.
If this objection were combined with the objection that lying could be directed
to third parties (as in bogus disclosure, or disclosure), (L1) may be modified
into (L4):
- (L4)U lies =df
U makes a believed-false statement, to an addressee A or in the believed
hearing of another person, with the intention that the addressee —the person
addressed or the other person in the believed hearing—believe some
believed-false statement to be true.
Against this condition, it has also been objected that although there is a
necessary relationship between lying and deception, nevertheless, this
intention should be understood merely as the intention to be deceptive to an
addressee, which is the intention “to conceal information” from the addressee A.
According to this objection, concealing evidence, understood as hiding evidence
or keeping evidence secret, counts as being deceptive to the addressee.
(L1) may thus be modified to read as (L5):
- (L5)U lies iff
(i) U states that p to A (ii) U believes that p is false and
(iii) U intends to be deceptive to A in stating that p.
Against this "intention-to deceive-the-addressee" condition it has been
objected that no intention to deceive is required for lying.
If the sworn-in witness in the trial of a violent criminal goes on the record
and gives untruthful testimony — in order, e.g., to avoid being killed by the
defendant or any of his criminal associates—without any intention that that
testimony be believed to be true by any person (not the jury, the judge, the
lawyers, the journalists covering the trial, the people in the gallery, the
readers of the newspaper reports, etc.), the witness lies.
Such non-deceptive lies are lies according to this objection (but others hold
that these lies are intentionally deceptive, or not intentionally deceptive.
Cheers,
Speranza
