[lit-ideas] Re: Grice on the alethic

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:10:20 +0100 (BST)

 From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>

>On the other hand, to quote from Tarski's deep theorem in his Polish  paper:

"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.


That is what a theory of truth does. >

Yes, though why this is worth it as a theorem may need explanation (not to P 

Of course, Tarski uses a correspondence theory of truth [as opposed to, say, a 
coherence theory] - and this is only one theory of truth (albeit the correct 
one). The problem is to show that the correspondence theory does not involve us 
in paradox or inconsistency or incoherence - to put it on a sound logical 
footing. And this Tarski can be said to have done. Even though his work is not 
a philosophical argument for a correspondence theory, putting that theory on a 
sound logical footing is of great philosophical importance - for doubts about 
the corrrespondence theory are almost as old as the theory itself.

What Tarski's theory does not do is tell us how we know or decide 'what is 
true': and we might argue it is not the remit of a theory of truth to answer 
this, for that we need a 'theory of knowledge'.


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