McEvoy was referring to Popper's answer to Hume's quandary about personal
identity.
For the record, "quandary" is a lexical item of unknown origin, perhaps a
quasi-Latinism based on Latin "quando" "when? at what time?; at the time that,
inasmuch," pronominal adverb of "state of perplexity," 1570s, of unknown
origin, perhaps a quasi-Latinism based on Latin quando "when? at what time?; at
the time that, inasmuch," pronominal adverb of time, related to qui "who" (from
PIE root "kwo-" stem of relative and interrogative pronouns). Originally
accented on the second syllable.
Grice, reacting to Pears's interpretation of Hume's Appendix to the Treatise,
argues that CAUSATION presupposes personal identity.
Hume writes in his "Appendix":
"When I turn my reflection on
myself, I never can perceive
this self without some one or
more perceptions."
"Nor can I ever perceive any thing
but the perceptions. It is the composition
of these, therefore, which forms the self."
"We can conceive a thinking being to
have either many or few perceptions."
"Suppose the mind to be reduced even
below the life of an oyster. Suppose it
to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger."
"Consider it in that situation. Do you
conceive any thing but merely that perception?"
"Have you any notion of self or substance?"
"If not, the addition of other perceptions can
never give you that notion."
"The annihilation, which some people suppose to
follow upon death, and which entirely destroys
this self, is nothing but an extinction
of all particular perceptions; love and hatred,
pain and pleasure, thought and sensation."
"These therefore must be the same
with self; since the one cannot
survive the other."
"Is self the same with substance?"
"If it be, how can that question have place,
concerning the subsistence of self, under
a change of substance?"
"If they be distinct, what is the difference
betwixt them?"
"For my part, I have a notion of neither, when
conceived distinct from particular perceptions." ...
"However extraordinary this conclusion may seem,
it need not surprise us."
"Most philosophers seem inclined to think,
that PERSONAL IDENTITY arises from
consciousness; and consciousness is nothing
but a reflected thought or perception."
In his response to Pears, Grice manages to quote from Price 1940/65 and
Strawson in this connection. All very properly Oxonian.
But quandaries remain, as they should!
Cheers
Speranza
References
Grice, Personal Identity, repr. in Perry, Personal identity.
-- Method on philosophical psychology
-- Personal identity as a logical construction
-- Hume's quandary about personal identity
