In a message dated 3/20/2012 10:34:49 A.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes from Russell: "Mr Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said, thus suggesting to the sceptical reader that possibly there may be some loophole through a hierarchy of languages, or by some other exit." I relate this to Grice -- his bootstrap. Grice writes is considering considering a 'fine distinction' concerning levels of conceptual priority: "It is perhaps reasonable to regard such fine distinction as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps." Grice adds: "In this connection it will be relevant for me to say that I once invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled as Boostrap." Grice goes on: "The principle laid down that: when one is introducing the primitive concepts of a theory formulated in an object-language, one has freedom to use any battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language, subject to the condition that counterparts of such concepts are subsequently definable or otherwise derivable in the object-language. So, the more economically one introduces the primitive object-language concepts, the less of a task one leaves oneself for the morrow." This may relate to Witters's paradox of 'saying/showing' that McEvoy is considering. Note that Russell mentions this 'hierarchy of languages' dis playing a loophole. Or something like that. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html