[lit-ideas] Re: Folksy Grice
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2014 11:19:36 -0500 (EST)
My last post today.
Grice was 'into' a 'folksy' type of philosophical psychology.
In a message dated 1/8/2014 10:57:10 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
So there is much to be said on this topic: but I want to make clear that
my view is not at all blankly critical of 'folk psychology' as such...
Thanks. I will re-read and elaborate McEvoy's interesting post.
For the record, below, some notes on the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on
folk psychology by Ravencroft.
It is structured in two sections. The second section deals with Lewis's
approach -- which is also Grice's.
Thanks to McEvoy for making clear to me how this connects with 'know', by
requoting:
McEvoy: "I should have added that JTB-theory is just the 'folk psychology'
of knowledge - but it is much worse than some other 'folk psychology'
because it is not even a crude approximation but more a highly misleading
account of 'knowledge', as 'knowledge' in truth stands in no necessary
relation
to 'justification', 'truth' or 'belief'."
But in the ps, alla Lewis, I would like to explore the general
characterisation of at least one type of 'folk psychology'.
Cheers,
Speranza
----
Source:
Ravenscroft, Ian, "Folk Psychology as a Theory", The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-theory/>.
Ravenscroft writes: "In a series of influential papers, D. K. Lewis (1966,
1970, 1972, 1994) defended a particular approach to the semantics of
theoretical terms, applied that approach to the everyday psychological
vocabulary
(eg “belief” and “desire”), and thereby obtain a functionalist theory of
mental states. Whilst Lewis does not give an explicit definition of the
term “folk psychology”, an account of folk psychology naturally emerges from
his approach."
Ravenscroft goes on to use:
T[t1 … tn],
where
“t1 … tn”
stands for all the T-terms in T.
"If we systematically replace the T-terms with free variables, x1 … xn, and
prefix an existential quantifier binding the n-tuple x1 … xn, we obtain
the Ramsey sentence for T."
∃(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn).
Lewis adopts the modified Ramsey sentence
∃!(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn),
"Given Lewis's aversion to multiple realization, he prefers the modified
Carnap sentence which is a conditional with the modified Ramsey sentence as
antecedent and T as the consequent."
∃!(x1 … xn)T(x1 … xn) → T[t1 … tn].
Ravenscroft goes on to quote directly from Lewis:
“The t-terms have been defined as the occupants of the causal roles
specified by the theory T; as the entities, whatever those maybe, that bear
certain causal relations to one another and to the referents of the O-terms”
(Lewis 1972: 207).
Ravenscroft adds: "Lewis uses the explicit functional definitions of the
commonsense psychological terms he has obtained as premises in an argument
for physicalism about mental states (Lewis 1972: 204)."
1. Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R.
2. The occupant of causal role R = neural state N.
From (1) and (2) by transitivity we obtain:
3. Mental state M = neural state N.
Ravenscroft concludes the section on Lewis: "There is some evidence that
Lewis recognized these difficulties himself. In his “Reduction of Mind” he
remarks that “Pace Lewis, 1972, p. 256, eliciting the general principles of
folk psychology is no mere matter of gathering platitudes” (1994: 416). He
also remarks that folk psychology “is common knowledge among us; but it is
tacit, as our grammatical knowledge is” (1994: 416). These remakes are
consistent with his adopting some version of the mindreading sense of folk
psychology (see section 2 above); however, they are too cryptic for us to
establish exactly what Lewis's final position was."
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