[lit-ideas] Re: Geary's Truth

  • From: "Mike Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 10:32:54 -0600

Shucks, Walter, you didn't hurt my feelings. I think JL may be more thin-skinned or more self-respecting than me, probably both. You could have called me a "dumb ox", like they called Aquinas, and I wouldn't have cared. I yam what I yam. And as I've said before, I know it gets tedious to have to talk philosophy using the language of the street. It gets tedious trying to tell a customer why his compressor shorted to ground when he doesn't know what a compressor is or does or what shorted means -- so I know how it is. Take Palma and JL's last few posts -- I haven't the foggiest what the hell they're talking about. Will steer clear of that one, I promise you. But I do have some notion of what "Truth" means as well as "know" -- that is, I believe I do. And so I dive right into such arguments, happy to splash about. I don't care if people splash back at me, that's the fun of it. However, it is bit aggravating when someone says I'm all wrong but won't say how or where or why. I can understand not wanting to get into a tedious argument of invidious extent, but just an outline of one's counter argument would help clarify my own thoughts, no need to go beyond that. But again, I find it mildly aggravating, not insulting. I'm shanty boat Irish, after all, my mama did wear boots.


Mike Geary
Memphis



----- Original Message ----- From: <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>; <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
Cc: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2007 9:12 AM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Geary's Truth


On the point JL expresses below, I believe he is largely correct and he provides some relevant reasons for that belief. I apologize to Mike and JL for my recent lack of that collegial patience and discursive understanding we all expect from each other in identifying, attributing and constructively critiquing claims made and reasons proferred for those claims. I, for my part, will try to do better in the future, and I look forward to being helped in this attempt by positive modelling of the moral and epistemic virtues to which JL is committed.


Walter O
MUN



Quoting Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx:

W. O.:

"Shall we count the fallacies, contradictions and self-contradictions
populating
MG's post below?"

--- That was a bit offensive. It offended _me_ on behalf of Geary. So
apologies, Geary, this man, W. O. who's at Memorial, has no idea how hurtful
and
unwelcome his words can be.

Of course your post is not populated by fallacies (unethical word), and
self-contradictions (which would include contradictions). It was a sincere
attempt at a PHILOSOPHIA MEA which we all appreciate.

As I would appreciate a sincere MEMORIAL PHILOSOPHY from W. O. who has been

criticising the creative in us, as proposing constraints -- he called me a 'sophist', and says that I'm the living proof of the limitations of LEARNING!

How rude!) -- that there may be common in MEMORIAL, but which we don't have
to
air off in a snobbish way to silence others!

Anyway, some comments on Geary's post -- while I realise he's engaged in
positive criticism with Wager and Yost inter alii.






>I'm talking about beliefs.  Beliefs are all
>  we have.

Well, and DESIRES. I count my desires more important than my beliefs
ANYTIME.

>We acquire our beliefs through our culture.  On a universal  scale,
> no one belief has a more morally privileged standing than any other, > just

as
> no culture has a more morally privileged  standing.  What I have just
written
> is not the Truth, it is a  belief that there is no such thing as Truth.

You were lucky because you had a coherent (:-)) 'conceptual framework', as I

think Davidson and Quine calls what you mean by culture. After the fall of
Popper there have been many philosophers of the sceptical kind ('rotten
negativists', in L. K. Helm's marinistic parlance) who have realised the
importance
of the paradigm (Kuhn) or the research programme (Lakatos) or the heuristics

(Feyerabend) of beliefs to even survive as individuals.

>We hold to certain
> beliefs because we believe them to be  true.

Right. This I call the 'redundancy' theory of belief. Nothing wrong with it.

But it relates to some argument by Cambridge philosopher (he died very
young, possibly cancer), Frances Plumpton Ramsey. By this theory to say,

              "She is a bitch"

and

            "I  believe she is a bitch"

or

            "It's a  truth she is a bitch"

are all _equivalent_. His point is that the truth-predicate is indeed
_redundant_.


Geary continues:

>You may believe there is Truth
> out there, but until you can prove it incontrovertibly, it's just > another

> belief. Those who believe that there is no Truth believe that as a > truth,

> but at the same  time believe that it could  possibly be erroneous and
would
> amend  the belief, given incontrovertible evidence to the contrary.

Yes, that's the sceptic creed, and when I was first encountered with it
through Loeb's Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Phyrrohism) I was able to apply

Grice's conversational maxims. At the time, I deviced two operators:

     a noumenal operator n
     a phenomenal operator ph

So we say,

            (She is  a bitch)n
            (She is  a bitch)ph

The first reads, She _is_ a bitch, while the other reads, _For all I care,
she _looks_ like a bitch to me_. I analysed the interaction of the two
operators  in terms of Grice's maxims like:

           Do not say  what you lack adequate evidence for
           Do not say  that which you believe to be false

and easily concluded that the Sceptic had to remain _silent_ (ataraxia).
Also found an essay by Bar-Hillel saying that if all our language were of the

phenomenalistic guise, it would not count as a language.

Since, I have taken for granted that beliefs are _thought_ by the subject to

be _true_ even if not intersubjectively true.

Moore used to say, "It is raining but I do not believe it" was the epitome of the silly Cambridge philosopher (which he pretended us to believe he was).




>But I
> can't imagine what kind of evidence could ever be brought forth to > prove
> some belief a Truth.
> Mike  Geary
> speaking the truth.

Well, perhaps Popper would work for you here. The onus probandi would be in

your enemy (Larry Kramer) or your arch-enemy (W. O.) calling your belief
'self-contradiction', or 'fallacious', or 'contradictory' (with his own
beliefs?)

But his saying, to echo Evans, doesn't make it so.

Sweet dreams!

J. L. Speranza
    Philosophical Advising 7/24
and author of "Philosophy,  Literature and Ideas: The Life and Times of
Andreas  Ramos"



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