[lit-ideas] Re: Fwd: Re: Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 5 Sep 2014 07:09:44 +0100
Walter makes clear he means what he says when he writes:
>I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally).
Taken at face value, this (tacitly) claims that it is impossible to do moral
wrong intentionally. That claim goes against common sense and any known legal
system. Perhaps we might start by looking at how and why Socrates supported
this claim (as Walter suggests he did) as an entrance into whether it is a
valid claim?
Dnl
Ldn
On Friday, 5 September 2014, 2:19, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
Two things:
1) Kant's interpretation is the most cogent one I know of in these matters.
What's wrong with it?
2) You're spidey senses are tingling big time: I do indeed hold the Socratic
view that no rational agent knowingly does wrong. This is not the view that no
rational agent ever does stuff that others /society / believe to be wrong. That
happens often enough, thank god. It is the view that the agent herself must
believe her action to be morally right (i.e., obligatory or permissible) if she
goes through with it.
Regret, apologies, revisions of belief provide no compelling evidence against
the cogency of this Socratic view as these can also be consequent upon doing
what you believe at the time to be right. Regret for having done P is
essentially regret that one at the time actually believed P was the right thing
to do. As one must have if one did it. (And it doesn't matter if you didn't
inhale.)
If you didn't do the right thing at the time you acted, that is because you
thought the right thing to do was what you did. Otherwise you wouldn't have
done it. The Socratic thesis remains unrefuted. Nicht wahr?
A relevant scene from class:
Student: "Walter, that can't be right. Like the night before the midterm, I
stayed out shooting pool and drinking instead of studying. I knew that like it
was the wrong choice to make and my midterm grade proves it. I knew it was
wrong but I still went ahead and did it."
Walter: "Peter, what do you think about what Meghan said? Has she shown
Socrates to be wrong?"
Peter: "No she hasn't. But it's not because her argument is ... what do you
call
it ... invalid. It's just that there's no way of showing Socrates was wrong.
I'm
not quite sure what I'm saying ... but it's like any example you give can be
trashed by Socrates. [Peter is very bright. He'll make a fine teacher. So
fine, in fact, that the system will pull him out of the classroom and make him
vice-principal.]
Walter: "So what's wrong with that?"
Ralph: "Wait a minute!! Didn't you say last week that any judgement has to be
able to be wrong?"
Louise: "That's not what he said. Some things are true. What Walter said was
that a statement must be either true or false and it's got to be possible for
it to be that. I mean one or the other."
Suma: "Can we go now?"
Danielle: (Looking into her laptop) "OK, I got it. Google says it's exactly
like
what Walter said: 'Statements must be open to verification and falsification.'
Blah blah blah .... And it goes on to say that according to this guy
Wergenstone, that Salzburg is between Munich and Vienna is a genuine statement
because it's wrong ... no, because it *can* be wrong ... and some guy Moore
didn't know nothing.
And ...
Suma: "Will this be on the final? What IS this anyway? (Looking desperately
around for confirmation)
Pauline: "I just want to know what happened to Socrates. If you decide to stay
out drinking rather than studying, you're saying that's the right thing for you
to do. You're saying your pleasure is the way you want to go - rather than
doing
well on the test. .... You can fool yourself into thinking that "oh right I
knew
what I should've done ...'
Gerald: "But he didn't know. He knew to go drinking. It's like saying I know
this mushroom is poisonous, but I'll eat it anyway. If you know it's poisonous,
why da hell would you eat it? Didn't Socrates have to eat poison mushrooms?"
Rebecca: "Whhaaaa??"
Under the influence of the spirits haunting Yasnaya Polyana,
Walter O
Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> In Kantian terms, I reckon that this analysis is probably correct, but we
> don't have to (and perhaps ought not to) accept the Kantian interpretation
> of right and wrong. That Kant subsumed all moral /ethical discussion under
> 'practical judgement' is, perhaps, Kan't business. I also sense some
> Socratic view here that it is not possible to intentionally do wrong. My
> experience and intuitions strongly suggest that it is possible to do
> something that you know or believe to be wrong. In some cases, you regret
> your actions afterwards, and perhaps apologize, in other cases you revise
> your moral beliefs post facto. Still more, it is very possible - and
> actually I'd say part of every-day experience - to not do something that
> you believe is right.
