----- Forwarded message from Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx> -----
Date: Fri, 9 Jan 2009 05:06:31 +0000
From: Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Reply-To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Transcendental or what's in a name?
To: lit-ideas <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
A few days ago,
Phil Enns wrote:
"In some cases, there will be no clear answer [about whether it's a case of
stealing or not] and so the case lies in a grey area. What I don't see is how
having some cases ending up in this grey area changes the universal moral force
of the prohibition against stealing in those cases that are clear."
Perhaps I'm just dense, but there seems to me to be something that needs
explaining about the relationship between a term or proposition or maxim or
whatever which is supposed to be "universal" and something which is supposed to
be a "grey area" to which said universal term, proposition or maxim refers or
applies. That's not an oblique way of saying it can't be explained, just a
request for explanation.
I can imagine explaining that relationship by saying that the term, proposition,
etc. is universal in all those cases to which it unambiguously refers or
applies, but that there can often be a question as to whether or not it refers
to a particular situation and there can be situations in which there is real,
legitimate conflict over its applicability.
The point I was making that started this extended discussion, for my part
anyway, was about needing to understand exactly how the terms used in moral
judgments refer to (potentially) real human interactions. All I meant to be
saying was that if one took the term, proposition, etc., as 'universal', one
then had to make room for such subtleties of applying that universal term, etc.
to real situations as could allow for the sorts of grey areas Phil acknolwedges
can exist.
I can also imagine explaining the relationship between a "universal" and the
"grey area" to which it applies by saying that "universal" is just shorthand
for "general guideline" or "frequently appropriate guideline" or what have you,
i.e. some sort of pragmatically qualified universality. In my mind, that comes
to the same thing as saying that it's unqualifiedly universal but the range of
cases to which it applies may have some grey area in them.
I may be butchering some technical terminology, and running roughshod over
important distinctions, but I remain sincerely puzzled about why these are
problematic ways of resolving the question about the relationship between the
universal terms of a moral judgment and the grey area of its applicability.
Phil said, in response to my question about what might be lost if we (by which I
meant humanity at large) did not accept that there must be some transcendental,
universal, common meaning of moral terms,:
"...First, in the area of human rights, reference to a transcendental...meaning
of moral terms provides a much more robust account of what is due to every
human being. If everything is only historical, ethnically contextual, then
documents like the UDHR are far less likely to be as effective as they could
be."
A couple observations here. First, I think Phil offers a false dichotomy --
either there are transcendental meanings of moral terms or everything is "only
historical, ethnically contextual." That dichotomy only makes sense if one
thinks one can speak from a vantage point -- which itself would be
transcendental if it existed, at least as I see things -- from which the
alternatives transcendental or contingent can be seen to be the only
alternatives.
Instead, I would suggest that the meaning of "not transcendental" should be
"perhaps not applicable" or "possibly negotiatiable, at least to some extent".
Second, while I agree with what I take to be Phil's preference that the UDHR be
as effective as possible, I disagree that, as a practical matter, its
effectiveness is dependent upon its principles being universal. I think its
effectiveness is dependent upon its acceptance both as a set of precepts by
which all national governments operate and as occupying a sort of public
relations high ground from which foot-dragging countries can be cajoled into
cooperating with other countries to intervene where the UDHR's principles are
being violated.
Neither of those is dependent upon the UDHR in fact embodying transcendental
principles. Nor, in my opinion, would the UDHR be strengthened one jot by in
fact embodying such principles, if they existed, unless it were easy to
demonstrate publicly to all that they were in fact transcendental principles
that did, as such, apply to everyone everywhere and all the time.
Phil continues,
"Second, in the area of democracy, where reference to a transcendental,
universal, common meaning of moral terms fixes the equality of all citizens.
In a liberal democracy, the equlity of all citizens depends on the ability to
universalize moral terms so that any citizen, regardless of their historically
contingent identity, is to be treated as politically equal and equal before the
law. If moral judgments are only historically and ethnically contingent, then
it is much harder to explain why all citizens should be treated equally by the
state."
