Thanks to JLS for his post setting out more of Eccles' views.
We have to be wary of thinking that because 'Eccles follows Popper
philosophically' that 'what Eccles says is what Popper would say'. For example,
I don't think Popper would want to adopt the term 'pure ego' - though it is
clear that Popper is content with the idea of 'selves' and asserts that
'selves' exist.
Popper's position is that we become selves, though a process of W1-2-3
interaction, but are not born selves.
In what way do 'selves' exist? There are ways in which this question is not one
to which a clear answer can be provided. We might say, clearly enough, that our
'self' has a causal effect our actions and thoughts - that a different 'self'
might act and think differently because of its differences as a self. But this
does not tell us in what way 'selves' exist.
The problem of defending 'selves' is central to TSAIB, just as the problem of
defending human freedom is central to Popper's 'The Open Universe: an argument
for indeterminism'. But in neither case can the defence be a direct
demonstration that there is such a thing as a 'self' or 'human freedom': what
can be done is to provide a tenable philosophical framework within which
'selves' and 'human freedom' can play a causal role, and to argue for that
framework against its alternatives.
It is important that most of the arguments in favour of the framework are
independent of whether there are such things as 'selves' or as 'human freedom'.
That is, the assertion that there are 'selves' or 'human freedom' is a
comparatively weak basis from which to mount a defence of a framework within
which 'selves' and 'human freedom' are acknowledged.
Popper also defends indeterminism in a very careful way: it is possible to
accept all of Popper's arguments against determinism and yet conclude there is
no true human freedom (as Popper explains "Indeterminism is not enough", to
ground human freedom). It is possible that while indeterminism is true the
scope for true human freedom of action and thought is miniscule or negligible
or even non-existent. Popper draws back from saying what degree of human
freedom we have, in a world where our thought and action are part of processes
where most of the processes are not a result of free human thought or action.
It is in this context that we might understand how Popper aims to defend the
existence and importance of 'selves': not by direct demonstration, and not by
arguing what degree of influence 'selves' have etc., but by creating a
framework within which the 'self' may be rehabilitated from the onslaught of
(among many things) traditional empiricism.
DL
From: Luigi Speranza <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Monday, 21 August 2017, 2:47
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Grice's Underdogma
McEvoy was referring to TSAIB and it may do to do Eccles...
If we go by what Popper (never mind Grice) states about conceptual analysis in
"Unended Quest," it would seem that nothing contained in his co-authored essay,
"The self and its brain" is what Witters would call a tautology.
What about Eccles?
In his The Understanding of the Brain, Eccles summarises his 'philosophy.' He
holds a D.Phil Oxon -- unlike Grice, MA Lit.Hum. Oxon.
Eccles:
"I will at the beginning give an account of my PHILOSOPHICAL position on the
so-called 'brain-mind problem' so that you will be able to *relate* the
experimental evidence to this PHILOSOPHICAL position."
"I have [expanded] on this PHILOSOPHY in Facing Reality."
"I fully accept the PHILOSOPHICAL [via implicature, non-conceptually analyric]
achievements of Popper with his concept of three worlds."
"I was a dualist; now, I am a trialist!"
"Cartesian dualism has become unfashionable with many people."
Implicature: including philosophers like Ryle and Grice.
"[These people] embrace MONISM to escape the enigma of brain-mind interaction
with its perplexing problems."
"But Popper and I are interactionists, and what is more, trialist
interactionists!"
"The three worlds are easily defined."
But not analytically, if we trust Popper's credo in "Unended quest."
"World 1," Eccles summarises for us, "is the world of physical objects and
states. It comprises the whole cosmos of matter and energy, all of biology
including human brains, and all artifacts that man has made for coding
information, as for example, the paper and ink of books or the material base of
works of art. World 1 is the total world of the materialists. They recognise
nothing else. All else is fantasy.""World 2 is the world of states of
consciousness and subjective knowledge of all kinds. The totality of our
perceptions comes in this world. But there are several levels. In agreement
with Polten [if you've heard of him], I tend to recognise three kinds of levels
of World 2, but it may be more correct to think of it as a spectrum.""The first
level (outer sense) would be the ordinary perceptions provided by all our sense
organs, hearing and touch and sight and smell and pain. All of these
perceptions are in World 2, of course: vision with light and colour; sound with
music and harmony; touch with all its qualities and vibration; the range of
odours and tastes, and so on.""These qualities do not exist in World 1, where
correspondingly there are but electromagnetic waves, pressure waves in the
atmosphere, material objects, and chemical substances."In addition there is a
level of inner sense, which is the world of more subtle perceptions. It is the
world of your emotions, of your feelings of joy and sadness and fear and anger
and so on. It includes all your memory, and all your imaginings and planning
into the future. In fact there is a whole range of levels which could be
described at length.""All the subtle experiences of the human person are in
this inner sensory world. It is all private to you but you can reveal it in
LINGUISTIC expression, and by gestures of all levels of subtlety.""Finally, at
the core of World 2 there is the self or pure ego, which is the basis of our
unity as an experiencing being throughout our whole lifetime."As Grice notes in
his "Personal Identity," "pure ego" is a coinage by Broad. Grice opposed a
conceptual analysis of personal identity (or "I") in terms of this alleged
"pure ego."Eccles:"This World 2 is our primary reality.""Our conscious
experiences are the basis of our knowledge of World 1, which is thus a world of
secondary reality, a derivative world.""Whenever I am doing a scientific
experiment, for example, I have to plan it cognitively, all in my thoughts, and
then consciously carry out my plan of action in the experiment. Finally I have
to look at the results and evaluate them in thought. For example, I have to see
the traces of the oscilloscope and their photographic records or hear the
signals on the loudspeaker. The various signals from the recording equipment
have to be received by my sense organs, transmitted to my brain, and so to my
consciousness, then appropriately measured and compared before I can begin to
think about the significance of the experimental results.""We are all the time,
in every action we do, incessantly playing backwards and forwards between World
1 and World 2.""And what is World 3?""World 3 is the whole world of culture. It
is the world that was created by man and that reciprocally made man. This is my
message in which I follow Popper unreservedly.""The whole of language is
here.""All our means of communication, all our intellectual efforts coded in
books, coded in the artistic and technological treasures in the museums, coded
in every artefact left by man from primitive times—this is World 3 right up to
the present time.""World 3 is the world of civilisation and culture. Education
is the means whereby each human being is brought into relation with World 3. In
this manner he becomes immersed in it throughout life, participating in the
heritage of mankind and so becoming fully human. World 3 is the world that
uniquely relates to man. It is the world which is completely unknown to
animals. They are blind to all of World 3. I say that without any
reservations."Despite these unreserved trialism, in his later essay, "How the
self *controls* its brain," Eccles returned to a simpler dualistic mechanism.
But if there is still something Popperian about this Oxonian author, he
achieved this NOT via conceptual analysis!CheersSperanza
Sent from my iPhone
