McEvoy’s first reaction upon encountering Ritchie’s “another think coming,” was
to look for enlightment, and he summarized the view in such a way that reminded
me of … Grice – for I took McEvoy’s words to say that BOTH views – ‘another
thinK coming’ and ‘another thinG coming’ were correct – (I have not changed my
mind). It was while thinking that both expressions were correct, or rather than
an utterer has the inalienable right to utter as he pleases that I compliled a
little bibliographical list to support Grice’s idiosyncrasy (A procedure to
utter x meaning thereby by p is idiosyncratic, for Grice, if it is within the
utterer to decide). Or something. Anyway, the references below.
McEvoy was referring to keyword: solecism. I once did a study on this and found
out that solecism is more like a dialect thing. Originally, a solecism was a
dialectal feature rather than anything wrong. In any case, McEvoy is presenting
the case that ‘another thinK coming’ is NOT a solecism. A solecism is like a
malaprop – and Davidson started a little defense of them in his “A nice
derangement of epitaphs” – but then I don’ think ‘another thinK coming,’ being
a correct phrase, can be a malaprop. So the references below pertain more to
those who think it is “another thinG coming” which is the _correct_ expression
and to what right they have to utter “another thinG coming,” to mean, now in
Griceian parlance, well, _another thing coming_. Or something
· Baldwin, D. and M. Meyer, “How Inherently Social is Language?”,
in Hoff and Shatz.
· Barber, A. “Idiolectal Error”, Mind and Language, 16 -- cfr.
Grice on 'aiming at conformity' and 'correct' vs. 'incorrect' use -- in Grice's
sixth William James lecture -- repr. in Searle, "The philosophy of language,"
(Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. by G. J. Warnock). And cfr. Grice on
Deutero-Esperanto ("That makes me the master"). ––– Epistemology of Language,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Begby, E. and B. Ramberg, “Davidson’s Derangement of Epitaphs in
PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends --
Revisited: Guest Editors’ Introduction”, Inquiry 59
· Bennett, J. Linguistic Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Cfr. Grice's correspondence with J. Bennett, The Grice Papers, BANC MSS
· Burge, T. “On Knowledge and Convention”, Philosophical Review, 84
· Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of
Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism, New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
· Collins, J. “Representations Without Representata: Content and
Illusion in Linguistic Theory”, in Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and
Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries, Walter de Gruyter.
· Crystal, D. The Fight for English: How Language Pundits Ate,
Shot, and Left, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Davidson, D. “Semantics for Natural Languages”, in Visentini et
al. ––– Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, New York: Oxford University
Press.––– “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”, in PGRICE, Philosophical Grounds of
Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends -- vide R. Grandy and R. Warner's
abstract of it.
· Dummett, M. A. E. “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs: Some Comments
on Davidson and Hacking”, in Lepore.
· Fodor, J. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the
Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
· Grice, Herbert Paul, 1938. Negation-- 1948. 1957, “Meaning”,
Philosophical Review, 66–––, 1967. 1975, “Logic and Conversation”, in P. Cole
and J. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3. London: Academic Press.
Reprinted in H. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1989.-- 1980. Meaning Revisited (on
"Deutero-Esperanto")-- 1976. Pirotese. In Grice, BANC MSS 90/135c.-- 1967.
Utterer's meaning, sentence meaning, and word meaning, Harvard. Repr. in
Searle, The Philosophy of Language.
· Hacking, I. “The Parody of [Griceian] Conversation”, in Lepore.
· Higginbotham, J. “Languages and Idiolects: Their Language and
Ours”, in Lepore and Smith
· Lewis, D. Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.–––"Languages and Language”, in Gunderson.
· Millikan, R. “In Defense of Public Language”, in her Language: A
Biological Model, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
· Pietroski, P. “A Defense of Derangement -- Griceian or other”,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24–––“The Character of Natural Language
Semantics”, in Barber
· Putnam, H. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Gunderson -- cfr.
Grice, "I became less of a formalist after Putnam, of all people, told me I
· Quine, W.V., “Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic
Theory”, Synthese, 21-- vide H. P. Grice's reply to Quine in "Vacuous Names",
in "Words and objections".
· Reimer, M. “What Malapropisms Mean: A Griceian Reply to
Davidson”, Erkenntnis 60
· Strawson, P F., On Referring, Mind, 59 -- repr. in
Logico-Linguistic Papers. -- Introduction to Logical Theory, citing "Mr. H. P.
· Wiggins, D. “Languages as Social Objects”, Philosophy, 72