[lit-ideas] Duttoniana

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2013 11:17:29 -0500 (EST)

In a message dated 11/26/2013 5:18:45 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
torgeir_fjeld@xxxxxxxx refers to a book review by Denis Dutton of Walter  
Kaufmann, 
"Discovering the Mind".
 
Dutton, T. Fjeld notes, "brings up themes that have by now come to serve as 
 well-known refrains of positions critical of the linguistic turn."
 
I'm never sure if 'the linguistic turn' is not an exaggeration. It looks  
like another turn of the screw. It seems philosophy was always turning in  
linguistic circles since Cratylus.
 
"Central to this reaction to the awakening of linguistic perceptibility in  
-- particularly -- the social sciences, is the proposition that those who 
engage  questions of language suggest claims to "rigour and scientific 
precision, but in  fact the rigour is wholly spurious." Spurious is, it should 
be 
noted, a term  used to describe seemingly (but not really) causal relations, 
such as when it is  claimed that as sun follows rain, sunshine must be 
caused by rain. The ground on  which Heidegger is to be (supposedly) defeated 
is 
from the outset marked as that  of positivist-empiricist natural science."
 
On the other hand, 'consequence' is perhaps the key word in ALL  
philosophical discourse.
 
Indeed, to use T. Fjeld's examples:
 
sun is not the consequence of rain.
 
In linguistic turn terms:
 
It rains today---
---- Therefore, the sun shines tomorrow.
 
---
 
To _DENY_ the 'consequence' relation indicates that we need another  
concept, perhaps 'implicature'. Grice's example:
 
"He is an athlete"
---- Therefore, he is tall.
 
(Example Grice draws from Stevenson, "Ethics and Language").
 
We have to distinguish types of 'consequence' and the idea of a 'ceteris  
paribus consequence' (or not). Popper would criticise the idea of a ceteris  
paribus consequence as irrefutable and thus metaphysical or anti-scientific, 
if  not meaningless.
 
"In general, after rain, there is sun".
 
Or, in the well-known adage,
 
"There's a silver lining thru the dark clouds shining"
 
----
 
"It's always calm before the storm -- ceteris paribus".
 
---
 
T. Fjeld goes on:
 

"Dutton, drawing on Kaufmann, delights in semi-pornographic  biographical 
ditties, such as Heidegger's Catholic upbringing, which, in  Dutton's world, 
should serves to causally explain " that his philosophy ... has  been taken 
up so enthusiastically by so many Roman Catholic scholars." 
 
---- It is a good thing that by the time Plato was philosophising there was 
 no thing as the "Catholic religion".
 
I am always fascinated by the reception of BOTH Aristotle and Plato by  
Italian Renaissance philosophers (based around Florence) who would rather be  
seen dead than seen supporting the Roman Pope.
 
----
 
Fjeld:
 
"The explanation suffers under extensive reductionism -- what, precisely is 
 the chain of events that leads from a writer's religiously informed upbri
nging  to a specific audience of his texts some 60 years later? The natural 
scientist  should be baffled by the assumptions made on the reader. 
Furthermore, going to  the childhood of a writer to explain the meaning, and 
even 
more so the audience,  of a writer's work is a technique we associate with 
scholarship that predates  the so-called New Critics."
 
In the case of H. P. Grice, _my_ man, I don't. I find a lot of Grice's  
later philosophy already 'in germ', as it were, in his FATHER's philosophy, 
also  called Herbert. Herbert Grice senior was a non-conformist, and possibly 
while  Grice Junior's mother was pregnant (of Grice junior), Grice junior's 
fetus would  hear the non-conformist arguments (and their implicatures). The 
very fact that  Grice Junior was sent to Clifton (away from pappa and mamma) 
and later to Corpus  Christi (Oxford) surely "Shaped" His later Philosophy.
 
---- And the habits he acquired at Clifton, like a passion for cricket,  
informed his whole life. His obituary read, "Grice, amateur cricketer and  
professional philosopher" (The London Times).
 
Fjeld:
 
"In their view, this kind of scholarship would no longer be current,  
classifying biographically informed literary studies under the rubric of  
intentionally fallacious scholarship."
 
