I don't know if one could learn anything from this, but D
McE says I must send it on. Yrs, RP
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: J.M. Fritzman <fritzman@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 12:34 PM
Subject: Lewis & Clark Philosophy Colloquium, 10/16
To:
You are cordially invited to the following event.
Lewis & Clark
Philosophy Colloquium Series
* <https://www.pdx.edu/philosophy/avram-hiller>Avram Hiller
<https://www.pdx.edu/philosophy/avram-hiller> (Portland State University)*
*will speak on*
***Knowledge as Justified Stable Belief*
Friday,
October 16
, 3:30-5:0
0
, J
.
R
.
Howard Hall
102
Here's the abstract:
Epistemologists are (almost) in agreement that Edmund Gettier refuted the
account of knowledge according to which knowledge is justified true belief
(JTB).
This paper provides a novel explanation of why the JTB account was
wrongheaded from the outset.
Using an analogy between knowledge and soundness, I argue that knowledge
should never have been understood as having an independent truth condition,
although I do not deny that knowledge is factive.
The post-Gettier move to pursue a theory of warrant – whatever it is that
must be added to true belief to yield knowledge – is thus misguided, as is
the longstanding debate about whether warrant entails truth.
Instead of modifying or jettisoning the J condition on knowledge, or adding
a fourth condition, we ought simply to replace the T condition.
And so rather than seeking an account of warrant, epistemologists should
seek an account of what I will call stability, which can be defined at the
outset as that condition, whatever it is, that must be added to justified
belief to yield knowledge. Knowledge is thusjustified stable belief (JSB).
Unlike other approaches, the K=JSB view clearly distinguishes internal and
external components of knowledge, and I show that it is thus salutary for
fallibilist internalist accounts of justification.
I then take some steps in explaining what stability is and in
differentiating the JSB account from alternative views.
One of the main goals of this paper is to provide a framework of a theory
of knowledge which is an alternative to Timothy Williamson’s view that
knowledge is prime, and so I also show how Williamson’s arguments fail to
undermine the reductive nature of the K=JSB account.
http://college.lclark.edu/live/events/89762-knowledge-as-justified-stable-belief-by-avram
has more information.
*PLEASE FORWARD THIS TO ANYONE WHO WOULD BE INTERESTED*
