[lit-ideas] Godot in Iraq
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2006 21:07:57 -0800 (PST)
Godot in Iraq
The administration's plans for Iraq seem to owe more
to Samuel Beckett than to Donald Rumsfeld.
By Matthew Yglesias
Web Exclusive: 03.14.06
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Another depressing week in the war that won't end got
off to a typical start as I read in Saturday's
Washington Post that "President Bush plans to begin a
series of speeches next week again explaining the
administration's strategy for winning the war in
Iraq." The repetitiveness of this White House tactic
has gotten so absurd that the reporter dropped the
press corps typical posture of feigned obtuseness and
noted, repeatedly, that we've heard this song before.
Recall such classic headlines as "Bush Seeks to
Reassure Nation on Iraq" (5/25/04), "Bush Plans Bid to
Rally Iraq Support" (8/22/05), and "Bush Presents Plan
to Win Iraq War" (12/1/05) announcing previous speech
offensives.
In truth, things have slipped so far downhill in Iraq
that it's hard to say what our goals are, much less
whether or not we're in a position to meet them. What
can be said is that the administration's plans for
Iraq seem to owe more to Samuel Beckett than to
serious national security policy. On the political
front, the administration is trying to put together an
Iraqi government that will enjoy more broad-based
support. This involves two main prongs. One is to get
the Interior Ministry out of the hands of the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) in Iraq,
which, of the two main Iran-backed Islamist political
parties in Iraq is considered the more Iran-backed and
extreme. The other is to replace Prime Minister
Ibrahim al-Jafari, a member of the other major
Iran-backed Islamist political party, now regarded as
corrupt and ineffective, with a more conciliatory
figure, Vice President Adil Abd al-Mahdi.
Al-Mahdi, meanwhile, is a member of SCIRI, the same
political party that can't be trusted to run the
interior ministry -- the one that, in other contexts,
is regarded as the more extreme of the two main
options. So where's the evidence that he's a more
moderate figure? Who knows? The Kurds like him, seems
to be the theory, though Kurds seem scenario for hope
in his Friday column. What needs to happen, he says,
is for the Kurdish parties to form a coalition with
Sunni parties and secularists to boot the Shia from
power and form a broad-based national unity
government. I have various mathematical quibbles with
the notion that this is actually a possible outcome,
but even so it misses the point. If today's problem is
that a Shiite Islamist government is alienating Kurds
and secular Shiites while inspiring violent warfare
from Sunni Arabs, simply flipping the scenario around
doesn't change anything. Put Shiites in power and
Sunnis out, and the Sunnis fight against the Shiite
government. If you put the Sunnis back in power, and
the Shiites back out then, well, the Shiites will
fight against the Sunni government. The problem is the
conflict, not the organizational chart.
Even Krauthammer's plan to rearrange the deck chairs
on the Titanic, however, is outdone by Donald
Rumsfeld's staggering testimony last week in which he
assured senators that in the event of civil war, the
plan is to have "Iraqi security deal with it to the
extent they're able to." General John Abizaid further
elaborated that in case of civil war, "it's very clear
that the Iraqi forces will handle it, but they'll
handle it with our help." The only conclusion to draw
from this is that top Pentagon officials don't know
what a civil war is. Here's the basic idea: In a civil
war, whether in the United States, or Russia, or El
Salvador, or what have you, the official state
security forces are one side in the conflict, not
referees who keep a lid on things. In our Civil War,
the U.S. Army fought the war, they didn't "deal with
it." The basic nature of the burgeoning conflict in
Iraq is that the state, and its security forces, are
under Shiite control and they're fighting a Sunni Arab
armed insurrection. Civil war is merely the
intensification of the conflict already under way.
Some in the government seem to see it this way. The
March 6 LA Times reported that "U.S. officials have
revamped and expanded training programs for Iraqi
police units amid mounting concern that their focus on
fighting insurgents, and not protecting citizens, has
created an unaccountable force plagued by corruption
and rights abuses." Then again, this understanding
clearly isn't our only guiding light. As recently as
January 18 the Associated Press explained that "the
United States is embarking on a revamped training
program for Iraq's 80,000 police force in a bid to
strengthen local security forces battling the rampant
insurgency."
To recap, then, the administration's plan has two
elements, one political and one military. On the
political side, the plan is to either give SCIRI more
power or else less power. On the military side, the
plan is either to have Iraqi forces focus more on
fighting insurgents, or else to focus less on doing
so. If anti-insurgent operations by Iraqi forces
become a civil war, then Iraqi forces will handle it.
Clear?
Neither am I. Fortunately, I hear there's a series of
speeches in the works to straighten us out.
Matthew Yglesias is a Prospect staff writer.
© 2006 by The American Prospect, Inc.
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