I follow York University scholars in aesthetics (Lamarque) in finding that  
'fallacy' is fallaciously applied to the intentional theory created by  
Beardsley.
 
----
 
Fjeld goes on:


"Kaufmann and Dutton are so busy in their collective patricide  that, while 
rejoicing in what they percieve as self-defeating criticism on  Heidegger's 
part (he is "himself ... flagrantly guilty of the Gerede and  Geschreibe 
(chatter and scribbling) of which he so sarcastically accuses  others"), they 
forget that "chatter" is one of the key criterions of  scholarship. Whether 
Kaufmann/Dutton's brand of literary analysis is adept or  inept should be a 
matter for readers to judge."
 
I like the distinction between ge-rede and ge-schreibe.
 
I am reminded of Russell who regretted (and indeed criticised) that Grice  
would spend his life to a dedication of an analysis of 'the silly things 
silly  people say" in their silliest moments, I would add.
 
----
 
Note that Grice's term of art is the 'conversational' implicature, because  
-- unlike Nowell-Smith, or Austin -- he found that it was in 'colloquial 
chat'  that we can isolate 'maxims' of discourse such as "let the 
conversational flow  flow easily", 'contribute with appropriate moves to the 
conversational exchange'  and so on -- which are 'operative' even in 
'over-the-garden-fence' chit-chat, he  would go on to say.
 
Fjeld goes on:
 
"Kaufmann -- and Dutton reproduces this -- then rehearses some familiar  
postures with regards to Heidegger's texts. They are "exceptionally formulaic. 
 He himself seems to be mesmerized when he has found a complicated, 
unusually  forbidding, formula and subsequently treats it as if it had been 
delivered by an  oracle. Such imposing formulations are repeated over and 
over," 
writes Kaufmann,  and Dutton transcribes."
 
There's a mnemonic value to that. Oracles are like 'adages'. Grice's  
favourite was his modified razor:
 
"Senses should not be multiplied beyond necessity",
 
which does sound as coming from Delphi.
 
Cfr. "Nihil est in intellectu quod prior non fuerit in sensu".
 
--- Most philosophy is made of adages, but then also most of -- to quote a  
favourite songwriter of McEvoy -- Zimmerman-Bob Dylan -- or to quote one of 
 Geary -- Elvis Presley.
 
---
 
Someone should write a book on the IMPLICATURES of Bob Dylan's song titles  
(or not).
 
 
Fjeld goes on:
 
"Is not the writer's position here, though, that of an over-bearing, and  
yet perhaps not fully comprehending fan? From where would the naturalist find 
 evidence of the kind of self-aggrandisement suggested in the quote? Is the 
type  of self-love proposed by the writer something that is of Heidegger or 
is the  writer projecting some of his own emotions onto the emotionally 
imposing  father-figure?"
 
Good point. We should discuss
 
"Grice" and "Griceian" and similarly
 
"Heidegger" and "Heideggerian".
 
So we could truthfully say that Kaufmann (not the tenor) is a Heideggerian, 
 or is Heideggerian". There is multitude in Heidegger, as Whitman said ("I  
contain multitudes"), so there are Heideggerians and neo-Heideggerians. 
These  should be distinguished from palaeo-Heideggerians, and 
post-Heideggerians.
 
---
 
Fjeld:
 
"Finally, in their effort to defeat Heidegger on the grounds of a science  
that cultivates clarity and singularity of meaning, they are willing 
sacrifice  the core of the literary-philosophical experience: it's ability to 
render  meanings that a multiple and complex, and that facilitates what 
Heideggerian  scholar Jacques Derrida referred to as the threshold of 
indeterminacy. 
Is it not  only from such a standpoint that we can enter into the field of 
philosophy  proper?"
 
Well, this is disputable. Grice was fascinated by the motto by Lewis, 

"Clarity is not enough".
 
This presupposes or implicates that someone once held that linguistic  
clarity (a term Fjeld uses) IS enough. For Lewis, philosophy requires MORE than 
 
clarity. I'm never sure.
 
But Geary is right that Heraclitus was referred to as 'obscure' and yet  
Heraclitus remains as one of the most beloved figures in universal philosophy. 
 Or not.

Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
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