[lit-ideas] G - U - R - K - H - A (Toll Free)
- From: jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, richierd@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 12:45:01 -0500
From an online source at
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/archive/index.php/t-9153.html
------
M1A2U2
04-05-2004, 05:06 PM
What is the story where the Gurkhas sneek into Stanley in
the middle of the night and slit the throats of the Argentines after one of
their men was excecuted?
hist2004
04-05-2004, 05:16 PM
Try this
link:
http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/Mount-William.htm
Never
heard of the incident you mentioned.
Regards,
Hist2004
Royal
04-05-2004, 06:06 PM
Never heard of the incident you
mentioned.
Ditto.
martinexsquaddie
04-18-2004, 04:41 AM
though read a book of interviews with Argie conscript woh
claimed the Gurhka's were high on drugs and wearing Sony walkmans :roll: and
they butchered there own injured. Though in real life I think they had only
very
limited combat most argies fled at rumour of they were on there way. Not that I
blame then did the same thing on exercise not helped by a Gurhka officer
explaining "the boys sometimes get confused between exercise and real combat
unfortunatly there's just no stopping them sometimes :lol: "
I guess it was a
wind up but nobody else was planning to stick around to find out :P
DeltaWhisky58
04-18-2004, 03:05 PM
What is the story where the Gurkhas sneek into Stanley in
the middle of the night and slit the throats of the Argentines after one of
their men was excecuted?
Had this incident actually taken place, I very
much doubt that "Johnny Gurkha" would have limited himself to slitting the
Argie's throats - the Khukri is designed for lopping off heads in one clean
swipe, not for lesser actions!
Saranof
04-18-2004, 05:16 PM
though read a book of interviews with Argie conscript woh
claimed the Gurhka's were high on drugs and wearing Sony walkmans :roll: and
they butchered there own injured. Though in real life I think they had only
very
limited combat most argies fled at rumour of they were on there way. Not that I
blame then did the same thing on exercise not helped by a Gurhka officer
explaining "the boys sometimes get confused between exercise and real combat
unfortunatly there's just no stopping them sometimes :lol: "
I guess it was a
wind up but nobody else was planning to stick around to find out
:P
Reminds me of what some our Kustjägare ("Coasthunters" , Coastal
Rangers) are like. On one occasion, one of 'em emptied a live ammo mag into a
tent, as retribution for some soldiers complaining of them being too rough :)
It didn't go down too well wtih the command, but they shut the thing down
pretty soon.
Geezah
04-19-2004, 11:20 AM
I'm currenlty reading a book on the Gurkhas, in one section
they talked about Argentines fleeing their post because of propogande their
government put out saying the Gurkhas were "drug crazed, half human
cannibals"?
csqnsas
04-19-2004, 12:25 PM
Urban/Military myth.
The Gurka throatslitting has
been myth since WW2.
The Gurkas would creep into the jungle at night,
finding any basha areas - check who was there by feeling the boots of the
sleeping toms. As the Japanese had different boots to the Brits, Indians,
Americans. If they were Jap boots then they would slit the throats of all but 1
or 2 men.
The survivors would wake to find the whole section etc wiped
out?
Anyone been in the Jungle?- No movement at night.
Also the
story of the Gurka who found his way back to India from Burma after the fall .
On questioning him . How did you do it?. He replied " It was not hard I had a
map"
Further investigation shows the map is of London, or in other
versionsis that the map is of the London underground.
Loads of Myths I'm
afraid.
WW1 - The British put out propagand to the effect that all the
Germans were baby eating , Nun raping killers. Again all cr*p made up as local
proof of how just the war was.
WW2. The Japanese- British myth - All Japs
were cross eyed and could not shoot.
Fact, they were very good shots and
the adverage Japanese soldier was more adaptable than the adverage Allied
soldier in jungle warefare.
There are hundred of them
hist2004
04-19-2004, 03:21 PM
The controversy over the Gurkhas deployment to the Falklands
surprises me to some extent.
Their operations have been documented and the
fact that Argentine conscripts had conjured up
fables about them rest solely
in their imaginations. A controversy that did occur during this
time was the
capture of NP (Naval Party) 8901. It had been widely reported and
misreported
that the Argentine unit Buzo Tactico (Combat Divers) were
responsible for the capture of the
Governors House.
