Thanks to McEvoy. He notes re: Eccles' views as they compare to Popper's.
Indeed, Eccles may follow Popper philosophically, yet what Eccles says may NOT
be what Popper would (e.g. "pure ego' "though it is clear that Popper is
content with the idea of 'selves' and asserts that 'selves' exist'l" which was
good to know. "Popper's position is that we become selves, though a process of
... interaction ... In what way do 'selves' exist? ... We might say, clearly
enough, that our 'self' has a causal effect [on] our actions and thoughts ...
But this does not tell us in what way 'selves' exist." Perhaps because, as Kant
would say, "existence" is not a predicate? McEvoy: "The problem of defending
'selves' is central to [Popper] just as [is] problem of defending human
freedom ... But in neither case can the defence be a ... demonstration that
there is such a thing as a 'self': what can be done is to provide a ...
philosophical framework within which 'selves' ... can play a causal role ...
[M]ost of the arguments in favour of the framework are independent of whether
there are such things as 'selves' ... That is, the assertion that there are
'selves' ... is a comparatively weak basis from which to mount a defence of a
framework within which 'selves' ... are acknowledged" -- that seems pretty
weak but reminds me of Grice's "ontological marxism," roughly: "if entity E
WORKS, E exists. McEvoy: "... We might understand how Popper aims to defend the
existence ... of 'selves': not by ... demonstration [or] arguing what degree of
influence 'selves' have ... but by creating a framework within which the 'self'
[is] rehabilitated from the onslaught of ... traditional empiricism." In a
dialytical fashion, as it were. In a previous post ("The philosophy of
football"), McEvoy refers to this excursus by Popper in "Unended quest" against
analysis: Popper sees things dialytically, not analytically. He is using a
figure of speech used by Publio Rutilio Lupo and the term of art was
appreciated by W. Bartley, III, enough to include "dialysis" in one of his
essays, if not in the index of terms for it! But back to Eccles, I see he
includes "memory" within not the "pure ego" (an expression which, if we trust
McEvoy, Popper would have avoided using), and which forms the basis for
*Grice*'s analysis (never dialysis) of "I". Eccles says he is following this
author, which is not that fair, seeing that he prefaced his essay: Eric P.
Polten, "Critique of the psycho-physical identity theory: A Refutation of
Scientific Materialism and an Establishment of Mind-matter Dualism by Means of
Philosophy and Scientific Method. With a preface by J. Eccles." The Hague.A bit
of a plug by Eccles there. For the record, then, Grice's analysis he himself
presented, in "Personal Identity" of the ordinary English: i. I hear a noise.
if and only if ii. a. A past hearing of a noise is an element in a total
temporary state which is a member of a series of total temporary states such
that every member of the series EITHER b. would, given certain conditions,
contain as an element A MEMORY OF SOME EXPERIENCE which is an element in some
previous member, OR c. contains, as an element, some experience A MEMORY OF
WHICH would, given certain conditions, occur as an element in some sub-sequent
member; d. there being no subject of members which is independent from all the
rest. What Grice is attempting to defend Locke’s conceptual analysis of "I" --
in the mandatory reading for Grice's BA Lit Hum, "An Essay Concerning Humane
[sic] Understanding," by making some alterations to it. Grice introduces as
part of the analysans the concept of a total temporary state, and formulated
his reductive (never reductionist) conceptual analysis such that each temporary
state is within a temporal series. Grice further claimed that each total
temporary state contains within it, as an element, a MEMORY (to use Eccles's
phrase) of some experience ("hearing a noise"), which will therefore be
included as an element in all following members of this temporal series.
However, this reductive analysis would still fall victim to criticism by Reid,
aka The Lone Ranger. Grice feels forced to insert an extra prong: only under
certain conditions would a total temporary state contain an element that had
been experienced in a preceding member of the series. Grice realises
"consciousness" is complex; often memories are not held onto. Grice formulates
his analysis such that every experience of one’s "identity" being remembered
for the rest of that identity’s existence is a pretty absurd idea. Grice trusts
consciousness is what provides the continuity to constitute an identity but
that consciousness is infallible, if not as he read "Personal Identity" to
Hardie, his tutor at Corpus ("What does he know anyway?"). Grice got a first.
Incidentally, Popper's dialysis, like Grice's analysis for that matter, has the
proper (beloved by Oxonians) Graeco-Roman pedigree. Neither Grice's analysis
nor Popper's dialysis, alas, can ever for Popper solve a problem as it is. Both
are just a means to an end. But dialysis is deemed by Popper as much less
time-consuming means to the same end. In Roman, "dialysis," meaning
'separation,' is listed by Publio Rutilio Lupo (Cfr. P. Giambullari nel suo
Regole della lingua fiorentina). Greek: dialysis from διαλύω) Usage 1.
separating, parting, "δ. τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος” Usage 2. ending, cessation,
“κακῶν”; πολέμου”; cessation of hostilities; settlement, compromise; settlement
of a dispute, “ἠξίου δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἔμ᾽ αὑτῷ γίγνεσθαιτὰς διαλύσεις” Usage 3.
solution of a problem; “χρησμῶν”. Usage 4. refutation of an argument. Usage 5.
resolution of a diphthong: ἐν διαλύσει, = διαλελυμένως. Usage 6. Rhet.,
asyndeton. Usage 7. discharge, “χορηγιῶν”; "τῶν χρεωστουμένων”. Usage 8. deed
of separation or divorce. "ἔγγραφος δ.” Usage 9. division of inheritance.
Cheers -- Speranza
