McEvoy, elsewhere: "Even the short section quoted yesterday [from
Popper/Eccles, The self and its brain"], regarding Hume on the existence of
self, is a masterly disillation of important lines of thought - presenting a
dilemma that remains at the heart of discussion of 'self' (1) we may be
sceptical of the 'self' because it is not based on experience in the way we
have experience of external objects, and because the metaphysics of 'self' are
troublesome (2) we may feel the 'self' in inherent in 'our' experience of
anything, and that our consciousness of 'self' constitutes a form of experience
of self."
For the record, the Grice/Haugeland contribution is "Hume's Quandary About The
Self." It originated when D. F. Pears was invited by Grice to lecture on Hume
at Berkeley. Haugeland and Grice formulated a question regarding a possible
circularity between causation and personal identity. In their view, the latter
is presupposed by the former. Their focus is on Hume's "Appendix" to his
"Treatise," where Hume tries a way out of the labyrinth that Popper and others
find Hume in. The Grice/Haugeland contribution manages to cite from Price and
Strawson -- all very Oxonian.
Cheers
Speranza
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