[lit-ideas] Re: Geachiana
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2014 18:03:06 -0500 (EST)
In a message dated 1/22/2014 3:23:09 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
rpaul@xxxxxxxx quotes in "Cambridge changes" from Geach:
Geach:
"Clearly any change logically implies a ‘Cambridge’ change, but the
converse is clearly not true; there is a sense of ‘change,’ hard to explicate,
in which it is false to say that Socrates changes by coming to be shorter
than Theatetus when the boy grows up, or that the butter changes by rising in
price, or that Herbert changes by becoming an ‘object of envy to Edith’;
in these cases, ‘Cambridge’ change of an object (Socrates, the butter,
Herbert) makes no ‘real’ change in that object."
----
Before commenting on McEvoy's and O. K.'s further points, I would like to f
ocus here on:
"It is false to say"
I would think that we may then identify
"CAMBRIDGE CHANGE" with Geach and the idea of "it is false to say"
While we may stick with
"Oxford change" and Grice and the idea of "it is odd, misleadingly odd --
YET TRUE" to say.
----
Or not!
I'm amused that Geach wants to focus on the 'sense' of 'change'.
In other words, fly me to the moon. What Geach sees as a semantic problem
-- a "Cambridge change" that is not 'real' --, a Griceian [sic] approach
would stretch the scenarios there and rotate Geach's rather strict, "it is
false to say" to a mere conversational implicature that 'trades'
(figuratively) on what is ACTUALLY and strictly TRUE to say even if
misleadingly odd due
to the 'maxims of conversation', as it were.
Or not!
Cheers,
Speranza
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