I used to own a book
called “This Is the SAS: a Pictorial History of the Special Air
Service
Regiment by Tony Geraghty. In it is a picture of what was referred to
as Unit 602 (Argentine
Commandos) shown “proning out” the Royal Marines after
Governor Rex Hunt ordered them
to cease resisting. In fact the unit
responsible for this was Ca Cdo Anf (Marine Commandos).
The reason I
mentioned this incident because the actions this unit took after Governor
Rex
Hunt ordered the Royal Marines to surrender in a sense laid the
foundation for the Argentine’s
defeat in the Falklands.
The Royal Marines
were unceremoniously stripped of their weapons and webbing and then forced
to
lie face down in front of the Governor’s House with their hands behind their
heads. They
weren’t mistreated, but the Argentine forces made a serious
miscalculation by photographing
the event, and then letting the pictures out
to the world press. This one action, which upon viewing
it in Great Britain,
got the Brit’s “blood up” and served as catalyst for hardening Britain’s
resolve
in reclaiming the Falklands.
Regards,
Hist2004
Marsuitor
04-19-2004, 03:54 PM
Regarding the Gurkhas, wasn't there some photo op of them
sharpening their kukris that had the Argentines all winded up? Remember seeing
a
b&w photo of them all taking turns on a huge sharpening wheel while having
the most scary grin on their faces, after which the UK really made sure this
photo ended up in Argentine media.
Geezah
04-19-2004, 04:29 PM
The controversy over the Gurkhas deployment to the Falklands
surprises me to some extent.
Their operations have been documented and the
fact that Argentine conscripts had conjured up
fables about them rest solely
in their imaginations. A controversy that did occur during this
time was the
capture of NP (Naval Party) 8901. It had been widely reported and
misreported
that the Argentine unit Buzo Tactico (Combat Divers) were
responsible for the capture of the
Governors House.
I used to own a book
called “This Is the SAS: a Pictorial History of the Special Air
Service
Regiment by Tony Geraghty. In it is a picture of what was referred to
as Unit 602 (Argentine
Commandos) shown “proning out” the Royal Marines after
Governor Rex Hunt ordered them
to cease resisting. In fact the unit
responsible for this was Ca Cdo Anf (Marine Commandos).
The reason I
mentioned this incident because the actions this unit took after Governor
Rex
Hunt ordered the Royal Marines to surrender in a sense laid the
foundation for the Argentine’s
defeat in the Falklands.
The Royal Marines
were unceremoniously stripped of their weapons and webbing and then forced
to
lie face down in front of the Governor’s House with their hands behind their
heads. They
weren’t mistreated, but the Argentine forces made a serious
miscalculation by photographing
the event, and then letting the pictures out
to the world press. This one action, which upon viewing
it in Great Britain,
got the Brit’s “blood up” and served as catalyst for hardening Britain’s
resolve
in reclaiming the
Falklands.
Regards,
Hist2004
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/photos/images/falklands/fkd3020.jpg
Royal
Marines captured by Argentine Special Forces during the invasion of the
Falkland
Islands, 2 April
1982.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/photos/images/falklands/fkd2049.jpg
The
original Royal Marine garrison pose with the Falkland Island's flag outside
Government House, Port Stanley, after the Argentine surrender, June 1982.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/photos/images/falklands/fkd164.jpg
Argentine
prisoners under guard at Port Stanley, June 1982.
http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/photos/images/falklands/fkd2028.jpg
Royal
Marines marching toward Port Stanley, June 1982.
The Argentines
didn't stand a chance, Britain up until that point had been involved in some
type of conflict 98yrs out of 100 and the Argentine troops were
green.
hist2004
04-19-2004, 05:58 PM
The Argentines didn't stand a chance, Britain up until that
point had been involved in some type of conflict 98yrs out of 100 and the
Argentine troops were green.
This is only my opinion, but I wouldn’t say
that the Argentines “didn’t stand a chance”. The British encountered
plenty
of operational difficulties (which they overcame) during the conflict. If the
Argentine commanders had
begun to confront the task force (British) while it
was still some distance from the Falklands, utilizing aircraft
based from the
Falklands themselves; along with submarine offensive operations they could have
done serious
damage to the task force. Remember, the British only had a
limited number of Harriers with them and they lost most
of their helicopter
transport due to Argentine air attacks hitting the ship transporting them once
they were in San
Carlos. The Argentine commanders also failed to cover every
possible landing site. RM & Paras landed unopposed.
Again, just talk on
my part, the Brits showed the resolve needed and got the job
done.