Again, I think the dichotomy between 'transcendental' and 'historically and
ethnically contingent' is a false one.
I certainly understand the practical, even rhetorical value of the claim to have
transcendental moral truths, and to have embodied them in the state's political
processes and laws. To make that claim is to call all disputants to attend to
the greater good in resolving their disputes, thereby helping ensure that
factional disagreement does not degenerate into civil war.
But that is a piece of pragmatic real-politik, not a demonstration of
transcendental truth. I don't think Phil's point is that transcendental truths
are such because they happen to work effectively in liberal democratic politics.
At least I hope that's not his point, both because it seems contrary to the
spirit of arguing for the intellectual merits of transcendental truth and
because here too I think it is a more treacherous public political position
than may appear at first blush.
It is politically treacherous -- by which I mean not necessarily conducive to
the long-term health of the liberal democratic processes I take Phil to have
been endorsing -- because in those cases where a group feels marginalized,
disenfranchised, or otherwise cut out of the benefits of the liberal democratic
process, to tell them they should simply accept what they see as the wrong done
them for "the greater good of the transcendental values our system represents"
is, as a practical matter, precisely to push them towards, not away from, the
violent remedies to their grievances the avoidance of which is one of the great
benefits of the liberal democratic system in the first place.
The more prudent position, imho, is to treat their grievance as potentially
calling for reconsideration of the very otherwise transcendentally-justified
rules the democracy had enacted. The problem is, of course, that the more one
has heralded one's system as embodying a transcendental notion of justice, the
more *any* adjustment to its operations opens the door to question all of the
other aspects of its operations, which is to say it opens the door to
questioning it tout court.
The way to avoid that is to exercise a judicious restraint in characterizing the
universal applicability of one's rules. The sincere and accurate assertion that
one is trying to do a good job but one really does recognize one is inevitably
failing to do so allows for a challenge to authority without that challenge
being a challenge to all authority at once.
Anyway, I appreciate the opportunity for continued thorough and patient
consideration of the various facets of this collection of questions.
Best regards to all,
Eric Dean
Washington DC
----- End forwarded message -----
|
A few days ago,
Phil Enns wrote: "In some cases, there will be no clear answer [about whether it's a case of stealing or not] and so the case lies in a grey area. What I don't see is how having some cases ending up in this grey area changes the universal moral force of the prohibition against stealing in those cases that are clear." Perhaps I'm just dense, but there seems to me to be something that needs explaining about the relationship between a term or proposition or maxim or whatever which is supposed to be "universal" and something which is supposed to be a "grey area" to which said universal term, proposition or maxim refers or applies. That's not an oblique way of saying it can't be explained, just a request for explanation. I can imagine explaining that relationship by saying that the term, proposition, etc. is universal in all those cases to which it unambiguously refers or applies, but that there can often be a question as to whether or not it refers to a particular situation and there can be situations in which there is real, legitimate conflict over its applicability. The point I was making that started this extended discussion, for my part anyway, was about needing to understand exactly how the terms used in moral judgments refer to (potentially) real human interactions. All I meant to be saying was that if one took the term, proposition, etc., as 'universal', one then had to make room for such subtleties of applying that universal term, etc. to real situations as could allow for the sorts of grey areas Phil acknolwedges can exist. I can also imagine explaining the relationship between a "universal" and the "grey area" to which it applies by saying that "universal" is just shorthand for "general guideline" or "frequently appropriate guideline" or what have you, i.e. some sort of pragmatically qualified universality. In my mind, that comes to the same thing as saying that it's unqualifiedly universal but the range of cases to which it applies may have some grey area in them. I may be butchering some technical terminology, and running roughshod over important distinctions, but I remain sincerely puzzled about why these are problematic ways of resolving the question about the relationship between the universal terms of a moral judgment and the grey area of its applicability. Phil said, in response to my question about what might be lost if we (by which I meant humanity at large) did not accept