[lit-ideas] Re: Grice Grice

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 7 Jul 2012 21:32:38 +0100 (BST)

 From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
>McEvoy thinks of himself as "Gorilla Gorilla". 

Do I? It was only mentioned as it is the only example of a species where the 
name in science is the same as in ordinary language: contrast, rattus for rat 
etc. Not a lot of people know that. While on names: no doubt Cora Diamond is an 
appealing name, as you suggest, but what about Bob Diamond, or Neil Diamond? 
The view that the appeal of a surname can be divorced from the forename, and 
many other things - like fraudulent banking practices or hot August nights, is 
v questionable: compare Humbert Humbert to his cousins Jake and Archie, and 
while Joan Miro might seem a great name for an artist what if it was Joan as in 
Darby and Joan or even Baez?

And of course all this holds things up before we meet on what PMS says re W: 
here the important claims seem to me (1) that in the TLP, we need to 
distinguish what has sense [natural science], is senseless [logic] and what is 
nonsense [most everything else, including the content of the TLP] (2) that in 
the TLP, its propositions do not show "the truth" but rather its propositions 
try to say how the props of natural science and of logic show "the truth" [Max 

In particular, I am curious how (2) is thought to be the case given how W ends 
TLP's Preface - "On the other hand the truth of the thoughts communicated here 
to me unassailable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 
problems have in essentials been finally solved. And if I am not mistaken in 
this, then the value of this work secondly consists in the fact that it shows 
how little has been done when these problems have been solved." On the face of 
it, "the thoughts communicated here" includes the propositions of TLP: but if 
these say nothing with sense, and do not show anything either, how can they 
have "truth"? [I have been suggesting the TLP puts its propositions forward as 
saying nothing with sense but as nevertheless showing the truth.]

Last but not least, there is whether whatever view we have of TLP has important 
consequences for how we view PI. PMSH seems to imply it has and indeed that PI 
is clearly not simply a fresh start but crucially and deliberately given as a 
corrective to the TLP, as is other of the later W's work.

PMSH, it seems to me, sets out a v cogent case for how the saying-showing 
distinction is absolutely fundamental to TLP.

Perhaps there is a pdf of his view of how saying-showing applies - if it does - 
in PI and/or to understanding what is written there?

On taxi duty
In a bleak pdf-less landscape
Near Land's End

Other related posts: