[lit-ideas] Re: Finger-in-the-World
- From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2010 13:22:10 -0230
Pace Robert and Donal, I don't think Hume's (in)famous quip is about
"preferences" as we today understand that term and as the literature on moral
philosophy typically construes it. I believe it more accurate to undertsnad
Hume's "prefer" to mean "judge." He is saying that Reason on its own cannot
establish what our moral obligations are nor is it alone ever efficiacious in
getting us to act on those obligations. Hence, Reason alone can satisfactorily
neither defend our judgements nor ignite them into motivational ertness.
Hume is willing to grant that what is
morally good or bad is not simply a matter of personal preference (or social
consensus). The "Impartial Spectator" who *judges* good and bad (and "right"
and
"wrong" but not in the Kantian deontic sense of these terms) and who often
accompanied Dave and Adam (Smith) on their not infrequent jaunts to the local
watering hole, understood that the assertion of a moral judgement is not
equivalent to an ejaculation of personal preference or affective glee/disgust.
But while not equivalent, still a necessary component of the identification of
obligation and its efficacy in causing action.
Of course one should also add that if Hume's quip is correct, then it must
apply
to itself, since statements of obligation are themselves statements and Hume's
quip takes the form of a statement. But this
then renders Hume's own statement a slave of the passions. Hume's quip, if true,
would prove too much for its own good (truth). Nicely brought out by Chuck
Larmore.
Dr. Sir Walter of O
David Hume Professor of Noumenal Morality
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> JL wrote
>
> > We are considering Hume's inference[*]
> >
> > --- Between the scratching of my finger
> > ------- and the destruction of the whole world,
> > -- Vote me for the destruction of the whole world.
> >
> > I submitted that Hume seems to fail to realise that the finger, qua item,
>
> > is an item _in the world_.
> >
> > McEvoy objects,
> >
> >
> > "he's not metaphysicing about whether or not his finger is in-the-world.
> > It's whether reason is a slave to the passions. Donal
> > Finger-in-his-ear"
> >
> >
> > I can't see how he can deny that the finger (his finger) is in the world
>
> 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world
> to the scratching of my finger.' [/Treatise/ (somewhere)]
>
> *This is not an inference---it's claim about reason's being (as it 'ever
> is and always ought to be') the slave of the passions. ' 'Tis not
> contrary to reason to /prefer/ the destruction of the whole world to the
> scratching of my finger.' Of course someone who preferred the
> destruction of the world should have no trouble realizing that if the
> world were destroyed his finger would go with it. This is not, as you
> seem to think (?), some kind of dilemma in whicha person who prefers the
> destruction of the world wants to keep his finger safe. Hume's claim is
> that Reason cannot tell one which one should prefer.
>
> Donal is right:
>
> 'Hume's point being that "reason", in the narrow sense of "pure reason" or
> logic or inference, cannot determine a preference of this kind...'
>
> Robert Paul,
> preferring neither
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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