Regards,
Hist2004
Royal
04-19-2004, 06:25 PM
The Argentines didn't stand a chance, Britain up until that
point had been involved in some type of conflict 98yrs out of 100 and the
Argentine troops were green.
This is only my opinion, but I wouldn’t say
that the Argentines “didn’t stand a chance”. The British encountered plenty of
operational difficulties (which they overcame) during the conflict.
Very
true
If the Argentine commanders had begun to confront the task force
(British) while it was still some distance from the Falklands, utilizing
aircraft based from the Falklands themselves; along with submarine offensive
operations they could have done serious
damage to the task force.
As
the Santa Fe was neutralised in South Georgia and the UK had HMS Conqueror (and
other submarine assets) and until MPA was built in the mid 1980's there was no
airfield on the islands capable of supporting conventional fighter aircraft
(the
Argentines used rough strips for their C130's and Puccara's) other than the
small strip at Stanley - which was put out of action by Harriers (not the Black
Buck raids as was intended), I find that difficult to agree
with.
Remember, the British only had a limited number of Harriers with
them and they lost most of their helicopter transport due to Argentine air
attacks hitting the ship transporting them once they were in San Carlos.
The Atlantic Conveyor (carrying Chinooks and Harriers) was sunk outside
the TES - this certainly affected the heavy lift capacity (although one Chinook
was saved and used), there remained RN SeaKings as well as RN Lynx and RM and
AAC Gazelle and Scout helos.
The Argentine commanders also failed to
cover every possible landing site. RM & Paras landed unopposed. Again, just
talk on my part, the Brits showed the resolve needed and got the job
done.
The RM and Para's did not land unopposed. The main Argentine
position ovlooking Red and Blue beaches was neutralised by a party from the SBS
and 148 Bty RA just prior to the landings. Several Argentines escaped and
attempted to direct arty fire onto the beachead before they were
captured.
hist2004
04-19-2004, 11:06 PM
Some interesting points from:
CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC
the impact of air power
Dr Robert W. Duffner
The
Argentines made a serious misjudgment by not using the month of April to work
on
extending the Port Stanley runway. If they had accomplished this vital task, a
more effective defense of Port Stanley could have been achieved. A longer
runway
could have accepted the much needed Skyhawks and Mirages, allowing them to
perform both counterair and close air support missions. Operating from a land
base on the islands, Skyhawks and Mirages would not have been so severely
restricted by the limitations of fuel and distance. By significantly increasing
the time that they could spend in the air and with at least a three-to-one
advantage in fighter aircraft, the Argentine pilots might have been able to
overwhelm the small British air force by numbers alone. Also, with the critical
element of staying power working in their favor, they could have engaged in
more
recon missions to collect more accurate intelligence on the kind and location
of
targets. Even more important, Argentine fighters flying out of Port Stanley
would have had a better opportunity to locate and successfully attack the
British fleet. This achievement might have altered the outcome of the conflict.
Air power was to have a much greater impact on the British landing at San
Carlos, which began on 21 May. British soldiers secured the beaches unopposed
on
the ground, but the escort ships in Falkland Sound that supported the operation
faced wave after wave of Argentine planes from two directions. The small
Pucarás
took off from Port Stanley and flew low to the ground, approaching the Royal
Navy from the east. The first Pucarás bombed and badly damaged the frigate
Argonaut, one of five ships that formed a forward defense line to detect
aircraft coming from the Argentine mainland.
The problem of bombs that hit
their targets but failed to detonate plagued the Argentines throughout the war.
Some accounts estimate that nearly 80 percent of the bombs dropped on target
malfunctioned because of poor wiring and delivery techniques. Releasing the
bombs at very low altitudes (less than 40 feet) did not give the bombs
sufficient time to arm themselves prior to impact.
Britain suffered its
worst casualties from Argentine air power on 8 June, when British troops were
caught in a poorly planned and badly executed operation to land soldier sat
Fitzroy. Two landing ships, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad, anchored in Fitzroy
inlet (four miles from Bluff Cove) without protection from naval escort ships,
offered an inviting target to the Argentine Air Force. Mirages and Skyhawks
capitalized on the opportunity by dropping bombs on both ships, which were
loaded with troops ready to disembark at Fitzroy. Without naval- or land-based
SAMs available to provide protective firepower, the Tristram and Galahad were
extremely vulnerable. As a result, more than fifty lives were lost--the highest
single-day casualty figure of the war for the British.