that there must be some transcendental, universal, common meaning of moral terms,: "...First, in the area of human rights, reference to a transcendental...meaning of moral terms provides a much more robust account of what is due to every human being. If everything is only historical, ethnically contextual, then documents like the UDHR are far less likely to be as effective as they could be." A couple observations here. First, I think Phil offers a false dichotomy -- either there are transcendental meanings of moral terms or everything is "only historical, ethnically contextual." That dichotomy only makes sense if one thinks one can speak from a vantage point -- which itself would be transcendental if it existed, at least as I see things -- from which the alternatives transcendental or contingent can be seen to be the only alternatives. Instead, I would suggest that the meaning of "not transcendental" should be "perhaps not applicable" or "possibly negotiatiable, at least to some extent". Second, while I agree with what I take to be Phil's preference that the UDHR be as effective as possible, I disagree that, as a practical matter, its effectiveness is dependent upon its principles being universal. I think its effectiveness is dependent upon its acceptance both as a set of precepts by which all national governments operate and as occupying a sort of public relations high ground from which foot-dragging countries can be cajoled into cooperating with other countries to intervene where the UDHR's principles are being violated. Neither of those is dependent upon the UDHR in fact embodying transcendental principles. Nor, in my opinion, would the UDHR be strengthened one jot by in fact embodying such principles, if they existed, unless it were easy to demonstrate publicly to all that they were in fact transcendental principles that did, as such, apply to everyone everywhere and all the time. Phil continues, "Second, in the area of democracy, where reference to a transcendental, universal, common meaning of moral terms fixes the equality of all citizens. In a liberal democracy, the equlity of all citizens depends on the ability to universalize moral terms so that any citizen, regardless of their historically contingent identity, is to be treated as politically equal and equal before the law. If moral judgments are only historically and ethnically contingent, then it is much harder to explain why all citizens should be treated equally by the state." Again, I think the dichotomy between 'transcendental' and 'historically and ethnically contingent' is a false one. I certainly understand the practical, even rhetorical value of the claim to have transcendental moral truths, and to have embodied them in the state's political processes and laws. To make that claim is to call all disputants to attend to the greater good in resolving their disputes, thereby helping ensure that factional disagreement does not degenerate into civil war. But that is a piece of pragmatic real-politik, not a demonstration of transcendental truth. I don't think Phil's point is that transcendental truths are such because they happen to work effectively in liberal democratic politics. At least I hope that's not his point, both because it seems contrary to the spirit of arguing for the intellectual merits of transcendental truth and because here too I think it is a more treacherous public political position than may appear at first blush. It is politically treacherous -- by which I mean not necessarily conducive to the long-term health of the liberal democratic processes I take Phil to have been endorsing -- because in those cases where a group feels marginalized, disenfranchised, or otherwise cut out of the benefits of the liberal democratic process, to tell them they should simply accept what they see as the wrong done them for "the greater good of the transcendental values our system represents" is, as a practical matter, precisely to push them towards, not away from, the violent remedies to their grievances the avoidance of which is one of the great benefits of the liberal democratic system in the first place. The more prudent position, imho, is to treat their grievance as potentially calling for reconsideration of the very otherwise transcendentally-justified rules the democracy had enacted. The problem is, of course, that the more one has heralded one's system as embodying a transcendental notion of justice, the more *any* adjustment to its operations opens the door to question all of the other aspects of its operations, which is to say it opens the door to questioning it tout court. The way to avoid that is to exercise a judicious restraint in characterizing the universal applicability of one's rules. The sincere and accurate assertion that one is trying to do a good job but one really does recognize one is inevitably failing to do so allows for a challenge to authority without that challenge being a challenge to all authority at once. Anyway, I appreciate the opportunity for continued thorough and patient consideration of the various facets of this collection of questions. Best regards to all, Eric Dean Washington DC |
