[lit-ideas] Fwd: Re: Re: Moral Distinctions Not deriv'd from Reason
- From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 22:43:05 -0230
----- Forwarded message from Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> -----
Date: Thu, 4 Sep 2014 22:54:42 +0200
From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
In Kantian terms, I reckon that this analysis is probably correct, but we
don't have to (and perhaps ought not to) accept the Kantian interpretation
of right and wrong. That Kant subsumed all moral /ethical discussion under
'practical judgement' is, perhaps, Kan't business. I also sense some
Socratic view here that it is not possible to intentionally do wrong. My
experience and intuitions strongly suggest that it is possible to do
something that you know or believe to be wrong. In some cases, you regret
your actions afterwards, and perhaps apologize, in other cases you revise
your moral beliefs post facto. Still more, it is very possible - and
actually I'd say part of every-day experience - to not do something that
you believe is right.
On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 9:15 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
> Just a couple of Kantian thoughts from the dacha:
>
> There are technical, prudential, etc, meanings of "right" and "wrong."
> However,
> to speak of *moral* right or wrong is to speak either of obligation
> (ought) or
> permissibility in moral terms. What is morally right is either obligatory
> or
> permitted. What is morally wrong is either morally forbidden or morally
> impermissible.
>
> So, yes, I would think that if you claim that action or maxim P is right,
> you
> may only be claiming that P is morally permissible but not obligatory
> (i.e.,
> ought to be done).
>
> I agree that it is possible to do moral wrong (though not intentionally).
> But I
> don't see how that fact connects up with our discussion.
>
> If you claim that something is right "in theoretical terms" only, you are
> not
> making a moral (practical judgement). There is no "simply theoretical"
> when it
> comes to practical judgement. I guess that's how it got it's name.
>
> Walter O
> MUN
>
>
> Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > However, moral discussions can also proceed in terms of what is right or
> > wrong without necessarily passing to 'ought,' can they not ? I can argue
> > that something is right in theoretical terms without necessarily
> commanding
> > that it ought to be done. (It is possible to do wrong, or not do what is
> > right, after all.)
> >
> > O.K.
> >
> >
> > On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 2:45 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for
> > DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > > My last post today. The passage analysed by Pigden is as per below.
> From
> > > Hume's pen:
> > >
> > >
> > > âMoral Distinctions Not derivâd from Reasonâ.
> > >
> > > In those days, philosophers felt like ENTITLING things and sections.
> But
> > > the title is not relevant. What is relevant is the content of the
> section:
> > >
> > > Hume writes:
> > >
> > >
> > > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
> > always
> > > remarkâd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way
> of
> > > reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
> > > concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprizâd to find,
> that
> > > instead of
> > > the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
> > > proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
> > > change is
> > > imperceptible"
> > >
> > > This seems hyperbolic, since HE perceived it, and so do I. So he means
> > that
> > > the change is _subtle_ rather. He ought to use words more precisely!
> > >
> > > Hume (or "Home", as the original spelling went) goes on:
> > >
> > > "; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or
> ought
> > > not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,âtis necessary that it
> > > shouâ
> > > d be observâd and explainâd; and at the same time that a reason
should
> > be
> > > given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation
> can
> > > be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it ⦠[I]
> > am
> > > persuaded, that a small attention [to this point] wouâd subvert all
> the
> > > vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of
> vice
> > > and
> > > virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is
> > > perceivâd by
> > > reason."
> > >
> > > I think that von Wright and H. Paul Grice would use an 'alethic'
> operator
> > > here (unknown to Hume):
> > >
> > > Ë«p
> > >
> > > We then oppose this assertion sign (which is in fact a double sign,
> > > 'affirmation' and 'judgement') to an 'imperative' sign (which would
> > > comprise the
> > > cases that Hume perceived -- though he deemed imperceptible) of an 'is'
> > > turning into an 'ought to':
> > >
> > > !p
> > >
> > > Hume: "that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and
> is
> > > not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
> or an
> > > ought not."
> > >
> > > Hume mentions: discussions of God -- natural theology, say -- or
> > > philosophical theology, as opposed to dogmatic theology of this or that
> > > religion.
> > > And then he mentions 'vice' and 'virtue' and 'human affairs'.
> > >
> > > I agree with Pigden that the issue is very complex!
> > >
> > > Hume speaks of 'copulation'. He means 'copula', as in
> > >
> > > The S is P.
> > >
> > > versus
> > >
> > > The S OUGHT TO BE P.
> > >
> > > Where 'ought to be' is another copulation or copula. An 'imperative'
> > > copulation, as it were, and not an assertoric copulation involved in
> the
> > > Frege
> > > sign.
> > >
> > > Since 'virtue' (not to mention 'God') seems like a value- or
> ought-laden
> > > expression, it's not surprising that an author (such as Hume
> criticises)
> > > would use, to vary the prose, an 'is' here, and an 'ought' there,
> because
> > > he
> > > would rely on his addressee to understand that he is staying in the
> realm
> > > of
> > > 'morality'.
> > >
> > > The title to the section refers to Hume's fork or 'law' (which
> admittedly
> > > sounds rather grand, as Pigden notes). But while Hume woke Kant up from
> > his
> > > dogmatic slumber, Kant was courageous enough to, following Aristotle,
> > > assert strongly that THERE is such a thing as the place of reason in
> > > ethics!
> > >
> > > -----
> > >
> > > Oddly, Witters once got very offended when he found out that Toulmin
> had
> > > borrowed all his ideas from him on this very issue! (*)
> > >
> > > Cheers
> > >
> > > Speranza
> > >
> > > *. The title of Toulmin's dissertation at Cantab. is "The place of
> reason
> > > in ethics", later turned, typically, into a hardcover book!
> > >
> > >
> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------
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> > >
> >
>
>
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