The absence of an
adequate Argentine naval force and the inferior training of the bulk of
Argentine ground troops resulted in Argentina's placing a disproportionate
share
of combat responsibility and expectations on the Argentine Air Force. This
circumstance, coupled with the Argentines' failure to extend the vitally
important Port Stanley airstrip and their very limited aerial-refueling
capability, directly contributed to Argentina's defeat.
British combat
operations in the conflict were successful not only because of the Argentines'
fundamental military weaknesses but also because of the superb leadership and
highly coordinated planning efforts carried out by the Royal Navy, Army, and
Air
Force at all levels of command.
Regards,
Hist2004
Royal
04-20-2004, 03:53 AM
Regardless of what Dr Duffner (who I presume was not there)
says, I'm sure that those men who fought and died (or were captured) would
dispute his claim that the landings were unopposed - as do the British official
unit war diaries...
His point about the extension of the runway at
Stanley would be a valid one but for two vital points; a cratered runway is no
use for fast jets no matter how long it is (the runway was already being
cratered by Harriers to prevent its use by C130s - an aircraft renowned for its
rough take off/landing abilities). But probbaly more importantly, how would the
Argentines have got enough jet fuel to Stanley to support the jets? The British
had already largely prevented use of the runway by supply planes (although the
racecourse was used) and do you really think a supply ship would have made it
through the TES unscathed and then docked and unloaded without being
hit?
A final point that just occured to me - Pebble Island. Yes Stanley
airfield would have been better defended, but the UK was already prepared to
sacrifice an SAS squadron in a 'suicide attack' on Stanley that was planned and
not executed - they would certainly have done it in this case.
hist2004
04-20-2004, 10:23 AM
Royal-
Thanks for the give and take on this matter,
good discussion with no arrows. I’ll give you the
last word. To those forum
members who aren’t too familiar with the Falklands War, I encourage
you to
read about it because it is a testament to what high quality Infantry,
excellent
cadre, and
commanders (from each service branch) can accomplish. The British
faced a logistical nightmare
with extended supply lines conducting combat
operations in difficult terrain (weather included).
With heavy lift
helicopter support unavailable due to battle damage, the Royal Marines and
Paras
“yomped” (Royal Marines), “tabbed” (Para’s) 40 miles with all their
personal equipment with
packs weighing up to 110 pounds. This route took them
up and down hills along rocky valleys
and through stone runs that ran for
miles. The Paras tabbed for 24 hours straight stopping only
occasionally to
reach their objectives and then without rest conducted combat operations.
Obviously this wouldn’t have been possible without superior troopers
hardened by excellent
training.
When the Welsh Guards troops transport was
hit by air attack, the wounded didn’t complain
at all, their only concern was
how their fellow wounded were.
Regards,
Hist2004
Ichhabe
04-20-2004, 11:35 AM
Any of you guys seen Falklands-The land battle?
It is a 4
part series. Quite informative.
martinexsquaddie
04-20-2004, 01:47 PM
had a Platoon commander who thought it would be "fun" to
reenact the famous Yomp :(
it was'nt.even in september even when the weather
is better :(
csqnsas
04-20-2004, 01:57 PM
Did you serve there Royal during the war?.
I got down
there in 84 when the Argies were still 'probing' the air defence and on two
occasions we were on Air alert red.
Talking about propaganda and such,
All of the Air Defence in 84 were also the same as those who served during the
conflict.
One of those I knew had even shot down a Pucara with a Blowpipe.
Anyway they also had to act as guards for the returning Argintinian
conscriptsback to Argintina as POWs. Sad tales .
The conscripts had been
filled with Sh*t stories from their Officers. So when the RA guards tried to
get
the POW's to have a shower, they mostly started crying ( Remember these were
mostly 18 year olds straight from home to a war!).
The had been told that
if caught they would be gassed . So thought that the "shower" was the execution
chamber.
Also the state of the conscripts was a shock to all those
British, Starving and without the most basic of supplies in the
most.
Poor bastar*s
Royal
04-20-2004, 02:11 PM
No, I was still at school. I joined a couple of years later.
Needless to say all my DS in training and NCO's on my first few drafts had been
'down south'.
I've been there (and South Georgia) on training exercises,
so I know the geography pretty well.
________________________________________________________________________
More new features than ever. Check out the new AOL Mail ! -
http://webmail.aol.com
Other related posts:
- » [lit-ideas] G - U - R - K - H - A (Toll Free)