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Just a couple of Kantian thoughts from the dacha:
> >
> > There are technical, prudential, etc, meanings of "right" and "wrong."
> > However,
> > to speak of *moral* right or wrong is to speak either of obligation
> > (ought) or
> > permissibility in moral terms. What is morally right is either obligatory
> > or
> > permitted. What is morally wrong is either morally forbidden or morally
> > impermissible.
> >
> > So, yes, I would think that if you claim that action or maxim P is right,
> > you
> > may only be claiming that P is morally permissible but not obligatory
> > (i.e.,
> > ought to be done).
> >
> > I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally).
> > But I
> > don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.
> >
> > If you claim that something is right "in theoretical terms" only, you are
> > not
> > making a moral (practical judgement). There is no "simply theoretical"
> > when it
> > comes to practical judgement. I guess that's how it got it's name.
> >
> > Walter O
> > MUN
> >
> >
> > Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
> >
> > > However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right or
> > > wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can argue
> > > that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily
> > commanding
> > > that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or not do what is
> > > right, after all.)
> > >
> > > O.K.
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> > > DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > > My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below.
> > From
> > > > Hume's pen:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ‘Moral Distinctions Not deriv’d from Reason’.
> > > >
> > > > In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections.
> > But
> > > > the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the
> > section:
> > > >
> > > > Hume writes:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> > > always
> > > > remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary
> way
> > of
> > > > reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
> > > > concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find,
> > that
> > > > instead of
> > > > the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
> > > > proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
> This
> > > > change is
> > > > imperceptible"
> > > >
> > > > This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he means
> > > that
> > > > the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
> > > >
> > > > Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
> > > >
> > > > "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
> > ought
> > > > not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’tis necessary that
> it
> > > > shou’
> > > > d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason
> should
> > > be
> > > > given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation
> > can
> > > > be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it …
> [I]
> > > am
> > > > persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wou’d subvert all
> > the
> > > > vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of
> > vice
> > > > and
> > > > virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is
> > > > perceiv’d by
> > > > reason."
> > > >
> > > > I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic'
> > operator
> > > > here (unknown to Hume):
> > > >
> > > > Ë«p
> > > >
> > > > We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
> > > > 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
> > > > comprise the
> > > > cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed imperceptible) of an
> 'is'
> > > > turning into an 'ought to':
> > > >
> > > > !p
> > > >
> > > > Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and
> > is
> > > > not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
> > or an
> > > > ought not."
> > > >
> > > > Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
> > > > philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or
> that
> > > > religion.
> > > > And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
> > > >
> > > > I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
> > > >
> > > > Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
> > > >
> > > > The S is P.
> > > >
> > > > versus
> > > >
> > > > The S OUGHT TO BE P.
> > > >
> > > > Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
> > > > copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in
> > the
> > > > Frege
> > > > sign.
> > > >
> > > > Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or
> > ought-laden
> > > > expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as Hume
> > criticises)
> > > > would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an 'ought' there,
> > because
> > > > he
> > > > would rely on his addressee to understand that he is staying in the
> > realm
> > > > of
> > > > 'morality'.
> > > >
> > > > The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which
> > admittedly
> > > > sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume woke Kant up
> from
> > > his
> > > > dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following Aristotle,
> > > > assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place of reason in
> > > > ethics!
> > > >
> > > > -----
> > > >
> > > > Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin
> > had
> > > > borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
> > > >
> > > > Cheers
> > > >
> > > > Speranza
> > > >
> > > > *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of
> > reason
> > > > in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------
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> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
>
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