Part II is missing, presumed unread. Am now trying all kinds of ways to
overcome the List's anti-spam filters. Condolences to those who, having
devoured Part I, wait with bated breath for Roberts Part II...
D
From: Donal McEvoy <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, 11 November 2017, 17:35
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Note on Roberts in parts I-XIII (with XI skipped)
Attachments not working, so I cut and pasted the case judgment in four page
blocks - I to XIII.
XI is not missing - instead I lost track and numbered XII after X.
I will post something on this case separately, but for the purposes of our
discussion of "meaning" (vis-a-vis it involving a W3 problem-solving approach
to propositional content) it may be best that anyone challenged to read this
case should tackle it without assistance:- since one of many points I wish to
bring out, is how difficult a text may be without any [W3] background guide,
even where nearly all the words are known to the reader and the technical terms
self-explanatory or explained by the judgments.
Armed with some suitable explanatory assistance, the various judgments may
change from appearing something like technical and jargon-ridden gobbledegook
to quite clear and methodical examinations of a series of practical problems,
with their solutions in law discussed, analysed, weighed and decided. A
fundamental question is how easy is it to 'derive' that "suitable explanation"
from the text itself?
I do not expect many people will take up this challenge, but thought it fair
everyone has the opportunity: as previously posted, my reliance on this case is
because (I suggest) texts concerned with propositional content in 'highly
developed' W3 contexts more clearly bring out the role of W3 in understanding
than do examples drawn from basic everyday use of language. Not only is the
role of W3 more evident with such texts, but it is layered - there are
different levels of understanding (i.e. higher and lower). Lower levels may be
sufficient (correct enough) for many purposes, but not sufficient for others.
The division 3 to 2 in the Supreme Court brings out how the analysis and
weighing of various points differs between the majority and minority (in fact,
it becomes apparent one of the Law Lords swung the result, by changing from the
view held by the eventual minority to what then became the majority view). It
may be seen that all the Law Lords agreed that the appeal should be rejected -
they differ only on the basis, with the majority preferring a more far-reaching
basis than the minority.*
DL*
Mild spoiler alert: at the heart of this disagreement are issues of
practicalities and the degree of conclusiveness attached to a specific legal
analysis (here Lord Collins'): the majority think Lord Collin's analysis
suffciently conclusive that the Supreme Court must impose a correspondingly
far-reaching basis for rejecting the appeal; the minority do not think it
sufficiently conclusive, and would accordingly prefer to dismiss the instant
appeal on a narrower ground, leaving the more far-reaching basis to be decided
only when confronted with an appeal that demands it.
