[lit-ideas] Re: Factivity of "See" (Was: Frege)
- From: "Mike Geary" <atlas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 16 Aug 2004 18:48:27 -0500
Let me weigh in here, because as I see it, ignorance is not only bliss, it's
refreshing. Herr Henninge worries that the case of the world is assumed to
be as we assume it to be. Robert
"Somewhere-outside-Lake-Oswego-but-not-for-very-much-longer -- stay-tuned"
Paul laughs: "Ha, ha, ha," at Frege's denial that human psychology plays any
role in logic or mathematics. Or maybe he doesn't. I can't tell. I do
laugh though. And I have no problem doing so, since I don't know any logic
beyond my own desires, nor any math beyond the twelve's times table. But
Jesus Grice! as Paul Stone once cried out, here comes JL slinging his Grice
like some Medieval mace, not to mention crossbowing Macbeth and Banquo, and
why not? It's all safely beyond our knowing. I would think that the
existence of George W. Bush is proof enough that there is no non-sensible
something that insures that our preceptions of the world out there are not
inherently idiocyncratic. How else explain the last 3 years?
Mike Geary
Memphis
----- Original Message -----
From: <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, August 16, 2004 2:00 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Factivity of "See" (Was: Frege)
>
>
> R. Henninge quotes from Frege:
>
> >>Having visual impressions is ... necessary for *seeing* things,
> >>but it is not sufficient. What must be added is not anything sensible.
> >>And it is precisely this that unlocks the outer world for us; for
> >>without this non-sensible something, each of us would remain locked
> >>up in his inner world.
>
>
>
> R. Paul comments:
>
> >A sentence from some work or letter in which Frege is intent on denying
> >the
> >truth of 'psychologism,' i.e. he is intent on denying that human
psychology
> >plays any role in logic or mathematics).
>
>
> R. Henninge replies:
>
> >I don't think that's the point at all in this quote. The point goes much
> >further toward the private language arguments in the later Wittgenstein.
Can
> >you feel my pain? Can you know my tree? Can we communicate about
anything?
> >Remaining "locked up" in one's "inner world" is no joke for Frege, but
he
> >felt, with Wittgenstein, that the way out of the solipsistic dilemma was
to
> >establish the dimensions, the boundaries, the field made up of these
> >"non-sensible something"s that *is* the outer world for us. Robert knows
my
> >problem with Strawson. Maybe it's my grand problem with Anglo-Saxon or
> >UK-based philosophy, Kantianism, etc. Even Hawking. The "outer world" is
too
> >much taken for granted, unquestioned, unchallenged--even by as much a
> >Kantian as Strawson. The extent to which the so-called outer world is
forced
> >to sing to the tune of these Fregean-Wittgensteinian non-sensible
> >form-objects, that this "mathematical" agreement among language users
> >essentially provides to grounds for objectivity itself, has not yet been
> >*kapiert*. And that's why...
>
>
>
> I took Frege's quote to be about the alleged 'factivity' of "see" (sehen,
in
> German)
>
> Note that he speaks of 'visual', and 'see' -- which are cognates in the
> Romance languages. Only the Germanic languages make a distinction between
> 'visual' and 'see', and wonder what word Frege used for 'visual'.
>
>
> >>Having visual impressions is ... necessary for *seeing* things,
> >>but it is not sufficient. What must be added is not anything sensible.
> >>And it is precisely this that unlocks the outer world for us; for
> >>without this non-sensible something, each of us would remain locked
> >>up in his inner world.
>
>
>
> The problem is tricky and was discussed in Oxford by Grice and Warnock.
> Notably in Studies in the Way of Words, Grice brings the attention to the
use of
> 'see' in
>
> Macbeth saw Banquo.
>
> If 'see' is factive, then Macbeth could _not_ have seen Banquo since
Banquo
> was not there to be seen. This would be a case for Frege where "each of us
[or
> Macbeth, to be more specific] remains locked up in his inner world [of
> Scottish tragedy]."
>
> The problem is that sometimes we _do_ use "see" non-factively (as in
> "Macbeth saw Banquo") -- However, rather than deny that 'see' _is_
factive, it's
> best to analyse that use of 'see' (as in 'Macbeth saw Banquo') as a
_loose_ use
> of the verb.
>
>
> Grice writes:
>
> "If we all know that Macbeth hallucinated, we can quite safely say that
> Macbeth saw Banquo, even though Banquo was not there to be seen, and we
should
> NOT conclude from this that an IMPLICATION [entailment, not implicature]
of the
> _existence_ of the object said to be seen [in the seer's outer world, to
use
> Frege's phrase] is NOT part of the 'conventional meaning' of the word
'see',
> nor even (as some have done) that there is one _sense_ of the word 'see'
> which _lacks_ this implication." (WOW, p. 44).
>
> Grice was very concerned with this, as it's clear from his "Causal Theory
of
> Perception" -- only if there is an existent _cause_ to the sense-datum,
can
> we say that we actually _sense_ or perceive things. We don't want to
remain
> locked up in an inner world, which is Fregean for 'solipsism',
methodological
> or otherwise.
>
> Cheers,
>
> JL
>
>
>
>
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