"With all due respect," is how we must begin if we are to follow with, "what on earth is Hanson thinking"?
Few in 1861 anticipated the carnage that would ensue in the American CivilWar, in which massive armies collided with lethal new weapons -- anddepended on industrial production, electronic communications and railroads.Before the war broke out in 1861, the obscure U.S. Grant and WilliamTecumseh Sherman had failed at almost everything they had tried. But after the Union army was nearly wrecked by establishment generals like Ambrose Burnside, Henry Halleck, Joseph Hooker, George McClellan, John Pope andWilliam Rosecrans (who were all wedded to the set style of Napoleonicwarfare), President Lincoln turned to his two generals who best understoodmodern warfare.
Let's take the statements one at a time:"Few anticipated the carnage that would ensue...[when] massive armies collided with lethal new weapons."
So what was carnage and who might have anticipated it? http://www.libraryspot.com/lists/listwars.htmreveals that 290,000 men fought in the American Revolution. There were 4000 deaths. Divide the number of deaths into the number of fighters and you get--counting on all my fingers--72.5.
War of 1812 287,000 divided by 2000=143.5 Indian Wars 106,000 divided by 1000=106 Mexican War 79,000 divided by 13,000 = 6.1 Civil War 2,213,000 divided by 364,000=6.1 Spanish American War 392,000 divided by 11,000=35.6 World War One 4,744,000 divided by 116,000 = 40.9 World War Two 16,535,000 divided by 406,000=40.7By American standards the Civil War was "carnage" in that the ratio of deaths to those involved is strikingly different from all other wars *except* the Mexican War, the one in which Civil War leaders cut their teeth. So who could have anticipated that level of carnage? Everyone who fought in Mexico.
My second point is that--new weapons aside-- the absolute level of carnage was many times greater in the Napoleonic wars:
http://www.taphilo.com/history/war-deaths.shtml#napoleonSo the thing to explain is why American casualty ratios got worse in the nineteenth century and were better in the preceding and succeeding centuries. Was this about "massive armies colliding with lethal new weapons"? The difficulty with that argument is that weapons and army size are different in the Mexican and the Civil War. Tactics are not.
Now let's try, "wedded to the set style of Napoleonic warfare." Peter the Great's ability to crush armies twice and three times the size of his own came from making exactly the move that Patton later adopted--feint at one point, crash into the flank at another with speed and discipline. Napoleon and his enemies remembered this and thus Napoleonic battles were not, as they appear often in movies, marked by lots of men standing still and awaiting orders. There was much feinting and manouever, marching and counter-marching, all designed to disguise where the main attack was coming. Waterloo was different. Napoleon was in a hurry, wanting to defeat Wellington before the Prussians arrived, so there was little or no manouever; he sent the cavalry and the Imperial Guard right up the middle.
Why does little change between Napoleon and the Civil War? Because weapons did not change much and, more importantly, because the means of conveying instructions from general to subordinate commanders don't change one iota. Generals could imagine all the clever moves in the world; to communicate their cleverness all they had at their disposal were scribbled notes and messengers on horseback. Napoleon always sent messages in triplicate, by three different horsemen on three different routes. That tells you something about the fragility of command.
So what's different about the Civil War? Industrial production, certainly. Size of armies? Not a lot different from Napoleonic times. Railroads? J.E.B. Stuart is famous for catching and harassing horse-drawn baggage and supply trains. Railroads were important in supplying, for example, western beef and mutton to feed the Union.
And what is different about the winning generals of the Civil War? Was it, as Hanson suggests, an ability to be flexible? In the case of Lee and Grant, you could agree if flexibility means a willingness to take risks, but Grant was famously inflexible, undistractable once battle began. His was the bulldog approach. Keep feeding men into the place where you want to apply pressure. Keep marching around the flank of Lee's diminishing forces.
The more I understand about war, the more I understand about sport. Tennis rackets and balls may change, occasionally someone comes up with a new stroke. But the essence of the thing is very old--hit the ball at your opponent's weaknesses and try to disguise the fact that this is what you intend. If only they let you leave a token force on your side of the net, run onto the neighboring court, and hit into the enemy's flank.
David Ritchie, Portland, Oregon